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Abstract  
 
De aanklager van het International Criminal Court lobbyt bij de lidstaten van het ICC. Hij lobbyt voor 
de bevordering van de arrestatie en uitlevering van verdachten van het ICC. Op welke manier de 
aanklager dit doet en waarom hij bepaalde lobbytactieken gebruikt wordt geanalyseerd in dit 
onderzoek. Door middel van een inhoudsanalyse van diplomatic briefings, die ongeveer twee keer 
per jaar worden gegeven door de president, hoofdaanklager en secretaris van het Hof, wordt 
onderzocht welke lobbytactieken op welke momenten door de aanklager worden gebruikt. 
Geconcludeerd wordt dat er twee dingen van invloed zijn op het gebruik van lobbytactieken door de 
aanklager. Specifieke gebeurtenissen hebben invloed op de hoeveelheid lobbytactieken die gebruikt 
worden. Deze geven de aanklager een aanleiding om te benadrukken dat de verdachten van het ICC 
gearresteerd en uitgeleverd dienen te worden. Ten tweede heeft de aard van het ICC invloed op de 
tactieken die de aanklager gebruikt. Het ligt in de aard van het ICC om meer waarde te hechten aan 
feiten en verdragen. Er wordt meer gebruik gemaakt van lobbytactieken die gebaseerd zijn op feiten 
en verdragen dan lobbytactieken die hier minder gebruik van maken. 
 
Inleiding 
 
 
Wereldwijd gingen mensen in de nacht van 20 april 2012 de straat op om overal rode posters te 
plakken met de tekst ‘Kony 2012’. De organisatie ‘Stop Kony’ probeerde hiermee aandacht te vragen 
voor de misdaden die gepleegd zijn door het Lord Resistance Army (LRA) onder leiding van Joseph 
Kony. De korte documentaire die tevens door de organisatie via YouTube is verspreid is wereldwijd 
door meer dan 100 miljoen mensen bekeken. In de documentaire verteld de documentairemaker zijn 
zoontje over de misdaden van Joseph Kony. Hij roept op om de wereld een betere wereld te maken. 
De arrestatie van Joseph Kony zou hiertoe de eerste stap zijn. Door de misdaden van de LRA overal 
bekend te maken hoopt de organisatie dat overheden actie zullen ondernemen tegen Joseph Kony. 
Naast een uiteenzetting van de misdaden van het LRA werd de hoofdaanklager van het International 
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Criminal Court (ICC) geïnterviewd in de documentaire. De hoofdaanklager riep de staten ook op om 
actie te ondernemen tegen het LRA. 1   
Sinds het midden van de jaren 80 is er onder andere door mondialisering een nieuw soort oorlog 
ontstaan. Volgens Sheehan zijn deze moderne conflicten vaak het gevolg van de disintegratie van 
staten, waardoor een strijd over de controle van het land ontstaat (2008, p.221). De assumptie dat 
oorlog tussen twee staten plaatsvindt en niet binnen een staat is gebaseerd op de Vrede van 
Westfalen in 1648; conventionele oorlogen tussen twee verschillende staten werden gereguleerd 
door formele regels. Er zijn echter steeds vaker milities en paramilitairen betrokken bij een conflict 
(2008, p. 222). De formele regels opgesteld bij de Vrede van Westfalen zijn daardoor niet altijd meer 
toepasbaar. Er worden nu grenzen gesteld aan de absolute staatsoevereiniteit die vanaf 1648 
bestond. Wanneer een staat zijn bevolking niet kan beschermen tegen gruwelijkheden, zoals 
genocide, dan is de internationale gemeenschap hiervoor verantwoordelijkheid volgens de 
responsibility to protect norm en komt de absolute staatsoevereiniteit dus te vervallen (Contarino, 
Negrón-Gonzales en Mason 2012, p.277). Het ICC is opgericht en is onderdeel van het criminal justice 
regime (Mills 2012, p. 407). Het Hof is opgericht op wreedheden tegen te gaan en is het meest 
recente en meest krachtige geïnstitutionaliseerde vertegenwoordiging van dit regime. De 
internationale normen zijn aangepast aan de nieuwe vorm van conflicten. Het internationaal recht 
heeft hierdoor ook een verandering doorgemaakt. 
Deze verandering is te zien in de oprichting van het ICC om de straffeloosheid van daders van 
oorlogsmisdaden binnen de moderne conflicten tegen te gaan. Op 1 juli 2002 werd het Rome 
Statuut, waarop het ICC is gefundeerd, van kracht.2 Sinds 2002 zijn er 18 zaken uit 8 oorlogssituaties 
voor het ICC gebracht.3 De aanklager kan volgens het Rome Statuur op drie verschillende manieren 
een onderzoek beginnen. Ten eerste kan hij dit doen wanneer een lidstaat een zaak doorverwijst 
naar het ICC. Ten tweede kan een zaak doorverwezen worden naar het ICC door de VN 
Veiligheidsraad. Tenslotte kan de aanklager besluiten een onderzoek te starten wanneer hij 
informatie over misdaden heeft ontvangen van individuen of organisaties.4 Een van de zaken die voor 
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de rechtbank werd gebracht door de aanklager na een doorverwijzing van een lidstaat is het conflict 
in Oeganda. Joseph Kony wordt ervan verdacht dat er onder zijn leiding oorlogsmisdaden worden 
gepleegd door het LRA. Aanvankelijk werden deze misdaden alleen in Oeganda gepleegd. Later werd 
het LRA ook actief in de Democratische Republiek Kongo en in Sudan. 
Wetenschappelijk onderzoek naar het functioneren van het ICC heeft zich tot nu toe hoofdzakelijk 
gericht op het functioneren van het rechtssysteem. Een voorbeeld van een onderzoek hiernaar is het 
onderzoek van Michail Vagias dat zich heeft gericht op het vraagstuk van de jurisdictie van het ICC 
binnen het grondgebied van staten (2012). Andere onderzoeken richten zich op ontstaan van het ICC 
zoals het artikel van Welch en Watkins (2011) of zoals het artikel van Bikundo (2011) over het effect 
van specifieke rechtszaken die door het ICC behandeld zijn, in dit geval het effect op Afrika. Er is 
echter minder aandacht geschonken aan het werk van het Hof voordat een verdachte terecht staat in 
de rechtbank. De hoofdaanklager van het ICC is onderwerp van wetenschappelijk onderzoek wanneer 
het gaat over de juridische aspecten van zijn werk. Een voorbeeld hiervan is het onderzoek van 
Rauxloh waarin onderzocht wordt in hoeverre plea bargains noodzakelijk zijn voor de aanklager 
(2011).5 Door theorieën vanuit de internationale politiek toe te passen op deze internationale 
organisatie wordt er in dit onderzoek geprobeerd om meer zicht te krijgen op het proces voor de 
terechtstelling.  
Dit onderzoek richt zich op het werk van de aanklager voor het daadwerkelijke begin van het proces 
tegen de verdachte, iets wat tot nu toe nog niet is onderzocht. Het onderzoek richt zich op de vraag 
waarom er gekozen is voor bepaalde tactieken. Er wordt onderzocht of de unieke aard van het ICC 
hier invloed op heeft. Tot op heden is er nog geen onderzoek gedaan naar de invloed van de aard van 
de actor op de gekozen lobbytactieken.  
Het Rome Statuut heeft individuele criminele verantwoordelijkheid in internationaal recht 
bekrachtigd in gevallen van genocide, misdaden tegen de menselijkheid en agressie in 
oorlogssituaties. Een land dat het statuut geratificeerd heeft de verantwoordelijkheid om verdachten 
van het ICC, tegen wie een arrestatiebevel is uitgevaardigd, te arresteren en uit te leveren. Verder 
dienen staten samen te werken met het Hof, als het Hof daarom vraagt (Mills 2012, p. 408-409). Het 
ICC is afhankelijk van de medewerking van staten om haar wensen uit te voeren. Staten hebben 
echter ook hun eigen belangen die kunnen overlappen of tegenstrijdig kunnen zijn met de wensen 
van het ICC. Hierdoor kunnen er conflicten ontstaan over de interpretatie en het belang van deze 
                                                          
5
 Met een plea bargain wordt het onderhandelen van de officier van justitie met de verdachte over de op te 
leggen straf of de ten laste te leggen feiten bedoeld.  
5 
 
belangen en normen. De norm van absolute staats soevereiniteit kan in deze gevallen conflicteren 
met nieuwere normen voor mensenrechten (2012, p. 407).  
De openbaar aanklager kan gebruik maken van lobbymethoden om de staten te beïnvloeden. Op 
deze manier kunnen de conflicten tussen verschillende belangen en normen eventueel worden 
voorkomen of in het voordeel van de aanklager worden beslist. De lidstaten van het ICC dienen te 
voldoen aan hun verplichtingen richting het ICC door bijvoorbeeld een verdachte uit te leveren en 
dienen niet uitsluitend hun eigen belang na te streven. Door te lobbyen kan de aanklager van het ICC 
dit bevorderen. De onderzoeksvraag die in dit onderzoek centraal staat is: Waarom gebruikt de 
aanklager van het International Criminal Court specifieke lobbymethoden?  
De onderzoeksvraag zal onderzocht worden door middel van een case study. De casus in dit 
onderzoek is de zaak aanklager vs. Joseph Kony. In deze zaak is de verdachte, Joseph Kony nog niet 
gearresteerd. Het hof is geheel onafhankelijk.6 In deze scriptie wordt geen onderzoek gedaan naar de 
rechters van het ICC en er wordt aangenomen dat zij neutraal handelen in hun functie. In dit 
onderzoek staan de handelingen van de openbaar aanklager van het strafhof centraal. Deze geeft 
ongeveer tweemaal per jaar een diplomatieke briefing aan de lidstaten van het ICC. Dit is een directe 
manier van communicatie tussen het Hof en de lidstaten. Door middel van een inhoudsanalyse van 
deze briefings zal onderzocht worden op welke manier de aanklager de lidstaten probeert te 
beïnvloeden. De aanklager kan druk uitoefenen op individuele staten om verdachten uit te leveren. 
Er kan echter ook druk uitgeoefend worden op de internationale gemeenschap als geheel zodat zij op 
hun beurt druk uit willen oefenen op individuele staten. Er wordt verwacht dat de aanklager van het 
ICC gebruik maakt van lobbymethoden om de druk op de internationale gemeenschap en individuele 
staten te vergroten. Op die manier kan bijvoorbeeld de aanhouding van Kony worden versneld. 
Een aantal concepten zal eerst uiteen worden gezet voordat geanalyseerd kan worden op welke 
manier de aanklager van het ICC lobbymethoden gebruikt om uitlevering van verdachten te 
bevorderen. Het concept van normen zal eerst verder uitgediept worden, specifiek de responsibility 
to protect norm en de uitleveringsnorm. Vervolgens zal besproken worden op welke manier de 
aanklager de staten kan beïnvloeden. De vier verschillende lobbytactieken die Keck en Sikkink 
uiteengezet hebben zullen hierbij besproken worden (1999). Deze tactieken zullen worden toegepast 
op de diplomatieke briefings gegeven door de hoofdaanklager. Voordat er geanalyseerd kan worden 
waarom de aanklager gebruikt maakt van specifieke lobbymethoden zal er eerst uiteengezet worden 
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welke methoden de aanklager precies gebruikt heeft. Tenslotte zullen er conclusies getrokken 
worden uit de resultaten en zal er een advies gegeven worden voor toekomstig onderzoek.  
 
Theoretisch kader 
 
Normen 
Het eerste concept dat uitgediept dient te worden zijn normen, specifiek de uitleveringsnorm. Een 
definitie van een norm is volgens Finnemore en Sikkink: ‘the embodiment of quality of “oughtness” 
and shared moral assessment, norms prompt justifications for action and leave an extensive trail of 
communication’ (1998, p.892). Finnemore en Sikkink hebben een model ontwikkeld waarin zij een 
drietal stadia aangeven waarin een norm zich kan bevinden. Deze stadia zijn achtereenvolgend norm 
emergence, norm cascade en internalization (1998, p. 896). Het eerste stadium, norm emergence, 
betreft een stadium waarin een nieuwe norm door norm entrepreneurs onder de aandacht wordt 
gebracht (1998, p. 897). Voordat de norm het tweede stadium kan bereiken dient deze 
geïnstitutionaliseerd te worden door internationale organisaties en binnen internationale regels 
(1998, p. 900). Binnen deze tweede fase, norm cascade, zal er een toename zijn van staten die de 
norm accepteren. Door middel van internationale socialisatie zullen steeds meer staten de norm 
handhaven (1998, p. 902). In de laatste fase, internalization, is de norm volledig geïnternaliseerd. Het 
is dan vanzelfsprekend dat de norm er is (1998, p. 904).  
 
De norm responsibility to protect gaat net als het ICC uit van het principe van complementariteit. Dit 
houdt in dat de primaire verantwoordelijkheid voor de veiligheid en bescherming van burgers bij de 
individuele staten ligt. Op het moment dat de staten echter falen hun eigen bevolking te beschermen 
tegen gruwelijkheden dient de internationale gemeenschap deze taak op zich te nemen. Staten 
dienen zich namelijk aan de Universele Verklaring van de Rechten van de Mens te houden 
(Contarino, Negrón-Gonzales en Mason 2012, p. 277).  
 
De responsibility to protect is een norm in wording. Formeel is deze norm aangenomen door de 
Verenigde Naties en hoewel er veel naar de norm gerefereerd wordt door de internationale 
gemeenschap is deze nog steeds controversieel. Het is nog niet vanzelfsprekend dat er in alle 
gevallen ingegrepen wordt door de internationale gemeenschap met deze norm als fundering 
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hiervoor. De definitie van de norm is nog niet universeel geaccepteerd. Hij kan op verschillende 
manieren worden geïnterpreteerd (Contarino, Negrón-Gonzales en Mason 2012, p. 275-276). China, 
India en Rusland grijpen vaak terug op de absolute soevereiniteit van de staat en vinden dat de norm 
daar teveel inbreuk op maakt. Verzet tegen de uitvoering van de norm in conflictsituaties is 
daarnaast gegroeid sinds coalitietroepen Irak binnen zijn gevallen in 2003 (Axworthy en Rock 2009, p. 
54). Wanneer de theorie van Keck en Sikkink wordt toegepast op deze norm dan is te zien dat deze 
norm in de tweede fase van the norm life cycle geplaatst kan worden (1998, p. 902). Hoewel de norm 
formeel is aangenomen door de Verenigde Naties, wordt er niet altijd als vanzelfsprekend naar 
gehandeld.  
 
De responsibility to protect norm verplicht regeringen om genocide, oorlogsmisdaden, misdaden 
tegen de menselijkheid en etnische zuiveringen te voorkomen en te stoppen. Het ICC is met deze 
norm verbonden. Het Hof heeft een mandaat om de daders van genocide, oorlogsmisdaden, 
misdaden tegen de menselijkheid en misdaden van agressie te vervolgen (Contarino, Negrón-
Gonzales en Mason 2012, p.277). Het ICC is daarmee verantwoordelijk voor de juridische uitvoering 
van de norm the responsibility to protect.  
 
Wanneer een staat het Rome Verdrag geratificeerd heeft is het juridisch verplicht om een 
arrestatiebevel van het ICC uit te voeren. Daarmee wordt volgens Contarino, Negrón-Gonzales en 
Mason the responsibility to protect uitgevoerd door dat desbetreffende land (2012, p.289). Het 
uitleveren van verdachten aan het ICC kan daarmee gezien worden als een uitleveringsnorm die 
verbonden is aan de norm van responsibility to protect. Het ICC en de responsibility to protect norm 
richten zich op dezelfde misdaden. Toch wordt er niet expliciet naar de norm gerefereerd door het 
Hof. Dit kan volgens de auteurs erop wijzen dat de norm voor het Hof nog niet specifiek genoeg 
gedefinieerd is of dat de norm nog te controversieel is. De acties van het Hof betreffende de norm 
geven aanwijzingen voor het feit dat er rekening gehouden wordt met de politieke limitaties en de 
mogelijke controversie die expliciete verwijzing naar de norm mogelijk met zich mee kunnen 
brengen. Regeringen, organisaties en ICC medewerkers geven echter wel aan dat het ICC een rol kan 
spelen in het verder definiëren en bekrachtigen van de norm. De voormalig hoofdaanklager van het 
ICC, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, heeft bijvoorbeeld aangegeven dat het ICC legitimiteit kan toevoegen aan 
de beslissing van de VN Veiligheidsraad gebruik te maken van de responsibility to protect (2012, 
p.298).  
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De uitleveringsnorm wordt net als the responsibility to protect niet door alle staten geaccepteerd. De 
norm is echter wel opgenomen in internationale verdragen, zoals het Rome Statuut. Deze norm 
bevindt zich daarom in de tweede fase van het model van Finnemore en Sikkink over de drie 
verschillende stadia van normen. De norm wordt niet altijd nageleefd door staten die de norm 
officieel hebben geaccepteerd; een aantal verdachten van het ICC is namelijk nog steeds 
voortvluchtig. Het desbetreffende land heeft de verdachte om verschillende redenen nog niet 
kunnen en/of willen arresteren en uitleveren. Naast de voortvluchtige verdachten in Oeganda zijn 
onder andere de vier verdachten in de casus Darfur in Sudan ook nog steeds voorvluchtig. Twee 
andere verdachten in deze zaak, Mr. Banda en Mr. Jerbo, hebben zich vrijwillig gemeld bij het ICC.7 
 
Macht van het ICC 
Het hebben van macht wordt in de internationale politiek gedefinieerd als het vermogen van actor A 
om actor B te beïnvloeden waardoor deze zich op een andere manier gaat gedragen dan de actor 
eigenlijk van plan was. Macht kan onderverdeeld worden in twee soorten macht, hard power en soft 
power. Hard power is de macht van actor A om actor B anders te laten handelen (Art 1996 in Wilson 
2008, p. 114). Soft power is echter de macht om de ander te overtuigen te doen want jij wilt (Nye 
1990 in Wilson 2008, p. 114). Volgens het artikel van Wilson maken de verschillende vormen van 
macht ook gebruik van verschillende middelen om hun doel te bereiken. De strategieën van hard 
power zullen zich hoofdzakelijk richten op militaire interventies, dwingende diplomatie en 
economische sancties. Deze vorm van macht wordt dan ook vooral toegeschreven aan staten. Soft 
power maakt vooral gebruik van overtuigingskracht en het aantrekkelijk maken van de gewenste 
uitkomst. Naast staten beschikken ook internationale organisaties over deze vorm van macht (Wilson 
2008, p. 114). 
Als een internationale organisatie heeft het ICC in tegenstelling tot een staat alleen de mogelijkheid 
om soft power te gebruiken om invloed uit te oefenen. Het ICC is afhankelijk van een bijdrage van 
haar lidstaten en giften van onder andere internationale organisaties en individuen om haar uitgaven 
te kunnen financieren.8 Het Hof heeft echter wel beschikking over overtuigingskracht om een staat te 
overtuigen om naar haar te luisteren en kan bepaalde keuzes aantrekkelijker maken. Eventuele 
sancties of interventies kunnen alleen vanuit lidstaten van het ICC worden opgelegd aan verdachten 
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of staten. Door gebruik te maken van overtuigingskracht en aantrekkingskracht kan het ICC een staat 
ervan overtuigen een verdachte uit te leveren. Daarnaast kan het ICC de andere lidstaten stimuleren 
om de druk op te voeren ten opzichte van deze staat. Beide opties kunnen ervoor zorgen dat 
verdachten sneller uitgeleverd worden aan het ICC en de rechtszaak tegen deze verdachten kan 
beginnen. Lobbyen is een voorbeeld van hoe het ICC gebruik zou kunnen maken van 
overtuigingskracht en aantrekkingskracht om uitlevering mogelijk te maken of te bespoedigen.  
De openbaar aanklager lobbyt in dat geval voor de uitvoering van de uitleveringsnorm en indirect 
voor the responsibility to protect. De manier waarop de openbaar aanklager lobbyt bij staten zal 
onderzocht worden aan de hand van de classificatie van lobbymethoden door Keck en Sikkink (1999). 
Zij stellen dat er gebruik kan worden gemaakt van verschillende tactieken en frames om het gedrag 
van anderen te veranderen. Een frame kan een gebeurtenis belangrijk maken door ervaringen op een 
specifieke manier te presenteren. Hierdoor wordt er richting gegeven aan de mening en actie van de 
ontvangende actor. Door informatie op een bepaalde manier te interpreteren en te presenteren 
wordt getracht het gedrag van anderen te beïnvloeden (1999, p.95).  
 
Keck en Sikkink classificeren vier verschillende tactieken die een lobby groep kan toepassen: 
information politics, symbolic politics, leverage politics en accountability politics. Information politics 
wordt toegepast door die informatie te gebruiken die het gewenste en grootste effect heeft. De 
tactiek maakt voornamelijk gebruik van feiten en getuigenissen. Deze worden echter aangeboden 
met het doel richting te geven aan de acties van anderen. Dit kan inhouden dat alleen feiten gebruikt 
worden die een specifiek aspect belichten en andere aspecten onderbelicht laat. Hoewel er gebruik 
wordt gemaakt van een frame, heeft deze tactiek ook als effect dat er informatie wordt verschaft die 
anders misschien niet bekend was geworden (1999, p.95). Naast feiten kan er volgens de auteurs ook 
gebruik gemaakt van getuigenissen. Deze worden geïnterpreteerd aangeboden in termen van goed 
en fout. Hierdoor wordt er richting gegeven aan de acties van anderen. Het doel van de tactiek is om 
anderen te overtuigen en hen te stimuleren actie te ondernemen. Door te laten zien dat een situatie 
niet natuurlijk of onopzettelijk is, wordt er een schuldige aangewezen en aangestuurd op de 
gewenste oplossing (1999, p.96).  
 
De tweede lobbytactiek die volgens Keck en Sikkink gebruikt kan worden is symbolic politics. Hierbij 
wordt gebruik gemaakt van symbolen, acties en verhalen om een situatie te duiden of om een 
publiek aan te spreken en dat publiek dat meestal ver weg is aan zich te binden (1999, p.95). Er wordt 
binnen deze tactiek ook gebruik gemaakt van een frame. De symbolische gebeurtenissen worden 
geïnterpreteerd aangeboden. Er worden verklaringen geboden voor deze gebeurtenissen. Andere 
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verklaringen lijken onlogisch door het selectieve en geïnterpreteerde aanbod van symbolische 
gebeurtenissen. De methode wordt gebruikt om actoren over te halen door bewustwording te 
creëren (1999, p.96). Vaak is het niet één gebeurtenis die mensen overhaalt om hun mening of 
gedrag aan te passen. Het is een combinatie van gebeurtenissen waardoor me van mening veranderd 
en actie onderneemt (1999, p. 97). 
 
Leverage politics is de mogelijkheid een beroep te doen op machtige actoren om een situatie te 
beïnvloeden (1999, p. 95). Het doel is om invloed uit te oefenen op specifieke actoren. Volgens Keck 
en Sikkink zal er geprobeerd worden invloed uit te oefenen op andere actoren die invloed hebben op 
deze specifieke actoren. Het beleid wordt dan indirect beïnvloed. Op deze manier kunnen de 
zwakkere actoren meer invloed hebben op de uitkomst dan zij hadden gehad wanneer ze deze direct 
hadden proberen te beïnvloeden. Er zijn twee verschillende vormen van macht die ze over andere 
actoren uit kunnen oefenen; material leverage en moral leverage. Material leverage houdt in dat een 
bepaald onderwerp wordt gekoppeld aan iets van waarde. Hierbij kan gedacht worden aan geld of 
goederen maar bijvoorbeeld ook belangrijke functies binnen organisaties. Moral leverage houdt zich 
niet bezig met materiële zaken, maar houdt het gedrag van actoren tegen het licht. Dit onderzoek 
naar het gedrag van de actoren kan mogelijk uitkomsten hebben die negatief zijn voor de reputatie 
van de actor. Wanneer de onderzochte actor waarde hecht aan zijn reputatie en internationale 
prestige dan kan hun gedrag veranderen door de mogelijkheid op schaamte (1999, p.97).  
 
De laatste van de vier tactieken die Keck en Sikkink hebben geclassificeerd is accountability politics. 
Hierbij wordt getracht om machtigere actoren te verplichten zich aan eerder onderschreven beleid 
en/of principes te houden (1999, p. 95). Wanneer een regering publiekelijk een norm of regel heeft 
onderschreven dan kan er gebruik worden gemaakt van deze methode. De tactiek zal laten zien dat 
er een verschil zit tussen praktijk en theorie. Hoewel de actor in theorie beleid en principes heeft 
onderschreven is hier in de praktijk geen sprake van. Wanneer duidelijk wordt gemaakt dat er een 
verschil zit tussen de praktijk en theorie dan kan dit schadelijk zijn voor de internationale reputatie 
van de actor. De actor zal deze hoog willen houden en daardoor zijn gedrag aanpassen naar de al 
eerder onderschreven theorie (1999, p. 97-98).  
 
Het onderzoek zal kijken welke van de vier tactieken die uiteengezet zijn door Keck en Sikkink 
gebruikt worden door de hoofdaanklager van het ICC. Er zal onderzocht worden waarom de 
aanklager die methoden gebruikt. Op basis van de theorie die hierboven uiteen is gezet wordt er niet 
verwacht dat er sprake zal zijn van material leverage. Zoals al eerder is besproken is het ICC 
afhankelijk van de lidstaten voor financiële ondersteuning en uitvoering van hun beleid. Het kan 
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daarom geen materiële beloningen beloven. Daarnaast wordt er verwacht dat het aard van het ICC 
een rol zal spelen in de keuze voor bepaalde lobbytactieken. Het ICC is een unieke actor in de 
internationale politiek. Er wordt verwacht dat dit invloed uitoefent op de keuze voor bepaalde 
tactieken. De verwachting is dat er doordoor meer gebruik wordt gemaakt van information politics en 
accountability politics. Omdat het ICC een gerechtshof is kan er aangenomen worden dat er meer 
waarde wordt gehecht aan feiten en verdragen. Dit zou de keuze voor deze twee tactieken kunnen 
verklaren.  
 
  
Onderzoeksmethode 
 
Om te onderzoeken waarom de hoofdaanklager van het ICC bepaalde lobbytactieken gebruikt wordt 
een case study gebruikt. Er kan in dit geval dus alleen gesproken worden over de gebruikte 
lobbytactieken voor deze specifieke casus. Er is sprake van een explanatory onderzoek, omdat er 
onderzoek gedaan wordt naar verklaringen van het gedrag van de aanklager. Er is voor dit onderzoek 
gekozen voor een case study gekozen, omdat er tot dusver geen onderzoek is gedaan naar deze rol 
van de aanklager en de keuze voor bepaalde lobbytactieken. Een case study kan als voorbeeld dienen 
voor verder onderzoek en geeft verwachtingen voor het gebruik van lobbytactieken door de 
aanklager in het algemeen.  
Er is gekozen voor de casus van Oeganda. In december 2003 heeft de president van Oeganda, Yoweri 
Museveni, de zaak betreffende the Lords’s Resistance Army (LRA) doorverwezen naar het ICC. De 
aanklager van het ICC heeft op basis daarvan besloten een onderzoek te starten.9 Dit was, samen met 
het onderzoek naar de misdaden die gepleegd waren in de Democratische Republiek Kongo, een van 
de eerste onderzoeken van het ICC. De resultaten van dit onderzoek zijn voorgelegd aan de Pre-Trial 
Chamber II en deze besloot op 8 juli 2005 een arrestatiebevel uit te vaardigen tegen 5 leden van het 
LRA. Een van deze verdachten is de leider van het LRA, Joseph Kony. Hij wordt onder andere verdacht 
van misdaden tegen de menselijkheid, oorlogsmisdaden en het tegen hun wil in rekruteren van 
                                                          
9
 International Criminal Court. ‘Press and Media: Press releases 2004’ http://www.icccpi.int/en_menus/icc 
/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/2004/Pages/president%20of%20uganda%20refers%20situation%20
concerning%20the%20lord_s%20resistance%20army%20_lra_%20to%20the%20icc.aspx, 10-5-2013 
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kindsoldaten. Tegen vier van deze verdachten geldt het arrestatiebevel nog steeds, een van de vijf is 
namelijk inmiddels overleden.10 
De oorlogssituatie in Oeganda was de eerste die doorverwezen werd naar het ICC en de tweede zaak 
die door de aanklager onderzocht werd. Er is echter nog geen van de verdachten gearresteerd.11 Dat 
maakt het interessant om juist deze zaak te onderzoeken. Hoewel de zaak is doorverwezen door de 
president van Oeganda en het land lid is van het ICC, is geen van de verdachten nog gearresteerd. 
Deze zaak kan daarom als representatief gezien worden voor andere rechtszaken waarin er nog geen 
verdachte is gearresteerd. Het zijn deze gevallen waarin de aanklager van het ICC gebruik kan hebben 
gemaakt van lobbytactieken om de aanhouding van de verdachten te versnellen. De verklaring van 
de keuze voor specifieke tactieken door de aanklager kan daarom op basis van deze casus vastgesteld 
worden. 
Om dit te onderzoeken is er een combinatie van kwalitatieve en kwantitatieve methoden van data 
analyse gebruikt. Door middel van een inhoudsanalyse is de inhoud van politieke briefings 
uiteengezet. De kwalitatief verkregen data is omgezet in kwantitatieve data zodat er gezien kan 
worden in welke frequentie de verschillende tactieken gebruikt zijn door de aanklager. Om de 
hoofdvraag te kunnen beantwoorden is er gekeken naar de gebruikte tactieken en hoe deze zich 
bijvoorbeeld tot gebeurtenissen verhouden.  
De data die onderzocht is verzameld door middel van een inhoudsanalyse van diplomatic briefings. 
Deze worden ongeveer twee keer per jaar gehouden door de president, de secretaris en de 
hoofdaanklager van het ICC. In totaal zijn er 18 speeches geanalyseerd. Deze zijn gehouden in de 
periode van 8 juni 2005 tot 19 september 2012. In totaal zijn er 22 diplomatieke toespraken gegeven. 
De eerste drie zijn niet vrijgegeven door het ICC op hun website en zijn niet meegenomen in dit 
onderzoek. Pas sinds de vierde briefing is de aanklager begonnen met het onderzoeken van mogelijke 
misdaden in Oeganda en de Democratische Republiek Kongo. Dit waren de eerste onderzoeken die 
het ICC heeft uitgevoerd. De eerste drie toespraken waren daarom niet van belang voor het 
onderzoek omdat er geen vermeldingen waren van het onderzoek in Oeganda of naar het uitleveren 
van verdachten. Binnen de briefings is er gekeken naar specifieke delen van de briefing die gaan over 
de casus Oeganda in het bijzonder of het uitleveren van verdachten in het algemeen.  
                                                          
10
 International Criminal Court. ‘Situations and Cases’ http://www.icccpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and 
%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200204/Pages/situation%20index.aspx, 10-5-2013 
11
 International Criminal Court. ‘Situations and Cases’ http://www.icccpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and% 
20cases/situations/Pages/situations%20index.aspx, 10-5-2013 
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De briefings hebben als doel om de staten die lid zijn van het ICC op de hoogte te houden van de 
vorderingen in specifieke zaken, maar ook om hen over de algemene gang van zaken in te lichten. De 
toespraken zijn een directe manier waarop de aanklager van het ICC kan communiceren met de 
lidstaten. Daarom is er gekozen om de briefings te gebruiken als basis van de inhoudsanalyse.  
Delen van de briefings zijn door middel van een inhoudsanalyse gecodeerd als information politics, 
symbolic politics, leverage politics en accountability politics. Een deel bestond uit een alinea die door 
het Hof zelf was geschreven. Het codeerboek (zie appendix A) gaf handvatten voor de analyse. Het 
coderen als een specifieke tactiek was echter ook afhankelijk van de context van de alinea in de tekst. 
Wanneer twee tactieken leken te overlappen binnen een alinea is deze als beide gecodeerd.  
Delen van de tekst zijn als information politics geanalyseerd wanneer er hoofdzakelijk gebruik is 
gemaakt van feiten en getuigenissen om de staten te overtuigen te handelen en de uitlevering van 
Kony te bevorderen. De delen van de briefings zijn geïnterpreteerd als symbolic politics wanneer er 
specifieke symbolische gebeurtenissen, acties en verhalen werden vermeld om een situatie te 
duiden. Door een situatie in een grotere context te plaatsen kan deze ene situatie meer waarde 
krijgen. Een gebeurtenis of feit wordt op die manier als symbool gebruikt voor een hele situatie. In dit 
geval is er sprake van symbolische gebeurtenissen om de situatie in Oeganda als geheel te duiden.  
Door gebruik te maken van een symbolische gebeurtenis worden de staten opgeroepen om meer 
actie te ondernemen in de casus Oeganda. Er was sprake van leverage politics wanneer er in de tekst 
een koppeling werd gemaakt tussen een verandering van het gedrag van een actor en een beloning. 
Dit kon een materiële beloning zijn zoals goederen, maar ook stemmen in een internationale 
organisatie. Verwacht werd dat er geen sprake zou zijn van deze vorm van beloning omdat het ICC 
afhankelijk is van de lidstaten voor financiële ondersteuning en de uitvoering van het beleid. Een 
materiële beloning is daarom niet waarschijnlijk. De beloning kon echter ook van morele aard zijn. 
Herin werd bijvoorbeeld een betere internationale reputatie voorgehouden als beloning als de staten 
een actievere rol aannamen in de arrestatie en uitlevering van Kony. Tenslotte is er gekeken naar 
signalen voor accountability politics. In dit geval is er sprake van het tot verantwoording roepen van 
staten, omdat zij een verplichting aan zijn gegaan. Hierbij is er bijvoorbeeld gekeken naar het 
noemen van eerder gemaakte afspraken, zoals het Rome Statuut.  
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Resultaten 
 
De resultaten van het onderzoek zullen in twee delen besproken worden. Er wordt eerst gekeken 
naar enkele algemene resultaten van de inhoudsanalyse. Hier zal besproken worden welke tactieken 
gebruikt zijn door de aanklager. Daarnaast zal er gekeken worden naar patronen over tijd. Vervolgens 
zal iedere lobby methode afzonderlijk besproken worden. Hier zal dieper ingegaan worden op de 
methoden die gebruikt zijn en waarom deze gebruikt zijn.  
Wanneer er gekeken wordt naar tabel 1 dan is te zien dat er voornamelijk gebruik is gemaakt van 
information politics en accountability politics. Van de 122 keer dat de hoofdaanklager van het Hof 
gebruik heeft gemaakt van lobbymethoden zijn er 85 geïnterpreteerd als information politics en 35 
als accountability politics. Er is geen sprake van het gebruik van leverage politics. Daarnaast is 
symbolic politics slechts twee keer gebruikt binnen de 18 briefings van de hoofdaanklager van het 
ICC. Van tevoren werd verwacht dat de aanklager hoofdzakelijk gebruik zou maken van information 
en accountability politics. Uit dit eerste overzicht blijkt dat dit inderdaad het geval is.  
Wanneer er gekeken wordt naar de patronen over de tijd dan is er te zien dat er een aantal 
momenten zijn waarop er meer dan gemiddeld gebruikt is gemaakt van een van de vier 
lobbytactieken. Gemiddeld wordt er 6,7 keer per briefing gebruik gemaakt van een van de vier 
tactieken. Hierdoor kunnen er een aantal pieken in het gebruik van deze tactieken door de 
hoofdaanklager worden vastgesteld. Vanaf de 4e briefing van 8 juni 2005 tot en met de 11e briefing 
van 10 oktober 2007 worden de tactieken meer dan gemiddeld toegepast. Dit is te verklaren door de 
gebeurtenissen die voor deze briefings hebben plaatsgevonden. De 4e briefing (zie appendix B) volgt 
op de eerste onderzoeken van het ICC naar de misdaden die gepleegd zijn in Oeganda. De staten 
worden in deze briefing ingelicht over de vorderingen van dat onderzoek. Omdat het een van de 
eerste zaken is die het ICC behandeld is het logisch dat er veel aandacht besteed wordt aan de 
vorderingen van de zaak in de briefings die volgen.  
Daarnaast zijn er vier onafhankelijke pieken te zien in het gebruik van lobbytactieken. De eerste 
hiervan is de 5e briefing van 26 oktober 2005 (zie appendix C). Vervolgens is er een piek bij de 13e 
briefing van 14 juni 2008. De derde piek is te zien bij de 15e briefing van 7 april 2009. De laatste van 
deze pieken is te zien bij de 16e briefing die op 26 mei 2009 plaatsvond. Deze pieken zijn te verklaren 
door de gebeurtenissen die voor de briefings plaats hebben gevonden.  
 
15 
 
Tabel 1: overzicht gebruikte lobbymethoden(n) 
briefing datum Gebruikte methode (n) 
  Information Symbolic Leverage Accountability Totaal 
4   8-6-2005 7   2 9 
5  26-10-2005 15   3 18 
6  23-3-2006 7   2 9 
7  29-6-2006 5   2 7 
8  26-10-2006 5   4 9 
9  29-3-2007 2 1  4 7 
10  26-6-2007 8 1  2 11 
11  10-10-2007 4   5 9 
12  18-3-2008 4   1 5 
13  24-6-2008 5   5 10 
14  8-10-2008 4   0 4 
15  7-4-2009 4   3 7 
16  26-5-2009 8   1 9 
17  4-11 2009 2   0 2 
18  26-4-2010 4   0 4 
19  3-11-2010 0   0 0 
20  8-4-2011 0   0 0 
21  8-11-2011 0   0 0 
22  19-9-2012 1   1 2 
totaal  85 2 0 35 122 
 
In de 5e briefing van 26 oktober 2005 is er de grootste piek te zien. In deze briefing worden de 
lidstaten van het Hof ingelicht over de uitvaardiging van de 5 arrestatiebevelen tegen leden van het 
LRA. Dit is een mogelijke verklaring voor het feit dat de aanklager in deze briefing bovengemiddeld 
veel gebruik heeft gemaakt van lobbytactieken.  
In de 15e briefing verwijst de aanklager naar twee gebeurtenissen (zie appendix M). Zo begint het 
pleidooi met een verwijzing naar de Rwanda genocide. Het is die dag namelijk de dag van 
Remembrance of the Rwanda Genocide. De tweede verwijzing is naar het feit dat het 5 jaar geleden is 
dat de zaak doorverwezen is naar het Hof door de president van Oeganda. Er was op het moment 
van de briefing echter nog steeds geen vooruitgang geboekt op het gebied van de uitlevering van de 
verdachten. Deze twee gebeurtenissen hebben de aanklager een reden gegeven om meer licht op de 
casus van Oeganda te werpen en de staten nogmaals te herinneren aan hun verplichtingen naar het 
Hof toe.  
Eenzelfde verklaring kan gegeven worden voor het bovengemiddelde gebruik van lobbytactieken in 
de 16e briefing (zie appendix N). De aanklager verwijst in deze briefing naar het feit dat het bijna vier 
jaar geleden is dat de arrestatiebevelen voor de misdaden van het LRA zijn uitgevaardigd door het 
ICC. Er wordt in de briefings dus specifiek verwezen naar gebeurtenissen. Deze gebeurtenissen 
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kunnen dan ook gezien worden als de verklaring voor het bovengemiddelde gebruik van 
lobbymethoden door de aanklager in deze briefings.  
Kijkend naar het geheel van de briefings is te zien dat er tot en met de 16e briefing van 26 mei 2009 
regelmatig over de situatie in Oeganda of over het uitleveren van verdachten werd gesproken. Daar 
werden voornamelijk information en accountability politics voor gebruikt. Na deze briefing neemt dit 
echter af. In de 19e, 20e en 21e diplomatieke briefing van achtereenvolgend 3 november 2010, 8 april 
2011 en 8 november 2011 werd er zelfs helemaal geen aandacht meer besteed aan de situatie of 
vorderingen in Oeganda of het uitleveren van verdachten in het algemeen (zie appendix Q, R, S). In 
de 22e briefing van 19 september 2012 werd er weer, echter minimaal, aandacht besteed aan deze 
onderwerpen (zie appendix T). De hernieuwde aandacht in deze laatste briefing is mogelijk te 
verklaren door het feit dat er tussen de 21e en de 22e briefing veel media aandacht is geweest voor 
het geweld dat veroorzaakt werd de LRA. De campagne Stop Kony 2012, en in het bijzonder de 
documentaire dat de organisatie van ‘Kony 2012’ op YouTube zette, zorgde voor veel aandacht. 
Hoewel er in de laatste briefing van 19 september 2012 niet gesproken wordt over het 
mediaoffensief van de campagne kan er toch aangenomen worden dat deze invloed heeft gehad 
aangezien er weer hernieuwde aandacht is voor de casus. Het feit dat er voor de campagne al drie 
toespraken niets gezegd is over deze specifieke zaak en er na de campagne weer hernieuwde 
interesse in is, levert bewijs voor deze invloed. 
Na deze eerste analyse van het gebruik van lobbytactieken en de patronen die te zien zijn door de 
tijd kan er geconcludeerd worden dat specifieke gebeurtenissen invloed hebben gehad op het 
gebruik van lobbytactieken. Het bovengemiddelde gebruik van lobbytactieken kan in de meeste 
gevallen verklaard worden door specifieke gebeurtenissen of momenten waarnaar verwezen werd 
door de aanklager. Voorbeelden hiervan zijn de hernieuwde media aandacht voor zaak door de ‘Kony 
2012’ campagne en het moment waarop het 4 jaar geleden was dat de arrestatiebevelen voor de 
leden van het LRA uitgevaardigd werden. Deze geven de aanklager een aanleiding om de staten te 
herinneren aan de situatie in Oeganda en hun verplichtingen tegenover het ICC om de arrestatie en 
uitlevering van de verdachten te bevorderen. Het grote effect van deze gebeurtenissen en moment 
op de lobbytactieken van de aanklager waren van tevoren niet verwacht. Wat wel overeenkomt met 
de verwachting is het feit dat de aanklager voornamelijk gebruik heeft gemaakt van information 
politics en accountability politics. 
De resultaten van de analyse zullen nu besproken worden per mogelijke tactiek van lobbyen die de 
hoofdaanklager heeft gebruikt. De resultaten voor information politics zullen eerst worden 
besproken omdat deze tactiek de basis vormt voor de andere tactieken. Alle andere tactieken maken 
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gebruik van een vorm van informatie om het gedrag van anderen te beïnvloeden. Na de resultaten 
voor information politics zullen de resultaten voor symbolic politics en leverage politics besproken 
worden. De analyse wordt afgesloten met een bespreking van het gebruik van accountability politics 
door de hoofdaanklager.  
 
Information politics  
Deze lobbytactiek is van de vier tactieken het meest gebruikt in de diplomatic briefings door de 
hoofdaanklager van het ICC. Delen van de tekst zijn als information politics gecodeerd wanneer er 
hoofdzakelijk gebruik werd gemaakt van feiten en getuigenissen (zie appendix A). Deze feiten werden 
op een dusdanige manier aangeboden in de briefings dat deze de vraag voor meer internationale 
druk om de verdachten te arresteren en uit te leveren ondersteunen. De staten worden door de 
tactiek overtuigd om meer te doen om ervoor te zorgen dat de verdachten gearresteerd en aan het 
ICC uitgeleverd worden.  
In totaal is er binnen de 18 onderzochte briefings 85 keer gebruik gemaakt van deze methode  
(zie tabel 1). Gemiddeld werd er 4,7 keer gebruik gemaakt van information politics binnen de 
briefings om de staten te overtuigen te handelen. Wanneer er gekeken wordt naar de briefings 
waarin er meer dan gemiddeld gebruik werd gemaakt van information politics, dan is te zien dat een 
groot deel hiervan geconcentreerd is in de eerste briefings, de 4e briefing tot en met de 8e briefing. 
Dit is te verklaren door het feit dat er in deze periode veel nieuwe ontwikkelingen waren. Deze 
nieuwe informatie kon de aanklager gebruiken om de staten ervan te overtuigen dat het belangrijk is 
dat de verdachten gearresteerd en uitgeleverd worden.  
In deze eerste briefings is er veel informatie gegeven over de vooruitgang in de zaak. Daarnaast is er 
toegelicht waar de zaak precies op is gebaseerd en is er informatie gegeven over de vijf verdachten. 
Door deze informatie te geven wordt duidelijk gemaakt waarom het van belang is dat de verdachten 
gearresteerd worden. Zo zei de aanklager in de 5e briefing: ‘The six attacks that are the focus of our 
investigation are some of the gravest attacks on civilians that the LRA has carried out in Northern 
Uganda since July 2002. The attacks were carried out in several different regions of Uganda.’ 
(International Criminal Court 2005, p.6). Dit is een representatief voorbeeld van het gebruik van 
information politics door de aanklager. Hij geeft informatie over de misdaden die gepleegd zijn door 
de LRA. Er wordt duidelijk gemaakt hoe ernstig deze misdaden waren (zie appendix C). Indirect wordt 
hiermee gesteld dat het belangrijk is dat de verdachten gearresteerd worden en uitgeleverd aan het 
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ICC zodat ze berecht kunnen worden. Dit voorbeeld laat zien dat door het geven van dit soort feiten 
het belang van de arrestatie en uitlevering ondersteund wordt.  
Naast het bovengemiddelde gebruik van information politics in de eerste briefings is er ook veel 
gebruik gemaakt van deze methode in de 10e en 16e briefings van de hoofdaanklager. In de 10e 
briefing van 26 juni 2007 is er naast een overzicht over de huidige stand van zaken in Oeganda ook 
gesproken over samenwerking tussen staten (zie appendix H). Een voorbeeld van de informatie die 
de aanklager geeft over de huidige stand van zaken is het volgende citaat: ‘On 8 July 2005 the Pre-
Trial Chamber issued the warrants of arrest for crimes against humanity, including enslavement, 
sexual slavery, rape and murder, and war crimes.’(International Criminal Court 2007, p.7). Door de 
aanklacht nogmaals expliciet te noemen wordt er nadruk gelegd op het feit dat de verdachten nog 
steeds niet gearresteerd en uitgeleverd zijn. Dit is een voorbeeld van hoe informatie de lidstaten van 
het ICC kan oproepen om meer aandacht te besteden aan het conflict.  
Na een periode waarin er iets minder aandacht werd besteed aan het conflict in Oeganda wordt er in 
de 16e briefing weer volop gebruik gemaakt van information politics (zie appendix M). Dit is te 
verklaren aan de hand van het eerder genoemde feit dat het op dat moment bijna vier jaar geleden 
was dat de arrestatiebevelen uitgegeven waren. Door middel van statistieken over het aantal 
ontheemde dat veroorzaakt is door het LRA wordt er duidelijk gemaakt hoe erg de situatie is in 
Oeganda. Zo zei de aanklager in deze briefing: ‘LRA killings and abductions continue under Kony’s 
leadership, with more than 100,000 now displaced by LRA activity in DRC, and over 50,000 in 
Southern Sudan, including over 18,000 displaced across the border from DRC, according to UN OCHA 
estimates.’(International Criminal Court 2009, p.3). Door deze gegevens te delen wordt geprobeerd 
het handelen van de staten te veranderen in de hoop de arrestatie en uitlevering van verdachten te 
versnellen.  
Op basis van de analyse kan geconcludeerd worden dat information politics door de hoofdaanklager 
van het ICC het meest gebruikt is van alle vier de lobbytactieken. De tactiek is vooral gebruikt om de 
lidstaten van het ICC te laten inzien hoe ernstig de situatie is in Oeganda en hoe lang het al geleden is 
dat de arrestatiebevelen uitgegeven werden. Door dit te benadrukken wordt geprobeerd de lidstaten 
van het ICC duidelijk te maken dat er meer nodig is dan alleen het arrestatiebevel. Hun hulp is nodig 
bij de arrestatie van de verdachten en de uitlevering van deze verdachten aan het ICC. Het veelvuldig 
gebruik van deze tactiek komt overeen met de verwachting die voor het onderzoek opgesteld werd 
dat information politics en accountability politics het meest gebruik zouden worden door de 
aanklager. Dit is te verklaren aan de hand van de aard van het ICC. Omdat er hier sprake is van een 
gerechtshof kan er worden aangenomen dat er daarom meer waarde wordt gehecht aan feiten. Dit is 
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terug te zien in het veelvuldig gebruik van feiten om de vraag naar meer druk vanuit de staten om de 
arrestatie en uitlevering te bevorderen te ondersteunen.  
 
Symbolic politics 
De tweede methode die besproken zal worden is symbolic politic. Delen van de briefing worden 
geïnterpreteerd als symbolic politics wanneer specifieke gebeurtenissen als symbool gebruikt worden 
om de gebeurtenis meer waarde te geven. Daarnaast kunnen er meerdere gebeurtenissen aan elkaar 
gekoppeld met als doel deze meer waarde geven. De symbolische gebeurtenissen worden 
geïnterpreteerd aangeboden. Hierdoor kan een er meer waarde worden gegeven aan bepaalde 
gebeurtenissen. Door deze belangrijke gebeurtenissen te noemen kunnen de lidstaten van het ICC 
beïnvloedt worden om meer aandacht te geven aan het conflict in Oeganda en de arrestatie en 
uitlevering van de verdachten te stimuleren.  
Slechts bij twee verschillende briefings is er bewijs gevonden voor het gebruik van deze methode om 
de lidstaten van het ICC te beïnvloeden. Zoals in tabel 1 te zien is, is er alleen in 9e briefing van 29 
maart 2007 en de 10e briefing van 26 juni 2007 gebruik gemaakt van symbolic politics (zie appendix G 
en G). Een mogelijke verklaring voor het spaarzame gebruik van deze methode is het feit dat het een 
aanklager is die de toespraken geeft. Het gebruik van symbolische gebeurtenissen is in een 
rechtszaak niet gebruikelijk. Hij zou dan ook meer waarde kunnen hechten aan feiten en afspraken, 
iets wat hij vaker gebruikt, dan aan symboliek.  
Wanneer er gekeken wordt naar de briefings waarin er wel gebruik is gemaakt van symbolic politics 
dan is er te zien dat er in de 9e briefing weinig gebruik is gemaakt van lobbytactieken in het 
algemeen. In de 10e briefing is dit in tegenstelling tot de 9e briefing wel het geval. In de negende 
briefing werd het arresteren van de verdachten gekoppeld aan de geloofwaardigheid van het Hof. De 
aanklager van het ICC, Luis Moreno-Ocampo zei: ‘Securing the arrest of the remaining four LRA 
commanders is on all counts a priority. Enforcing the decision of the Court on their arrest is important; 
it is important for the victims in Uganda and Southern Sudan, it is important for the credibility of the 
Court and its deterrent impact and it is important for the establishment of a legal framework 
worldwide.’(International Criminal Court 2007, p.5). Hiermee geeft hij de arrestatie van meer waarde 
dan alleen arrestatie op zich. De arrestatie van de vier verdachten wordt door de aanklager onder 
andere gekoppeld aan de geloofwaardigheid van het hof en de oprichting van een wereldwijd 
juridisch kader. In de 10e briefing wordt deze boodschap exact herhaald. Ook hier wordt dus de 
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koppeling gemaakt tussen de geloofwaardigheid van het Hof en de arrestatie van de verdachten. 
Daarnaast wordt ook hier verwezen naar het belang voor de slachtoffers.  
Geconcludeerd kan worden dat de aanklager slechts minimaal gebruik heeft gemaakt van symbolic 
politics. De twee keer dat dit wel werd gedaan is er een koppeling gemaakt tussen de arrestatie van 
de verdachten en onder andere de geloofwaardigheid van het Hof. Het minimale gebruik van deze 
tactiek kan verklaard worden aan de hand van de aard van het ICC. Omdat het een gerechtshof 
betreft wordt er minder waarde gehecht aan symboliek en zijn feiten belangrijker. Dit komt overeen 
met de verwachtingen die aanvankelijk gesteld waren. Deze hielden in dat de aard van het ICC 
invloed zou hebben op de keuze van de aanklager voor bepaalde lobbytactieken.  
 
Leverage politics 
Delen van de briefings zijn geïnterpreteerd als leverage politics wanneer er een koppeling wordt 
gemaakt tussen een verandering van het gedrag van de lidstaten van het ICC en een beloning. In dit 
geval zou deze verandering zich richten op het meer stimuleren van arrestatie en uitlevering van de 
verdachten aan het ICC door de lidstaten. In ruil voor deze verandering kan zowel een materiële als 
een morele beloning worden beloofd. Van tevoren werd er niet verwacht bewijs te vinden voor een 
materiële beloning vanuit het ICC wanneer staten hun gedrag zouden aanpassen. Het ICC is als 
organisatie verantwoordelijk voor het onderzoek naar misdaden en het vervolgen van verdachten. 
Voor het uitvoeren van arrestatiebevelen is het afhankelijk van staten. Daarnaast is het Hof 
afhankelijk van onder andere haar lidstaten voor financiële steun. Het heeft daarom simpelweg niet 
de financiële mogelijkheden om een materiële beloning tegenover een verandering van het gedrag 
van de lidstaten te zetten. In de briefings is zoals verwacht geen bewijs gevonden voor het gebruik 
van material leverage politics.  
In de briefings is ook geen bewijs gevonden voor het gebruik van moral leverage politics. Ook hier 
kan de aard van het ICC kunnen verklaren waarom er geen gebruik is gemaakt van deze tactiek. Het 
ICC heeft alleen de mogelijkheid om de betrokkenheid van de lidstaten van het ICC te stimuleren. Het 
ICC is geheel afhankelijk van deze lidstaten voor de uitvoering van de uitspraken. Het Hof is dan ook 
niet in de positie om een morele beloning te beloven, zoals een betere internationale reputatie.  
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Accountability politics 
De laatste lobbymethode die besproken wordt is accountability politics. Delen van de briefings zijn 
geïnterpreteerd als accountability politics wanneer staten tot verantwoording zijn geroepen of 
gewezen op eerder aangegane afspraken. Ook wanneer staten gewezen worden op een verschil 
tussen formeel onderschreven normen, zoals rechtspraak, en hun eigen handelen dan zal dit als 
accountability politics geïnterpreteerd worden.  
In totaal is er in de 18 geanalyseerde briefings 35 keer gebruik gemaakt van deze methode door de 
hoofdaanklager van het ICC. In tabel 1 is te zien dat dit voornamelijk in de begin periode van de 
briefings het geval was. Gemiddeld wordt er 1,9 keer per briefing deze lobbymethode toegepast. In 
briefings 4 tot en met 11 wordt er meer dan gemiddeld gebruik van gemaakt. Daarnaast zijn er nog 
twee momenten, briefings 13 en 15, waar dit het geval is. Slechts twee keer in alle briefings die 
geanalyseerd zijn is er meer gebruik gemaakt van accountability politics dan van information politics. 
Dit is het geval in briefings negen en elf.  
Voornamelijk in de beginperiode zijn de staten gewezen op hun verplichtingen tegenover het Hof en 
de bevolking van Oeganda. Dit is te verklaren aan de hand van het feit dat voor de 5e briefing op 26 
oktober 2005 besloten is om een arrestatiebevel uit te vaardigen voor 5 leden van het LRA (zie 
appendix C). In de 5e briefing werd deze beslissing dan ook uitgelegd aan de leden van het ICC. 
Vervolgens is er door middel van accountability politics geprobeerd om meer steun te krijgen van de 
lidstaten van het ICC. Door deze steun zouden de arrestatiebevelen sneller uitgevoerd kunnen 
worden. Een representatief voorbeeld van het gebruik van accountability politics in deze eerste 
briefings is deze uitspraak van de aanklager in de 5e briefing: ‘The next step is arrest. Arrest warrants 
of the ICC will help galvanize international efforts to apprehend the four suspects. The responsibility 
to execute the arrests is the responsibility of States Parties and the international 
community.’(International Criminal Court 2005, p.7). De lidstaten (States Parties) worden door de 
aanklager gewezen op hun verantwoordelijkheid om de arrestatiebevelen uit te voeren.  
 Na de 16e briefing op 26 mei 2009 is er nog maar zeer zelden gebruik gemaakt van de lobbymethode. 
Dit kan verklaard worden door het feit dat er op dat moment geen veranderingen meer plaatsvonden 
in de zaak. De verdachten waren nog steeds niet gearresteerd en uitgeleverd.  
Er zijn naast de eerste briefings nog twee briefings waarin er meer dan gemiddeld gebruik werd 
gemaakt van accountability politics om het gedrag van de lidstaten van het ICC te beïnvloeden. Na 
een briefing waarin nauwelijks gebruik was gemaakt van de methode, is er in de 13e politieke briefing 
van het ICC die plaatsvond op 24 juni 2008 vijf keer gebruik gemaakt van de accountability methode 
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(zie appendix K). Een voorbeeld van het gebruik van deze methode in deze briefing is deze uitspraak 
van de aanklager: ‘As I said earlier, the Court has now issued 12 warrants of arrest. States have only 
arrested four of these persons. Of the remainder, four warrants have been outstanding since 2005, 
one since 2006 and two others for over a year. The Court does not have the power to arrest these 
persons. That role belongs to States.’(International Criminal Court 2008, p4). Hieruit blijkt duidelijk 
dat de aanklager de staten wijst op hun verantwoordelijkheid. Het hernieuwde gebruik van deze 
methode in de 13e briefing is mogelijk te verklaren door het feit dat er tussen de twee toespraken 
meer ontvoeringen zijn gepleegd in 3 verschillende staten door het LRA. Dit geeft de aanklager een 
reden om opnieuw druk uit te oefenen op de lidstaten om hun verantwoordelijkheid te nemen. 
In de 13e briefing werd er even vaak gebruik gemaakt van Accountability politics als van information 
politics. De aanklager van het ICC gaf aanvankelijk vooral informatie over de veranderingen in de 
situatie in Oeganda sinds de vorige politieke briefing. In zijn slotpleidooi riep hij de staten echter op 
om hun verantwoordelijkheid te nemen voor het arresteren van de verdachten. Om dit te bereiken 
gebruikte hij accountability politics. De hoofdaanklager zei onder andere: ‘It is time for States to 
transform their expression of support to the idea of international justice into concrete cooperation. 
Impunity is not an abstract notion. Impunity fuels violence. Continuation of violence and crimes is 
what happens in situation, like that of Joseph Kony and other LRA leaders, where States Parties of the 
ICC are not facing their responsibilities, and still continue to refuse to call publicly for arrests’. 
(International Criminal Court 2008, p.10). Hier refereert hij duidelijk naar de verantwoordelijkheid 
van de staten om publiekelijk de druk op te voeren op Oeganda om de verdachten te arresteren 
waarna ze uitgeleverd kunnen worden aan het ICC.  
Ook in de 15e diplomatieke briefing van het ICC gebruikt de aanklager van het Hof na een periode van 
relatieve stilte veel gebruik van accountability politics (zie appendix M). In dit geval is dat te verklaren 
door het feit dat het 5 jaar geleden was dat de zaak door de president van Oeganda doorverwezen 
werd naar het ICC. Dit geeft de aanklager een directe aanleiding om de staten er nogmaals op te 
wijzen dat de verdachten nog niet gearresteerd zijn en dat zij verantwoordelijk zijn voor die taak. Dit 
deed hij onder andere door hen te wijzen op hun verantwoordelijkheid omdat ze het Rome Statuut 
hebben geratificeerd: ‘ It is a solemn reminder of the responsibility of States Parties to the Rome 
Statute. It is a call for action to arrest Bosco Ntaganda, Joseph Kony, Ahmed Harun and Omar 
Al‐Bashir, as well as to stop the massive crimes that they are still committing.’(International Criminal 
Court 2009, p.5). Hieruit blijkt duidelijk dat de hoofdaanklager de staten wijst op de verplichtingen 
die zij zijn aangegaan door zich aan te sluiten bij het ICC.  
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Conclusie 
 
In dit onderzoek stonden de lobbytactieken die de hoofdaanklager van het ICC heeft gebruikt 
centraal. Onderzoek naar het werk van de hoofdaanklager voor het proces is tot nu toe schaars 
geweest. Onderzoeken naar het ICC hebben zich voornamelijk gericht op de oprichting van het Hof of 
de processen die tot nu toe plaats hebben gevonden. Het is echter aannemelijk dat, voordat het 
proces kan beginnen, de hoofdaanklager invloed probeert uit te oefenen op de staten om arrestatie 
en uitlevering van verdachten te bespoedigen. Dit deel van het werk van de hoofdaanklager is door 
dit onderzoek onderzocht. Daarnaast is er geen onderzoek gedaan naar de invloed van de aard van 
de actor op de gebruikte lobbytactieken. In dit onderzoek is er onderzocht waarom de aanklager van 
het International Criminal Court bepaalde lobbymethoden heeft gebruikt.  
Dit is onderzocht door middel van een inhoudsanalyse van diplomatic briefings die ongeveer twee 
keer per jaar plaatsvinden. In totaal zijn er 18 briefings geanalyseerd die van 8 juni 2005 tot 19 
september 2012 zijn gehouden. Bij de inhoudsanalyse van de briefings is sprake van interpretatie van 
de tekst. De interpretatie van de tekst is mogelijk anders wanneer dit door anderen verricht wordt. 
Een vervolgonderzoek waarin de betrouwbaarheid van het coderen kan worden verbeterd is dan ook 
wenselijk.  
Om de hoofdvraag te kunnen beantwoorden is er eerst gekeken naar het geheel van de gebruikte 
lobbytactieken. Hier bleek dat de hoofdaanklager in de briefings vooral gebruik heeft gemaakt van 
information politics en accountability politics. Daarnaast bleek dat er een verband is tussen 
gebeurtenissen voor de briefings en de mate waarin de aanklager gebruik heeft gemaakt van 
lobbytactieken. Zo bleek er bijvoorbeeld dat het moment wanneer het 5 jaar geleden was dat de zaak 
doorverwezen werd naar het ICC en het moment wanneer het 4 jaar geleden was dat de 
arrestatiebevelen waren uitgevaardigd een positief effect hadden op de mate waarin de aanklager 
gebruik heeft gemaakt van lobbytactieken. Er was een toename te zien in het aantal gebruikte 
lobbymethoden. Daarnaast heeft de internationale beweging ‘Stop Kony 2012’ er mogelijk voor heeft 
gezorgd dat er, na drie briefings zonder verwijzingen naar Oeganda, weer aandacht werd besteed aan 
de zaak in de 22e briefing. Er kan worden geconcludeerd dat deze gebeurtenissen de aanklager van 
het ICC aanleiding geven om meer aandacht te besteden in zijn briefings aan de zaak Oeganda en om 
de lidstaten van het ICC te stimuleren dit ook te doen. Er was van tevoren niet verwacht een 
verklaring te vinden voor de schommelingen van het aantal lobbytactieken. Er is dan ook sprake van 
een extra bevinding.  
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De aanklager heeft hoofdzakelijk gebruik gemaakt van information en accountability politics. De 
andere twee methoden, symbolic en leverage politics, zijn niet of slechts enkele keren gebruikt. Dit is 
te verklaren aan de hand van de aard van het ICC. De keuze voor tactieken is afhankelijk van de aard 
van degene die lobbyt. Het ICC is een gerechtshof en daarom kan er aangenomen worden dat er 
meer waarde wordt gehecht aan feiten en verdragen. Dit leidt tot een voorkeur voor het gebruik van 
information en accountability politics. Symbolic politics stelt gebeurtenissen centraal en geeft deze 
meer waarde om zo anderen te beïnvloeden. Deze methode is amper gebruikt door de 
hoofdaanklager, omdat deze gebruik maakt van symboliek waar het Hof mogelijk minder waarde aan 
hecht. Leverage politics is niet gebruikt in de briefings. Dit is te verklaren door het feit dat het ICC 
afhankelijk is van de lidstaten om hun rechtspraak uit te voeren. Zelf heeft het Hof geen middelen om 
de verdachten te arresteren. Het Hof heeft echter ook geen middelen om als beloning tegenover een 
gedragsverandering te zetten. Het ICC is een onafhankelijk gerechtshof en het ligt dan ook niet in de 
aard van het Hof om staten een betere internationale reputatie te beloven. Het gebruik van 
information politics en accountability politics is te verklaren vanuit de mogelijkheden en voorkeuren 
die het Hof heeft om de lidstaten te beïnvloeden. De middelen die het ICC voorhanden heeft zijn 
feiten en verdragen, waaraan de staten zich dienen te houden.  
Dit onderzoek heeft uitgewezen dat het ICC wel degelijk gebruik maakt van lobbymethoden om 
uitlevering van verdachten te bespoedigen. Hoewel het ICC een onafhankelijk international 
gerechtshof is en aan haar neutraliteit niet getwijfeld wordt, is er in de momenten voor het 
daadwerkelijke proces gebruik gemaakt van lobbymethoden. Daarnaast kan er geconcludeerd 
worden dat het gebruik hiervan beïnvloed wordt door zowel de aard van de actor die de tactieken 
gebruikt als door specifieke gebeurtenissen.  
Meer onderzoek is wenselijk, omdat er tot nu toe weinig wetenschappelijk onderzoek gedaan is naar 
de invloed van deze twee zaken op de gebruikte lobbytactieken. Het is dan ook wenselijk dat er 
onderzocht wordt of deze zaken ook invloed hebben op andere actoren, bijvoorbeeld op de lobby 
van internationale organisaties. Daarnaast kan er onderzocht worden of een lobby van bijvoorbeeld 
het Joegoslavië tribunaal ook beïnvloed wordt door de aard van deze actor. Wat betreft de invloed 
van specifieke gebeurtenissen op het gebruik van lobbytactieken dient er verder onderzoek gedaan 
te worden naar in hoeverre de media invloed hierop heeft. De lobbytactieken van het ICC zelf dienen 
ook verder onderzocht te worden. Zo dient de effectiviteit van de lobby van de aanklager onderzocht 
te worden en kan er gekeken worden of het ICC ook op andere manieren lobbyt die minder zichtbaar 
zijn.  
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De bevinding van dit onderzoek, dat de aard van de actor invloed heeft op de lobbytactieken die deze 
gebruikt, heeft niet alleen implicaties voor deze casus. Er dient dan ook onderzocht te worden of hier 
alleen sprake van is bij gerechtshoven zoals het ICC of dat dit voor alle verschillende actoren geldt. 
Mocht dit gelden voor alle verschillende actoren dan verklaard dit een groot deel van de verschillen 
in de lobbytactieken die gebruikt worden.  
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A: Codeerboek 
 
Information politics 
Er wordt verwezen naar: 
 Feiten 
 Gebeurtenissen 
 Getuigenissen 
 
Symbolic politics 
Er wordt verwezen naar: 
 Symbolische gebeurtenissen 
 Koppeling tussen gebeurtenissen 
 Koppeling tussen gebeurtenissen en (mogelijke uitkomsten) 
 
Leverage politics 
Er wordt verwezen naar: 
 Verband tussen een verandering van gedrag en materiële beloning (bijv. geld) 
 Verband tussen een verandering van gedrag en morele beloning (bijv. reputatie) 
 
Accountability politics 
Er wordt verwezen naar: 
 Eerder gemaakte afspraken 
 Verdragen 
 Verantwoordelijkheid 
 Eerder gemaakte taakverdeling 
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I have been asked today to focus on a specific topic, namely our experiences with investigations in 
the field.  Since the last briefing in Brussels, we have initiated and carried out two investigations 
based on referrals from States Parties, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo. We have 
carried out numerous investigation missions to the field, interviewing persons and collecting other 
evidence.  Excellent progress has been made in both investigations. 
 
On Monday, we initiated our third investigation, into the situation in Darfur, following a referral 
from the Security Council. 
 
We carried out our first investigative activities at the same time as hiring and assimilating new 
staff, developing new protocols, and establishing cooperation networks.  At each step of the way, 
we are encountering issues that have never been considered before.   We must proceed 
expeditiously, but at the same time think carefully in our decisions.. We have to build a new 
permanent institution, determine strategies and best practices and at the same time we must be 
operational on the field, fulfilling high expectations. 
 
We have adopted strategies to address our challenges and obligations. 
 
o Small, flexible Office, relying on cooperation networks with a range of partners. 
o Focus on those who bear the greatest responsibility. 
o Focused investigations and focused charges. 
o Interdisciplinary approach. 
o Respect for interests of victims. 
 
Our  investigation  teams  include  investigators,  case  analysts,  interpreters  and field operators.   
The teams draw on extensive support from trial attorneys, analysts, cooperation experts, victims 
experts, forensic coordinators, legal advisers, translators, evidence assistants and others. 
 
Daily interaction takes place with Registry especially in victim protection and field activities (travel, 
field office). Our teams have training on investigative methods, security, first aid, crisis management, 
and cultural sensitivity. 
 
I will try now to give you a sense of the work we are doing and our experiences with investigations in 
the field.  You will appreciate that I have to limit myself in many respects given the confidential 
character of investigations. 
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Scale of Crimes 
 
One challenge we face in our investigations is the scale of the crimes.  To use the DRC situation as an 
example; the situation involves thousands of deaths by mass murder and summary execution 
since 2002, as well as large-scale patterns of rape, torture, and use of child soldiers. 
 
Numerous armed groups active in the DRC are allegedly involved in crimes. Groups are unstable, 
with non-conventional and changing structures.   It is a volatile situation where alliances are 
continuously shifting. 
 
To deal with this scope of crimes, we focused our investigation through analysis. 
 
We identified the Ituri region as the area with the gravest crimes within our temporal jurisdiction.  
We then did analysis to identify and prioritize the groups most responsible for crimes. We plan to 
work sequentially in the DRC, starting with one or two cases, selected based on gravity, while 
continuing to develop other cases. 
 
The concept of analyses driven investigation is implemented in all investigations. Only detailed 
analyses from headquarters allows detailed and focused planning on our investigation. 
 
Analytical tools are used for the analyses of the high volume of documents collected and through all 
the investigative process. 
 
 
Staff Security 
 
We often must work in situations of ongoing conflict.  In the DRC, large parts of the territory remain 
outside effective governmental control.  In Uganda, the LRA is active in many areas. 
 
Security for staff is a major concern. We take all measures not to expose our staff to inappropriate 
risks. 
 
In some areas, such as capitals, our staff can be lodged in hotels. In other areas, for   example   in   
Ituri,   we   make   other   arrangements,   such   as   staying   in peacekeeper camps. 
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During missions of our investigation teams, attacks on MONUC forces by rebel groups have taken 
place. 
 
While we must always show our independence, we are also obliged at times by the  security  
situation  to  rely  on  national  authorities  and  others  to  provide military escorts or armoured 
vehicles.  It can be difficult at times to manage the balance between demonstrating and upholding 
the appearance of independence, and ensuring security.   We manage the balance as best we can.   
Part of the solution is to rely at different times on different partners. 
 
Another  element  of  security  for  staff  is  reliable  communication  from  remote areas.   We have 
had to overcome logistical and regulatory hurdles in order to equip our people with reliable radios 
and satellite phones. 
 
Health can also be an issue for our teams.  Despite all precautionary measures that can be 
taken, team members have fallen ill and have been referred to the tropical disease clinic in 
Rotterdam to obtain treatment for illnesses such as malaria. 
 
Witness Security 
 
Witness security poses a range of issues, especially given that we work in conflict situations while 
being based in The Hague.  Security of witnesses and victims is a high priority for us.  We have 
adopted multiple methods to address this. 
 
First, we strive to limit the number of witnesses we contact, in order to limit the risk. 
 
Second, we try to work with witnesses who are outside the area of conflict; whether in other 
countries or in more secure parts of the country. 
 
Third, where we have identified a small number of victim witnesses in an area whom we need to 
interview, we apply a policy of conducting interviews only where there has been a clear assessment 
of protection issues.  In some cases, this means we must first put in place suitable witness 
protection arrangements.  For categories of vulnerable witnesses, we also require an assessment by 
the OTP witnesses unit to determine (1) whether we can interview in the circumstances and (2) 
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what follow up is needed.   These policies have at times caused some delays but security is a 
paramount concern. 
 
Forth, we try to interview witnesses in ways and places so that others will not know that a person 
has been interviewed. This is a particular problem if you have to investigative in villages in 
conflict areas only accessible by MONOC helicopter and military escort. At times we have adopted 
innovative ways to transport witnesses in secret or to meet them without raising attention. In  some  
areas  it  is  very  difficult  to  find  suitable  secure  sites  to  conduct interviews.  We sometimes 
must do interviews in hotels or locations provided by international  organizations.  This  situation  is  
far  from  being  ideal  for  many reasons (confidentiality, security). 
 
Where  witness  protection  is  required,  the  Registry  works  with  us  to  find partners, including 
local governments, to provide witness protection.   We sometimes work with local police who may 
have limited experience in witness protection and limited resources.  Sometimes circumstances 
have required us to improve local capacity to provide witness protection.   In one example, 
local police had no equipment for witnesses to communicate if they have problems, and  no  
means  of  transport  to  come  to  the  aid  of  witnesses.    We  therefore supplied them with 
communications equipment and with contingency arrangements for transport if needed. 
 
Regulatory and Logistical Issues 
 
Dealing with even simple logistics in the field can often require creativity and flexibility, in ways that 
might not at first be obvious from Brussels or The Hague. 
 
Some obstacles arise from lack of implementing legislation.   In Uganda, a constitutional issue has 
created delays with all legislation.  In the DRC, issues of transition and adoption of a constitution 
have caused delays. 
 
For example, in Uganda, we were unable to register vehicles in the name of the ICC because the ICC 
lacked legal personality in Ugandan law.  This was solved through discussions of the OTP and 
Registry with the Ugandan government. The Ugandan government found interim solutions so that 
we could register the vehicles. 
 
Equipment and transport will generally be a challenge in field work.   For example, in Uganda, before 
the registration issue was solved, we had to rent vehicles.   Our teams experienced 10 vehicle 
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breakdowns with rented vehicles. Now that we have our own vehicles, we expect this particular 
problem will be reduced. 
 
Similarly,  transport  in  the  DRC  is  a  challenge.    It  is  1700  kilometers  from Kinshasa to Bunia.   
We must fly through neighboring countries, Kenya and Uganda, to enter Eastern DRC.  To get to 
Ituri, we rely on MONUC flights, on a cost-reimbursable basis and with a low priority, so our missions 
are very dependent on MONUC decisions.  The aging Anatov planes face many technical problems, 
and flights are often cancelled for various reasons.  Nonetheless, this is simply a fact of our 
operations. 
 
Our planning also has to take into account power shortages.  For example, we are required to 
conduct questioning of potential suspects on video or audiotape, and therefore have often had to 
suspend interviews because of lack of power.  We are trying to procure generators to overcome this 
problem. 
 
Field Experience 
 
It is extremely complex to organize from The Hague some aspects of our work, such as locating and 
screening potential witnesses.      Moreover, working from hotels poses problems of where to take 
statements and how to organize work in a secure way.  . This is why we have concluded that a 
permanent premise is very important.  Establishment of field presence will always be highly 
dependent on the security situation. 
 
The Registry and the OTP have established a field office in Kampala. For the office in Kinshasa, 
the building is available and the work is done, and we are awaiting installation of equipment.   We 
will also have an advance operational base in Bunia, in containers in a military base.  Our people 
will be present on an ad hoc basis. 
 
Field  presence  is  not  only  important  to  facilitate  investigations  and  witness security, it is also 
important for perception and outreach.  If people know there is a concrete location for the ICC they 
can more readily contact us. 
 
Language and Culture 
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Language and culture require special sensitivity.   We have insisted on special training for our 
investigators and staff going to the field to raise their awareness of local culture.   Because 
witnesses are culturally diverse and potentially traumatized, we need specialized support  on all 
investigative missions.   For example, in Uganda, we require translators fluent in six different 
dialects. 
 
Many of our witnesses are not familiar with criminal justice as it is known in other countries.  
They simply do not relate to explanations about law, lawyers, rights and procedures.  This can make 
it difficult to explain and understand the legal caution that must be given prior to some interviews.   
Indeed, the local language may not even include words for some of the concepts in the caution. 
 
The work also requires cultural understanding.  For example, the notion of time is not the same in 
all cultures.  A witness may not be able to situation an event in terms of the date or time.  But the 
witness might describe the location of the sun during the event. 
 
The notion of family can also be different.   A person may refer to someone as their brother or 
uncle, but upon inquiry it turns out that the person is a distant cousin.  We have developed 
awareness of these issues in our questioning, so that we can ask the right questions. 
 
Some potential witnesses may not be accustomed to travel and transportation. Going to Bunia may 
be a major ordeal and the longest trip of their life.  So we would have to hesitate over whether to 
ask such persons to come all the way to the Hague.   The courtroom itself would be an intimidating 
environment.   We have the ability to interview someone in a location where they would feel 
comfortable, not in courtroom, but to do it remotely through video. 
 
Cooperation 
 
We have received strong cooperation in both situations. 
 
Cooperation in Uganda has been excellent, both from the government and from all other partners.  
Despite concerns of some partners about the involvement and impact of the ICC, cooperation has 
been steady. 
 
In the DRC, the government is cooperating with our investigations.   However, the government 
faces great challenges re-asserting control and establishing institutions.  Some areas of the DRC do 
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not yet benefit from the deployment of army  and  police,  which  are  now  being  integrated  and  
deployed.    Logistical issues are a barrier for cooperation.  For example, it is difficult to set up 
proper cooperation procedures when there are no working fax machines or no direct means to 
have requests    for    assistance    implemented    on    the    field. 
 
In both situations, we have concluded important cooperation agreements to facilitate our work.  We 
also have specific agreements on topics such as witness security and privileges and immunities. 
 
In the DRC, the cooperation of MONUC is indispensable.   Working with the Registry, we are 
negotiating a formal agreement with MONUC.   We hope for progress as soon as possible. While 
we are obtaining good logistical cooperation on an ad hoc basis for each of our missions, sharing of 
information will remain difficult until the agreement is concluded. 
 
 
Local Communities 
 
Working with local communities is an important part of our work in the field.  It is important for us 
to explain our activities and to raise understanding and support, since local groups are in contact 
with the victim population and they are an important intermediary.  In addition, there is also a more 
direct impact, since local groups can identify victims, provide information and reports, and advance 
our work.  Opportunities for cooperation are strong, although of course we must mutually respect 
independence. 
 
I will focus on Uganda for the purpose of providing an example. In our earliest outreach, we 
identified key local constituencies, and listened to their concerns. Their concerns informed our 
strategy and operations.  This led to our decision to maintain a low profile for the first year of 
operations, to develop trust. 
 
Many local and international actors in Uganda expressed concern about the potential impact of ICC 
involvement.   The challenge is how to achieve justice alongside peace and humanitarian efforts.   
We are striving to carry out our mandate, while taking concrete steps to manage our profile and 
activities so as to avoid any disruption to the peace process.  This conforms to the approach in UN 
report on the rule of law, which advises that justice, peace and democracy are not mutually 
exclusive but rather mutually reinforcing imperatives. 
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At this time, we have consolidated relationships and have the support necessary to begin increasing 
our profile.   In addition to our frequent consultations in Uganda, we invited over 30 community 
leaders to Hague in April and May of this year.   We discussed key issues, including the peace 
process, security and public information.    These leaders, although they had concerns and 
disagreements, agreed on a comprehensive approach.   We agreed that justice could be pursued at 
the same time as peace, humanitarian and other efforts.  We will carry out our mandate (justice) but 
we can be sensitive to these other efforts. We agreed on the need to coordinate efforts and to 
disseminate information. There has been a strong focus now in Uganda on the importance of 
providing justice. We will continue to engage with local communities to explain our role and to 
discuss concerns. 
 
Engagement with local communities is an important feature in all investigations, and one which we 
continue to intensify.  Two weeks ago, during my last trip to the DRC, I met with local NGOs to 
discuss roles and identify ways we can further strengthen cooperation. 
 
 
How States Parties Can Help 
 
I have tried to provide a simple overview of some of our experiences with investigations in the field.   
I want to close by emphasizing that we need your steadfast support. 
 
We need agreements for sharing of sensitive information.   Such information is essential for our 
strategy of focused investigations. 
 
We need logistical support for our activities. Forensic teams, software and equipment could be 
important contributions. 
 
We need support to facilitate arrests in both situations. The challenge to make arrest warrants 
meaningful and effective will be a collective challenge for all States Parties. 
 
We need institutional cooperation.  We are strengthening our relations with war crime units, and 
we will be present at the Interpol war crime conference next week. 
 
Above all, we need strong political support and commitment to justice.  This also includes working 
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with other states and organizations to encourage cooperation. 
 
We need to maintain a dialogue, to explain our strategies and to receive your feedback.  The 
Prosecutor has invited all States Parties to a meeting at the seat of the Court on Monday 20 June.  
In contrast to the short overviews we can provide at Diplomatic Briefings, this meeting will allow a 
more informal and technical exchange of information and ideas on the guiding strategies of the 
Office. 
We are advancing our investigations in a timely manner.  We ask that you help us to build 
understanding of our work, and that you continue to give us your unwavering support. 
 
 
Thank you. 
 
 
 
* * 
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Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor 
 
Thank you Mr. President.  Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, as requested, I have the honour 
to provide further information on our activities  in our three  investigations. 
 
Uganda 
 
I would like to start  with  a comparatively detailed explanation of the  Uganda 
investigation, in light of the issuance of arrest  warrants. 
 
On 28 July 2004, after the preliminary analysis required by the Statute,  I took the decision to 
open an investigation. 
 
The criteria  for selection  of the  first  case was  gravity. We analyzed the  gravity of all 
crimes  in Northern Uganda committed by  all groups - the LRA,  the UPDF,  and  other 
forces.  Crimes committed by  the  LRA  were  dramatically more  numerous and  of  much   
higher gravity than alleged  crimes by other  groups. We therefore started with  an 
investigation of the LRA. 
 
During the investigation, we also continued to collect information on other groups.  We 
collected documents and  carried out interviews of several  sources.   We will continue to 
collect information on allegations concerning all other  groups, to determine whether the 
Statute  thresholds are met and the policy of focusing on the persons most responsible is 
satisfied. 
 
The investigation was carried out by a multinational investigation team, supported by the 
entire Office  and  the  Registry.   The  team  works   in  a  highly   challenging environment,  
investigating massive crimes during an ongoing conflict. 
 
Operating in small  groups of two  or three,  we  made  more  than  fifty missions to 
Uganda. The main  part  of the investigation was over in nine months. We took a number of 
measures to protect the security of potential witnesses, the victims,  and our investigators. 
 
On 6 May 2005, we filed an application to Pre-Trial  Chamber II for warrants of arrest  for 
five of the most  senior  commanders in the LRA, including its leader  Joseph Kony. We 
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requested that  the application and the warrants be sealed,  primarily because  of security 
considerations. 
 
The Pre-Trial  Chamber issued the  five arrest  warrants on 8 July 2005. Since then,  we have  
been making preparations for security and  unsealing.   The Government of Uganda has 
the main responsibility for security on the ground. Together with the Victims and Witnesses 
Unit of the Registry, we prepared protective measures for victims and potential witnesses.  In 
light of these measures, the Pre-Trial  Chamber took the decision to unseal the warrants on 
13 October  2005. 
 
The six attacks  that  are the focus of our  investigation are some  of the gravest attacks  on 
civilians that  the LRA has carried out in Northern Uganda since July 2002. The attacks  were  
carried out in several  different regions of Uganda. 
 
The warrants are against five leaders of the LRA on counts  of crimes  against humanity 
and  war crimes.  The alleged crimes include rape, murder, enslavement, sexual enslavement, 
and forced enlisting of children. 
 
Joseph Kony is the absolute leader  of the LRA and controls life and death within the 
organization. We collected evidence showing how he personally manages the criminal 
campaign of the LRA. Vincent  Otti is second  in command, and  has personally led attacks  on 
civilians  in Uganda.  Raska Lukwiya is  Army  Commander of  the  LRA  and  is  responsible 
for  some  of  the  worst   attacks committed by the LRA during the investigated period. 
 
Dominic  Ongwen was  an LRA Brigade  Commander, commanding  the  most  violent  of the  
four brigades of  the  LRA   In  the  last  weeks,  it  was  reported that  Ongwen was  killed  
in  combat, following an attack on an IDP camp. 
 
In all our work,  we are guided by the interests of the victims  and  we will always be 
respectful of local traditions. My team  made  over twenty missions to Uganda to listen  to 
the concerns of local  community  leaders,  including  religious  and  traditional  leaders,  
local  government  officials, Members of Parliament, and local and international NGOs. 
 
I also  held  meetings here  in  The  Hague with  leaders of  the  Lango,  Acholi,  Teso,  and  
Madi communities. We agreed to working together as part of a common effort to achieve 
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justice and reconciliation, the rebuilding of communities, and to end violence  in Northern 
Uganda. 
 
Our  involvement brings  a  justice  component to  a  comprehensive strategy.   These  
efforts  can reinforce each other.   For example, we have already received reliable reports of 
LRA members demobilizing  in  reaction  to  the  warrants.    To  them  it  was  a  signal  that  
the international community is now  taking  the situation seriously and  that  it is no longer  a 
local issue.  In order  to deter  defections, LRA leaders have been claiming that  the ICC will 
pursue more  warrants against all fighters.  It is important to get out the message that we are 
focusing only on the persons most responsible.   The  justice  component work   may  help  
isolate  the  top  leaders, contributing  to security and an end to violence. 
 
The  next  step  is arrest.    Arrest  warrants of the  ICC will  help  galvanize international 
efforts  to apprehend the  four  suspects.   The  responsibility to  execute  the  arrests is the  
responsibility of States  Parties  and  the  international community.  Reports indicate that  
the  fugitives are  moving between three  countries:   Uganda, DRC, and  the  Sudan.  These  
countries must  work  together, with  the support of the international community, to carry 
out the arrests. 
 
Democratic Republic of the Congo 
 
In the  DRC situation, given  the  scale of the  crimes  and  the  number of armed groups, we  
must work  sequentially.   We  are  starting with  one  or  two  cases,  selected   based  on  
gravity, while continuing to develop other  cases.   We identified the  Ituri  region  as the  
area  with  the  gravest crimes within our temporal jurisdiction.  We then identified and 
prioritized the groups most responsible for crimes. 
 
We have  continued to carry  out missions. With the Registry,  we have  established a field 
office in Kinshasa. We also have an operational presence in Bunia. 
 
We  have  interviewed  witnesses,  insiders,  and  suspects,  have  and  collected  documents 
and materials with  respect  to  crime  base,  linkages, and  military structures.   We 
continue with  the Registry  to develop witness protection arrangements. 
 
Transport,  security,  and  logistics  remain  major  challenges.    We  remain  heavily  reliant  
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on MONUC.    For  example, it  is  1700  kilometers from  Kinshasa to  Bunia,  so  we  must  
arrange transport with  MONUC planes;  such  arrangements are  subject  to available 
space  and  frequent flight cancellations.  In some areas,  we do not have  secure  alternatives 
to finding accommodation in peacekeeping camps.   At times,  because  of security related 
concerns and  logistical  problems - for example, difficulties securing space  in camps  - we 
have  had  to postpone or cancel missions. Despite  some  organizational and  legal 
problems, support on the ground is generally good.   We are striving to become  as 
autonomous as possible in the circumstances, but in some areas, we will not be able to 
operate without support. 
 
Darfur 
 
With  regard to  the  Darfur investigation, I reported to  the  Security  Council  on  29 June  
2005, detailing our activities.   The report is available on our website. 
 
We recruited our  investigation team,  including investigators, analysts, and  field officers, 
as well as interpreters in local languages.  The team  completed its training on issues  such 
as legal aspects of the elements of crimes, investigation strategy, crimes of sexual violence, 
and local culture and society. 
 
We have secured cooperation of several key sources of evidence, including organizations and 
individuals.  We have  collected  and  analysed documents reports and  video  and  photo 
records. The  team  has  conducted twelve   missions to  third countries in  order   to  
interview witnesses, including victims. We have also conducted missions to Chad  to 
establish an operational presence there. 
 
We are analyzing national proceedings and admissibility issues. 
 
We  have  had  good  interactions with  the  Government of  Sudan, and  have  had  
exploratory meetings and received information on national proceedings.  Because we are 
commencing our investigation from outside of the territory, we have not yet issued any 
requests for cooperation to the Government of Sudan. Unfettered cooperation will be 
essential for an efficient investigation. 
 
The Security  Council  encouraged the Court  to support efforts to promote rule of law and  
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human rights,  and  emphasized the need  for reconciliation and  efforts  to restore  long-
lasting peace.   We will continue to work  in a manner mindful of these initiatives, and  bring  
a justice component to a comprehensive strategy.  We are also looking  forward to 
cooperation with  the AU, as set forth  in the Council  resolution. 
 
Analysis 
In addition to the three  investigations, we are conducting analysis of 7 situations of 
concern.   We are planning missions to the Central African Republic and to Cote d'Ivoire to 
collect additional information on the criteria of Article 53.  Our budget assumptions foresee a 
fourth investigation starting in 2006. 
 
Cooperation 
 
The Court  as a whole  needs  the cooperation of the international community.  We are 
grateful for the  strong statements of support from  so many  actors.   In order  to carry  
out  our  mandate, we need  concrete,  practical cooperation from all States Parties. 
 
For example, the  Office of the  Prosecutor needs  information in order  to carry  out  
efficient  and objective  investigations.  At this  time,  we  have  agreements to share  
sensitive information with only  two  States  Parties.  The  Office  of  the  Prosecutor and  the  
Registry  will  frequently need logistical  support to carry out operational activities  in the 
field.  We may need  political  support to arrange access  to witnesses and  evidence.  We 
need  any  help  possible to create  conditions for arrest.   We need  States Parties  working 
within international and  regional organisations to create the most  supportive 
environment possible.     By acting  on this  common commitment, we have  a unique 
opportunity to advance the aims of the Rome Statute. 
 
The  Registrar, Mr.  Bruno  Cathala, will  now  discuss some  of the  specific  challenges we  
face in these contexts  and the ways in which  we overcome them. 
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Luis Moreno‐Ocampo, Prosecutor/Le Procureur 
 
I have the honour to speak with you today about external communications for the Office of 
the Prosecutor.   As you know, the Registry has primary responsibility for disseminating general 
information about the Court, serving the goal of transparency.   The OTP supplements this with 
specific external communications to explain our policies and activities.  In this way we seek to build 
support for our activities, helping us to carry out our mandate. 
 
We have crossed a river.   We have opened 3 investigations, and we have almost completed 
investigations in 2 cases.  We have arrest warrants. A prisoner has been transferred. Trials will 
start this year. A new phase with new challenges is starting. 
 
I would like to communicate to you the main developments in our three situations and 
then discuss the issues and challenges for our communications and some plans for the future. 
 
ACTIVITIES 
 
Democratic Republic of the Congo 
 
The most important development since the ASP lies in the DRC situation, with the arrest and 
surrender of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo.  The ICC now has its first suspect in custody.   The Court is 
now in a position to commence its first trial this year.  Many partners made this possible 
through their cooperation.   We are grateful to the government of France for making available a 
military aircraft, and to the members of the Security Council sanctions committee for lifting the 
travel ban. 
 
Thomas Lubanga was the founder and leader of one of the most dangerous militia in 
Ituri. He has been charged with conscripting and enlisting children under the age of 15 years and 
using them to participate actively in hostilities.  Forcing children to become killers is an extremely 
serious crime.  I have a special duty under Article 54 of the Statute to consider crimes against 
children. 
 
This  is  the  first  case,  not  the  last.  The  investigation  is  ongoing,  we  will  continue  to 
investigate more crimes committed by Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and we will also investigate other 
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crimes committed by other groups in Ituri. This is important, it’s a sequence. 
 
Uganda 
 
In Uganda, we are working with the Registry on strengthened outreach activities and efforts to 
galvanize support for arrests.  The issuance of warrants has produced a new dynamic.  Uganda, 
the DRC and the Sudan have pledged to coordinate to carry out arrests and leave the LRA 
no safe haven.  The LRA is scattered into smaller groups in different places and is increasingly 
isolated. The security situation has improved and must be further solidified. 
 
We are continuing missions to complete the investigation of the first case.  We work in 
sequence and started with the top leaders of the group responsible for the gravest crimes.   When 
this is completed,  we  will  evaluate  information  on  crimes  allegedly  committed  by  others  
persons  , including member of the UPDF, to determine whether the gravity and 
complementarity standards of the Statute are met. 
 
Darfur 
 
Darfur presents new challenges for the Court.  The security situation in Darfur means that any 
national or international investigations in Darfur at this time would cause risks for victims. No 
one can conduct a judicial investigation in Darfur. A comparative advantage for the ICC is that we 
can more easily investigate from the outside.  We have interviewed witnesses in more than 10 
countries. We are planning to present a clear picture of the crimes in our next report to the 
Security Council, in June. 
 
We have recently conducted two missions to the Sudan, in November last year and in 
February. We have discussed cooperation and admissibility.  We have interviewed persons.  The 
Sudan will be sending us further information that we have requested. 
 
The African Union will be an essential partner for our work.  Any assistance of States Parties in 
advancing that partnership will be appreciated. 
 
Other situations 
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We have learned in our work that preventative impact can begin even before 
investigations. We have sent a mission to Central African Republic to seek information on 
admissibility.  There is a pending domestic decision that could affect admissibility.  We are also 
planning a mission to Cote d’Ivoire  when  security  permits,  with  the support  of the UN.   The 
mission  could  contribute  to prevention. 
 
EXTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS OF THE OTP 
 
Our communications help us to achieve our specific goals in at least two ways:   building 
support and cooperation for our work, and contributing to the broader impact of the Court. 
 
As a legal body responsible for carrying out investigations, we have several constraints on our 
scope to communicate.   We must present our evidence before the judges, not the media. 
Confidentiality   and  discretion   are  necessary   to  help  us  protect   witnesses   and  ensure   
the effectiveness of investigations. 
 
Some  constraints  arise  in  particular  circumstances.    Sometimes  protecting  the  interests  
of victims may require us to take a low profile. 
 
Information  may be under seal.   As a result, we may at times be unable to share the 
most important developments  or accomplishments.   We can only divulge or confirm the 
information once it has been unsealed in accordance with judicial process. 
 
How  do  we  maximize  the  sharing  of  information  with  the  constraints  of  an  Office  of  
the Prosecutor? 
•   One: We will engage in discussion and dialogue on our general policies and approaches. 
• Two: While most investigative activities will be low profile, we regularly engage in 
dialogue with local and national communities and provide general updates in various 
reports and forums, such as the Diplomatic Briefings. 
• Three:  Even during investigation, the level of profile will vary at different moments in 
the process.  Opportunities to galvanize attention will arise at key moments such as 
initiation of investigation, reports to the Security Council and unsealing of warrants.  The 
level of profile may  also  vary  based  on  the  needs  of  the  investigation.     In  Darfur,  
a  higher  profile investigation may be needed in coming months. 
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•   Four: General outreach in a situation can carry on independently of investigations. 
• Five: Trials are the most important moment for an elevated profile.   This will increase 
the impact of the Court, including its preventative and educational effects. 
 
Confidentiality and transparency in analysis 
 
Let   me  provide   some   examples.   I  will   start   with   analysis.      In   principle,   analysis   
of communications is confidential.   The Statute and the Rules emphasize the confidentiality of 
information,  protecting  the  senders  of  communications,  and  protecting  the  integrity  of  our 
processes. 
 
Subject  to these rules,  we are sharing as much information  as we can, given the 
legitimate external interest.  We have published a policy paper on our approach to analysis, we 
have invited comments, and we will be revising our policy on analysis to provide more details on 
our approach. 
 
On 10 February we published an important update on communications, providing statistics 
and information on our analyses.  We will be furnishing these updates on a periodic basis. 
 
While responses are sent only to senders of communications,  we announced our policy 
that important responses will be publicized in the interests of transparency.   We will make 
responses public where a situation has been subject to intensive analysis, the fact of analysis is in 
the public domain and reasons can be given without risks to the senders. 
 
As a result, we published our reasons for decision in the Iraq and Venezuela situations.   The 
reactions have shown that publishing responses can have a positive impact, building 
understanding of our mandate and our standards. 
 
Respecting interests of victims 
 
Investigations in situations of conflict pose many new issues for OTP communication.  I can 
give you the example of Uganda and the interests of victims. 
 
In Uganda, in our first contacts, many community leaders urged us to take a low profile, so 
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as not to aggravate security conditions and to avoid affecting efforts to negotiate an end to the 
conflict. We therefore kept a low profile in the early months of our investigation, showing the 
compatibility of  justice  and  efforts  for  peace.    This  was  our  duty  to  respect  victims,  and  it  
also  advanced cooperation for our investigation because it helped us build relations with local 
communities. 
 
We engaged in extensive dialogue with community leaders.   We reached understandings 
that we are bringing a justice component to a comprehensive approach.  Even the mediators of 
the peace process are now focused on how to work alongside justice and arrest efforts.  The result 
is a better context for cooperation, for arrest, and for succeeding in our mandate.  The networks 
are now used by the Court in its outreach programs.  The outreach of the Court has been 
increasing throughout last year and will continue to increase. 
 
Complex concepts, polarized populations 
 
Sometimes we must deliver messages on complex concepts, which will be particularly 
difficult in polarized settings where different sides may emphasize different messages. 
 
I can again use the example of Uganda and the discussion  on the interests of justice.   
Our position  was sometimes  misquoted  as meaning  that we had stopped  investigating  to 
allow the peace  process,  whereas  others  portrayed  it  as  meaning  that  we  were  indifferent  
to  the  peace process. 
 
Our position was that we were carrying out investigation as per our mandate.  We also 
collected information  on  the interests  of justice,  as per  our  duty  under  the Statute.    We  
noted  the legal possibility under the Statute of stopping if the stringent requirements under the 
“interests of justice” were satisfied, although the information never reached that standard.  We 
managed our timing and profile to avoid disrupting other efforts, and investigations continued 
unabated. 
 
It was through dialogue with local partners and organizations that understanding was reached. 
 
Building cooperation/different constituencies 
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For  my  last  example  of communication  challenges,  consider  the need  to build  
cooperation. Some observers have expressed concerns about contacts with particular 
governments or entities that they consider inappropriate.   This can create misperceptions of our 
work and thus create an external communication challenge. 
 
Let me be clear.  International justice is based on international cooperation.  Investigations 
are not possible without external support, particularly from States.  Territorial States are 
important to enable us to go to the field, to access evidence and to take security measures.  
Territorial States are uniquely essential for arrest efforts.   For effective investigation, it is my 
duty to seek cooperation from States and other partners who may help. 
 
It will be important for us to make clear that we will seek information and evidence from all 
sources.  The focus of investigation is driven only by the evidence.  We will continue to do this with 
full impartiality. 
 
Next steps 
 
Effective communication is essential for our operations and for our broader impact.  In the 
DRC, we are explaining that the Lubanga warrant was only one step in a sequence, and we 
are putting  the  spotlight  on  the  often  neglected  problem  of  child  soldiers.    In  Darfur,  we  
will  be increasing our profile in the coming months.  We need to explain to audiences in the 
Sudan and in the international community that the investigation is proceeding unabated, in a 
manner respectful of Sudanese  society. 
 
In  Uganda,  the  radio  messages  announcing  the  warrants  are  a  good  example  of  public 
information  contributing  to the operations.   The radio  messages  appear  to have contributed  
to defections, weakening the LRA.    Public information about the warrants is helping to discourage 
supply and support, leading to a greater likelihood of arrests.  Agreements with Uganda, the 
DRC and the Sudan are increasing the prospects for arrest. 
 
We  are  preparing   an   OTP   external   communication   strategy   that  will  supplement   
and complement the Court‐wide external communication strategy. 
 
Periodic strategic meetings with States Parties and with NGOs have been an excellent forum to 
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communicate about our policies and activities and to obtain feedback to improve them. 
 
The Office  is currently  developing  specific  policies  on various  issues.   We look  forward  
to opportunity for dialogue with States Parties and NGOs with respect to those policies.  This 
dialogue is an important component of our external communication.   Your understanding of our 
work will help amplify our messages and increase our impact. 
 
Developing an epistemic network of academics and research institutions will also help to shape 
our thinking and improve the appreciation of our work .  A lack of understanding of our specific 
constraints on the part of those who would evaluate academically the work of the ICC could 
undermine the ICC’s legitimacy. 
 
Communication  is  a  two‐way  process.    An  international  Prosecutor  is  always  making 
choices, and there will always be room for different views.  For example, in the Milosevic case, the 
Prosecutor had a choice between establishing a historical record or bringing very focused charges. 
Both options were reasonable.  The Prosecutor is now criticized for choosing the broader 
approach. My choice will be the narrower approach.  Some day I will be criticized for that 
approach too.  The point is, we understand there will always be other views, we are ready to 
explain our reasons and discuss views.   It does not affect  our independence  to receive views 
as part of an appropriate dialogue.  As part of the policy development process, I hope we can 
develop ways to continue and strengthen that dialogue. 
 
It is a very good moment for the Court. A new phase with new challenges is starting. 
We thank you for your cooperation, but we need to strengthen the efforts further. We need your 
help to arrest the LRA leaders and stop their activities, we need your help to develop new 
cases in DRC and to contribute to end crimes and impunity in Darfur. 
 
Thank you. 
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Luis Moreno‐Ocampo, Prosecutor 
 
PROSECUTORIAL STRATEGY 
 
I have the honor to speak with you today about the Prosecutorial Strategy. As 
President Kirsch just explained, the Court has adopted a common approach to strategic 
planning which sets out three interrelated strategic goals, and 30 strategic objectives over the 
coming years to help reach these goals. As you know, the ICC operates under the One‐Court  
principle,  while nevertheless respecting the independence of the individual organs. The common 
sector is contained in the ICC Plan. The Prosecutorial Strategy is independent, but coordinated 
with the ICC Plan. 
 
Background 
 
The OTP has developed its Prosecutorial Strategy after extensive consultation with the 
staff and senior management. It is based on the experience gained during the Office’s first three 
years of work. We are producing a report on the activities performed during these three years and 
we will organize meetings with states and other constituencies in order to receive their comments. 
We will explain  how we face certain  dilemmas.  The first dilemma  is how to begin  cases and 
gain  the necessary support and cooperation. Welcoming voluntary referrals by territorial states 
was a crucial policy  decision  taken  by  the  Office.  This  method  of  initiating  cases  has  
guaranteed  greater cooperation and on‐the‐ground support. 
 
The second dilemma faced by the Office is one shared by other international tribunals: 
how to conduct criminal investigations without a state apparatus, i.e., without any police forces, 
armies, or other enforcement capacities. The Court faces the added wrinkle of conducting the bulk 
of its investigations in the midst of on‐going conflicts. Operating in the context of on‐going 
conflicts has raised significant challenges for the protection of victims, witnesses and investigators 
and has also raised thorny dilemmas related to peace and justice.   In response, the Office has 
adapted its investigatory strategies to the individual conflict situations in which it operates, and 
has adopted an overarching policy of conducting focused investigations. 
 
The third dilemma facing the Office is how to execute arrest warrants. This is perhaps 
the most critical and difficult issue that the Office has encountered in its first three years. The 
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Court does not have its own enforcement capacity. Under the Rome Statute, it is the State Parties 
that bear the responsibility  for arresting  suspects and delivering  them to the Court for 
prosecution.  It is particularly crucial for a new, permanent International Criminal Court to begin 
creating a record of successful prosecutions early in its tenure. More assistance is needed to 
enforce the five outstanding arrest warrants that have been issued in the Northern Uganda case. 
We anticipate that this will be an on‐going challenge in the next phase of its operations. 
 
The report will include a summary of the issues we are discussing before the Pre‐Trial and 
Appeals Chambers regarding fundamental legal matters, such as the scope of victim 
participation; the role of the each organ in the investigative  process; and the scope of 
review of the Appeals Chamber. 
 
The formulation of the Prosecutorial Strategy took into consideration the lessons learned 
during the past and is crucial to allows us ‐ the OTP, the ICC as a whole and the State Parties – 
to agree upon a common understanding of what is expected of the Office over the next three 
years. The success of the Court should not be measured in terms of number of cases. Instead a 
more appropriate measure would be the impact of the Court in the promotion of national efforts 
and international cooperation to end impunity for the most serious international crimes. 
Therefore, it is important that we can agree on a common standard for evaluating the Office’s 
work in the coming years. In this regard, this briefing is not the end of the process. Rather, we 
intend to discuss the Prosecutorial Strategy with representatives of states in September‐October 
in New York and in the Hague. We will circulate a copy of the three year report and the 
Prosecutorial Strategy in advance, as well as the policy papers which we are in the process of 
finalizing and which have helped to shape the Prosecutorial Strategy. We will also distribute 
annexes to our policy paper, defining the standards we apply to select cases and how we interpret 
art. 53 of the Statute, specifically on the interests of justice. At the end of this process we will 
adjust our strategy in accordance with the comments received. 
 
Principles of the Prosecutorial Strategy 
 
At the core of the Prosecutorial  Strategy lie three essential principles that the Office 
has developed during its first three years of work: positive complementarity; focused 
investigations and prosecutions; and maximizing the impact. 
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With  regard  complementarity,  the  Office  recognizes  that  according  to  the  Rome  
Statute national states have the primary responsibility for preventing and punishing atrocities in 
their own territories. In this design, intervention by the ICC must be exceptional – it will only 
step in when states fail to conduct investigations and prosecutions, or where they purport to do 
so but in reality are unwilling or unable to genuinely carry out proceedings.  A Court based on 
the principle of complementarity  ensures  the international  rule of law by creating  an 
interdependent,  mutually reinforcing  international  system  of justice.  With this in mind,  the 
Office  has adopted  a positive approach to complementarity, meaning that it encourages genuine 
national proceedings where possible; relies on national and international networks, and 
participates in a system of international cooperation. As a consequence, the effectiveness of the 
Court should not be measured only by the number  of cases  that  reach  the Court.  On  the 
contrary,  the absence  of trials  by  the Court,  as a consequence of the effective functioning of 
national systems, would be a major success. 
 
The second principle guiding the Prosecutorial Strategy is that of focused investigations 
and prosecutions. The Office will select situations and cases taking into consideration their 
gravity in order  to  work  on  the  most  serious  crimes.  Our  focus  will  be  on  those  who  bear  
the  greatest responsibility for these crimes, according to, and dependent on, the evidence 
that emerges in the course of an investigation. The policy of focused investigations and 
prosecutions also means that we select incidents and as few witnesses as possible are called to 
testify, reducing the security risks and assisting the Court in operating cost efficiently. 
 
The policy of focused investigations and prosecutions is evident in the cases that have 
been brought  so  far.  In  Uganda,  the  Lord’s  Resistance  Army  has  had,  at  a  minimum,  
hundreds  of members. According to the evidence collected we concluded that five persons 
were those bearing the greatest responsibility. In Northern Uganda between July 2002 and June 
2004 there were approximately  850  incidents.  We  chose  to  focus  on  just  six,  representing  
different  regions  and criminalities, for example gender crimes and looting. The selection of cases 
was affected to a greater extent by security problems in the DRC.   We are presenting the first 
case based on the charge of child conscription. 
 
The  third  principle  guiding  the  Prosecutorial  Strategy  is  to  maximize  the  impact  of  
our activities. The mere existence of the Rome Statute has already had a deterrent effect by 
encouraging states to incorporate the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court into their 
domestic law. Even before the initiation of any investigation by the Court itself, the use of this 
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legislation can be a major step  towards  preventing  atrocities  or  at  least,  in  bringing  to  justice  
the  perpetrators  of  such atrocities. Of course ICC trials and convictions will have an additional 
deterrent effect. Even before trials have begun, the investigation itself will play a preventative 
role. The beginning of an investigation increases the risk of punishment and therefore has a 
deterrent impact. Massive crimes are planned, the announcement of an investigation could 
have deterrent impact. Interestingly not just  in  the  area  of  the  investigation  but  also  in  
different  countries  around  the  world.  We  are collecting information about this. 
 
Finally, in establishing and implementing its policies the Office has been and remains 
cognizant of the important role that victims play in the proceedings. At every stage of the judicial 
process, the Office will consult with the relevant victims and take their interests into account. The 
Office has also developed procedures to avoid unnecessary risks to witnesses and potential 
retraumatization. 
 
 
Objectives for the Coming Three Years 
 
Based on the OTP’s essential principles and utilizing its organizational structure, the 
Office has formulated five strategic objectives for the coming three years. 
 
The first objective is to conduct four to six impartial investigations of those who bear the 
greatest responsibility in its current or new situations. 
 
The second objective is to further improve the quality of the prosecution, aiming to 
complete two expeditious trials. 
 
The third objective is to gain the necessary forms of cooperation for all situations to allow 
for effective investigations and to mobilize and facilitate successful arrest operations. 
 
The fourth objective is to continuously improve the way in which the OTP interacts with 
victims and addresses their interests. 
 
Finally, the fifth objective is to establish forms of cooperation with states and 
organizations to maximize the OTP’s contribution to the fight against impunity and the prevention 
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of crimes. 
 
On the first OTP objective, we foresee that in the next three years a maximum of six 
investigations will be needed and that our current resources will be sufficient to carry them out. 
 
With regard to the second OTP objective, the number of trials is difficult to foresee as it is 
dependant on the arrests and their sequence. The length of the proceedings depends on a number 
of factors, such as the defense’s policy and the security for witnesses. The judges are in charge of 
the proceedings, however the OTP aims to complete two trials in the coming three years. 
 
I would like to emphasize the third objective of gaining the forms of cooperation 
necessary to mobilize and facilitate successful arrest operations. While the Court does not have a 
mandate to “arrest” by itself, the experience gained so far demonstrates that the Office can and 
should deploy substantial efforts to gathering information on the whereabouts of suspects, 
galvanizing support and cooperation for arrest and surrender, and promoting coordination among 
national and international parties potentially involved in a successful arrest. 
 
With regard to the fourth objective of continuously improving the way in which the Office 
interacts  with  victims  and  addresses  their  interests,  the  Office  has  the  obligation  to  assess  
the interests of victims as part of its determination of the interests of justice under article 53 and 
rule 48. Furthermore,  the  Statute  provides  for  a  generous  scheme  of  victims  participation  as  
a  way  of ensuring that their views and concerns are taken into account throughout  the 
proceedings.  For these reasons and in light of our past experience, it is clear that it is necessary to 
systematically seek the views of victims and local communities at an early stage, before an 
investigation is launched, and to continue to assess their interests on an ongoing basis. This 
systematic interaction will also allow for adequate outreach among local communities in order to 
enhance the understanding and impact of OTP activities. 
 
Finally, with regard to the fifth objective of establishing forms of cooperation with states 
and organizations to maximize the OTP’s contribution to the fight against impunity and the 
prevention of  crimes,  the  Office  is  committed  to  fostering  the  type  of  international  
cooperation  that  will encourage and assist states to address impunity for large‐scale serious 
crimes, in a comprehensive fashion. 
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Conclusion 
 
The Prosecutorial Strategy, based on the Office’s experience over the last three years, 
will assist the Office in achieving its objectives, and thereby enhance the ability of the Court to 
reach its overall strategic objectives and goals. However, this cannot be accomplished without 
the assistance of states. The design of the ICC is that the Court assumes responsibility for the legal 
aspects, while states ensure that the suspects against whom warrants are issued are arrested. We 
are planning how to  do  our  part  better  and  we  need  to  receive  from  you  indications  of  
how  the  international community  can assist  in executing  the arrests  warrants.     Without  
your  contribution  to secure arrests we are unable to fulfill our mandate. Together we can strive 
to achieve the aims of the Rome Statute to prevent impunity for the perpetrators of the most 
serious crimes of concern to the international community and thereby contribute to the 
prevention of these crimes. 
 
Thank you. 
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Luis Moreno‐Ocampo, Prosecutor 
 
Introduction 
 
Your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, it is an honour to address you here today. 
 
As you will recall, at the last diplomatic briefing on 29 June 2006 I spoke about the Prosecutorial 
Strategy. Specifically I described the Office’s five strategic objectives for the next three years : 
(1) To complete two expeditious trials improving the quality of the prosecution;  
(2) to conduct four to six new investigations of those who bear the greatest responsibility; 
(3) to gain the necessary forms of cooperation;  
(4) to continuously improve the way in which we interact with victims 
(5) to maximize the office’s contribution to the fight against impunity and the prevention of crimes.  
 
Today I would like to explain in a bit more detail our present activities regarding the 
different situations my office is working on and the assumptions for the coming year. 
 
Our current activities 
 
In the Darfur investigation, our efforts are complicated by the security situation within Sudan 
and, also,  within  neighbouring  countries  such  as  Chad.  The  OTP  has  regularly  consulted  with  
the relevant agencies of the UN and with the AU and continues to make an assessment of the 
security situation.  We  have  concluded  since  June  2005  that  it  was  not  possible  to  
adequately  protect witnesses in Darfur. No effective system of witness protection can be 
established. Thus investigative effort  are  continuing  outside  Darfur  in  more  secure  locations;  
this  has  not  prevented  the investigation from proceeding for a period of fourteen months. 
During that time the OTP has taken statements from witnesses and victims, including refugees 
from Darfur. We have conducted investigative  steps in fifteen countries.  The full collection  of 
evidence  gathered  since June 2005 includes approximately nine thousand seven hundred fifty 
items of evidence or information; this includes those documents provided by the UN International 
Commission of Inquiry. 
 
The OTP also has requested cooperation from the Government of Sudan. Four missions have taken 
place in Khartoum. Investigative staff from OTP have conducted formal interviews of two senior 
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officials of the Government of Sudan about the conflict in Darfur.  Among the material which 
has been supplied by the Government of Sudan is information on their own efforts to investigate 
and prosecute crimes which potentially fall within the jurisdiction of the Court. The OTP continues 
to monitor this activity by the Government  of Sudan in accordance  with its obligations under 
the Statute. In the coming phase the OTP will seek to complete the investigation of the first 
case and will continue to assess on an ongoing basis the admissibility of cases. The Office 
aims to deliver justice to the victims of the crimes in Darfur, either through respecting genuine 
efforts at a national level or through cases before ICC judges or a combination of both. 
 
Concerning Uganda, I would like to update you on issues relating to the arrest warrants and our 
contacts with relevant authorities  of the DRC, Sudan and Uganda. As you know, we 
regularly communicate with the Ugandan authorities. Since October 2005, the OTP has also 
conducted four missions to the Sudan during which meetings were conducted about the 
execution of the warrants of arrest.   Since the LRA entered the DRC, the OTP has also conducted 
missions to the DRC to exchange information.  In April 2006, I met with President Joseph Kabila 
and other government and UN officials about the LRA and the execution of warrants naming LRA 
commanders located inside the DRC territory.  The OTP also has conducted missions, in Europe, 
Africa, and to New York, to meet with representatives  of other concerned States‐parties and 
the relevant departments of the UN, including the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, as a 
means of supporting international cooperation in aid of arrest efforts. 
 
On 26 August 2006, the Government  of Uganda and the LRA signed a Cessation of 
Hostilities Agreement which conditioned a temporary cease‐fire.  The role of the existence of the 
warrants in creating pressure upon the LRA to bring them to the table has publicly been 
acknowledged. 
 
The States to which the warrants of arrest were transmitted continue to re‐state their 
commitment to executing  the  warrants  of  arrest,  during  the  pendency  of  the  ongoing  
negotiations.    Uganda’s position that it has engaged in the current peace talks as a means of 
seeking a permanent solution to the violence that serves the need for peace and justice, 
compatible with its obligations under the Rome Statute is expressed in the letter of the 
Government of Uganda to the Registry dated October 2006. The Government of Sudan has signed 
an ad hoc agreement with the OTP in which it agreed to cooperate in arrest efforts. Through its 
meetings with DRC representatives, the OTP is aware that the   Government   of   the   DRC   also   
understands   its   cooperation   obligations   and   has   in acknowledgment of those obligations 
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requested MONUC to support arrest efforts consistent with MONUC’s mandate. 
 
The peace negotiations have given rise to media accounts in which commentators or 
representatives of States are reported to have raised the possibility of “withdrawing”  the 
warrants of arrest or granting an amnesty to the persons named in the warrants.  No State or 
any other entity, however, has sought withdrawal of the warrants, nor has any State or any other 
entity requested any amnesty from this Court. The Government of Uganda, as a party to the 
talks, has also consistently indicated in its communications to the Registry and the OTP that “the 
talks remain at an early stage and it is speculative to determine the outcome at this moment.” 
 
Our mandate is judicial.  Neither the OTP nor the ICC are parties to the talks. The main point for 
us is  that  the  latest  letter  from  the  Government  of  Uganda  to  the  Registry  reiterates  that  
the commitment  of the Government  to cooperate  with, and support the Court remains 
unchanged. Ambassador  Blaak  also  acknowledged  the  ongoing  nature  of  Uganda’s  
cooperation,  in  openly seeking recognition from the other States‐parties attending the Second 
Public Hearing of the Prosecutor that “executing the ICC arrest warrants is a collective 
responsibility requiring intensified international cooperation.” 
 
On DRC,  the case against  Thomas  Lubanga  is the first. We are of course  continuing  to 
collect evidence in relation to other groups/crimes investigated in Ituri with the aim of a second 
case in the coming year.  However, security conditions and the current volatility of the situation in 
the DRC are strong  constraints  on our investigative  work  at the moment.  We are also 
planning  to open  an investigation in a third case in the DRC. 
 
Our activities extend beyond those 3 investigations. As you know, we continue to receive 
hundreds of communications from individual and groups on alleged violations of the Rome 
Statute and we assess   this   information; we   conduct   or   have   conducted   preliminary 
analysis   in   situations concerning  countries  from all continents.  We are assessing  the gravity  
and admissibility  of the situations that could fall under our jurisdiction. 
 
The Office of the Prosecutor’s Assumptions for 2007 
 
As made evident in the Prosecutorial Strategy, my Office’s assumption is that we will conduct 
one full trial, the trial against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, in 2007. Additionally, we will continue with a 
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second investigation in the Ituri region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and we expect to 
request an arrest warrant in 2007. We also expect to begin a third investigation in the 
situation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
 
With regard to the situation in Northern Uganda, we have made our plans based on the 
assumption that the arrest warrants against the four remaining LRA commanders will be 
executed. 
 
In our third situation, that of Darfur, the Sudan, we will continue our investigation and expect 
pre‐trial activity to occur in 2007. 
 
Finally, we expect to select a possible fourth situation before the end of 2006 and to carry out our 
investigation and pre‐trial activity during 2007. 
 
We have employed these assumptions as the basis for our budget proposal for 
2007. 
 
The Success of the Rome System is a Joint Responsibility 
 
 
The President has highlighted in his presentation the important role that cooperation from 
States Parties and other stakeholders plays in achieving the Court’s mandate. As the President just 
mentioned, it is essential that states and other relevant actors work with the Court if we 
are to achieve its mandate. The level of cooperation impact heavily on the efficiency and speed of 
the investigations led by the OTP. 
 
Interestingly enough, the issue of cooperation with states and international organisations was 
also one of the main issues mentioned by the States themselves and the NGOs during the Second 
Public Hearings that my Office engaged in with interested states and civil society here in the Hague 
and in New York in September and October. I would just like to briefly mention some of the 
requirements that were addressed during those exchanges. 
 
First of all, there is a requirement for general political support.  We need that political support to 
extend  to all the departments  within  your countries.  We  need  this  support  to be expressed  
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in multilateral meetings, in the General assembly and in the Security Council. 
 
To promote such efforts on your part, we recognize that there is a need to exchange 
information about the situation in the areas concerned between the OTP and States Parties.   
Some states have created  an  informal  dialogue  mechanism  with  the  OTP  involving  country  
desk  experts  and embassies abroad. Let me confirm again our availability for such contacts. 
 
Of course,  there  is also  a need  for more practical  assistance.    It was  noted  during  The 
Hague meeting that the OTP should be more explicit about the types of cooperation needed by 
providing detailed, extensive and concrete requests for support. The understanding of the 
importance of cooperation and the need to provide more details about different forms of 
cooperation is shared by the whole Court and we will come back to States on this point. 
 
Cooperation  by states  will be key  in the areas of arrest  and surrender.  Another  major  field  
of cooperation  is the protection  of  witnesses.  Offering  protection  to witnesses  at all stages  
of the proceedings is a statutory obligation for my Office, it is also a requirement for the integrity 
of our investigations and the relationship of trust we establish with our witnesses.   Whenever 
there is a threat, and this can arise very early in the investigative process, months before an 
actual trial, we need to move quickly and efficiently; threatened witnesses cannot wait.  The cost 
for the Registry which has the responsibility for such activities is immense; this is why the 
Court needs avenues such as agreements for relocation of witnesses. 
 
Other concrete forms of assistance include of course the sharing of information and intelligence; I 
should also mention the provision of expertise in some specific fields such as forensics; then the 
provision of an airplane in a timely manner, as in the case of Thomas Lubanga, can prove of 
utmost importance. 
 
It was also noted in The Hague meeting that the Court needs to consolidate and expand its 
relationship not only with States but with the UN and its various bodies and agencies. As 
indicated in the Prosecutorial strategy, it is one of our objectives. Our dialogue with the UN 
secretariat, the legal  advisor  of the UN  or DPKO  is intense.  Ad hoc  arrangements  with  
specific  agencies  and programmes are pursued. 
 
Your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, the recent exchanges I had with yourselves in The Hague 
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during the Public hearing, as well as my recent trip to New York have given me a lot of insight 
in what could or should be done in this area of cooperation.   Hours spent in exchanging ideas, in 
receiving criticisms sometimes, was not wasted.   This Court has a lot of different 
constituencies: states, NGOs, victims.  The importance of receiving support from all these 
stakeholders is key for achieving the Court’s mandate.   We need this supportive environment and 
only through our combined  efforts  of  outreach  will  we  succeed.  It  is  therefore  essential  that  
a  programme  as important as outreach should be sufficiently funded to enable the Court to fulfil 
its mandate. 
 
Conlusion 
 
Your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, thank you again for this opportunity to discuss aspects 
of the prosecutorial strategy with you today. 
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Luis Moreno‐Ocampo, Prosecutor/Le Procureur 
 
Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, 
 
As you will recall, at the last Diplomatic Briefing, I provided an update on the different situations; 
and I emphasized that the success of the Rome System is a joint responsibility.   I detailed 
potential areas of enhanced cooperation, including political support; information‐sharing; 
consolidation and expansion of our relationship with the UN; and finally, collaboration in the areas 
of arrest and surrender. 
 
Today,  I  would  like  to  provide  an  update on  the  OTP’s  activities and  mention some  of  the  
present challenges for the effective implementation of the Rome System. 
 
 
Cooperation to implement the Rome System 
 
As the President indicated, many of the crimes under our jurisdiction occur in the context of 
ongoing armed conflict; as a consequence there is an interlink between the delivery of justice and 
efforts to secure peace and reconciliation.  This was actually foreseen in Rome where the drafters 
of the Statute introduced a lot of provisions which can come into play:  they set a high gravity 
threshold so that the Court would only have jurisdiction over the most serious crimes, they 
organized the complementarity regime and they introduced the reference to a Security Council 
role. 
 
That being said, the decision taken in Rome in 1998 and ratified since then by 104 countries is 
clear:  Lasting peace requires justice. 
 
The Rome Statue established a new approach: victims are entitled to both peace and justice. 
Consequently, it is essential in any conflict resolution initiative to seek a solution compatible 
with the Rome Statute.  We must be mindful of the mandate of the Court and not compromise 
on legality and accountability. Implementing this new paradigm means fulfilling our duty to 
respect and uphold the law.   The Court depends on State support to consistently reiterate this 
point in your public statements and your bilateral and multilateral efforts.  It must be made clear 
to mediators and negotiators in particular that when arrest warrants have been issued by the 
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Court, they must be implemented. While the Rome Statute does establish a complementarity 
system that allows the States concerned or the named individuals to challenge the admissibility, it 
must be clear that the final decision will rest with the Judges and that there can be no preliminary 
negotiation of the ICC’s decisions.  I cannot emphasize enough that your cooperation is needed in 
mainstreaming Court issues within international fora and in relevant decisions, reports, 
resolutions, declarations, and statements. Promoting respect for the independence of the OTP’s 
justice mandate during conflict resolution initiatives is a priority. 
 
This issue of political support for the Court will be one of the points highlighted in the 
consolidated report on cooperation that the three organs of the Court have prepared following the 
request of the Bureau. 
 
Let me at this point explain the goal we the OTP are trying to achieve with this report. In our first 
years, we have had to deal with cooperation issues mostly on an ad hoc basis, as needs arose, and 
often on an emergency basis. As we are in a process of stabilizing the Office and establishing 
frameworks and procedures, we are now developing a more proactive approach to cooperation; 
the idea is to present examples of the types of cooperation required by the OTP well in advance, 
so that all States can determine in which field they could provide help and we can prepare a 
framework; thus when we are faced with emergency situations, we can act together swiftly and 
efficiently. 
 
Already, since the first presentation made by the 3 organs of the Court to the Hague working 
Group on the 17th  of January, we have noticed very positive reactions by States ; with the 
permission of the Spanish Ambassador, I would like to use the example of my recent visit to 
Madrid where all the different Ministries and relevant authorities had been informed of our 
priority list and were ready to study the possibilities of developing a framework for global 
cooperation with the Court, including the most sensitive fields such as intelligence sharing  or  
extraction  of  threatened witnesses especially  with  the  provision of  emergency humanitarian 
visas – an area of course where the Registrar is leading. Less than 2 weeks after my visit this 
framework was put to use and the Spanish authorities responded to a sensitive request in 
less than 48 hours. I could use other examples, for instance South Korea – which is now working 
on the possibility of offering forensics services. I am also looking forward to a very important trip 
by the Registry and the OTP to Berlin on issues of cooperation. Of course such an approach should 
not lead to any breach in the confidentiality of our bilateral cooperation. Let me now move to  an 
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update of our current situations to give you very concrete examples of the importance of 
securing political support and judicial cooperation. 
 
Current situations 
 
As you all know, the Office has had some important developments in the last few months. Notably, 
the Pre‐ Trial  Chamber confirmed the  charges against DRC  militia leader, Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo,  so  we  are continuing our preparation for trial.   And, on Darfur, we have submitted an 
application to the Pre‐Trial Chamber naming two individuals in relation to 51 counts of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity. But we are confronted with a worrying stalemate in relation 
to Uganda, since the LRA commanders have not yet been arrested. 
 
Let me start with Northern Uganda as it is a prime example of the challenges we are facing. 
 
Our common challenge of course is to ensure the implementation of the Rome Statute; in 
this case it requires the enforcement of the arrest warrants. It is the law. 
 
The crimes allegedly committed by the LRA in Northern Uganda have decreased since the issuance 
of the ICC warrants and the movement of the LRA into the DRC, but the LRA is still committing 
crimes in particular by keeping abducted children in their ranks; furthermore there are regular 
reports of LRA attacks in  Southern  Sudan  and  DRC  as  well  as  worrying reports  of  the  LRA  
re‐grouping and  re‐arming in preparation for a  renewal of  violence.   There is  also recent 
information of  some LRA units, possibly including Kony and Otti, moving into or towards the 
Central African Republic. 
 
Securing the arrest of the remaining four LRA commanders is on all counts a priority.   Enforcing 
the decision of the Court on their arrest is important; it is important for the victims in Uganda and 
Southern Sudan, it is important for the credibility of the Court and its deterrent impact and it is 
important for the establishment of a legal framework worldwide. 
 
The OTP is committed to galvanizing international efforts to execute the warrants.   We are not 
directly involved in arrests, but we can help the States Parties concerned, especially the 
Government of Uganda, set up a network of countries and international organizations (e.g. UN, 
MONUC and UNMIS) to initiate contingency planning for arrest of the LRA commanders. We must 
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not lose a sense of urgency to arrest the four individuals we believe to be responsible for the worst 
atrocities in Uganda. We acknowledge that other complementary solutions could be satisfactory for 
other LRA members. 
 
In January, I met with Mr. Chissano, the former President of Mozambique and current Special 
Envoy for LRA Affected Areas, to discuss this issue.     I will have further discussions in New York 
next week to emphasize again that the 4  LRA commanders must appear before the judges.     
Regarding the peace negotiations, as we have always said, any solution can and must be 
compatible with the Rome Statute.  We have taken a low public profile up to now to make sure the 
Court does not appear as if it is interfering in the peace process, but we are reassessing 
possibilities to expose better the horrific crimes committed by the LRA. 
 
I count on your political support to emphasize that holding the remaining four LRA commanders 
accountable for their crimes is the law as established in Rome.   It will prevent recurrent violence 
and contribute to sustainable peace and security. The victims in Uganda are entitled to peace, 
security and justice. 
 
Democratic Republic of the Congo 
 
As you all know, on 29 January, the Pre‐Trial Chamber confirmed the charges against Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo. 
 
Beyond the actual proceedings, I  would like to  use the example of  this case to  explain how 
we can implement our goal of maximizing the impact of our case.  On 5‐6 February, I participated 
in a conference, ʺFree Children from Warʺ co‐presided by UNICEF and the French Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and attended by the Secretary Generalʹs Special Representative for Children and 
Armed Conflict and the Director of UNICEF.   My presentation provided only judicial information 
but it was interesting to note how most participants would use the facts we presented to advance 
their advocacy campaigns against the recruitment of  child soldiers worldwide, with this  new 
idea that it  is  indeed a  serious crime and that it  will be prosecuted. 
 
To conclude on DRC, let me mention the ongoing second investigation, which is related to crimes 
allegedly committed by another Ituri armed group. We are of course confronted with the 
deterioration of the security situation on the ground. As you know, more than 1000 people were 
73 
 
killed during the last combats within Kinshasa. Our witnesses are threatened. 
 
Finally, we are in the process of selecting a third case to investigate in the DRC.  We hope to select 
it in the summer so that the investigation can commence before the end of 2007. This is an 
important process.  More generally, I have asked the OTP to develop an overall strategy for the 
DRC to explain better our approach and to take into consideration the interests of victims. 
 
The Situation in Darfur, the Sudan 
 
Over the past 20 months, we have conducted an investigation into crimes allegedly committed 
in Darfur, the Sudan. 
 
On 27 February 2007, we applied to Pre‐Trial Chamber I for the issuance of summonses to appear 
against Ahmad Harun, former Minister of State for the Interior of the Government of the 
Sudan and current Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs, and Ali Kushayb, a 
Militia/Janjaweed leader.  Our case is about Ahmad Harun and Ali Kushayb working together to 
attack the civilian population in Darfur. There is no such investigation in the Sudan. 
 
Ensure the appearance of the individuals in the Hague is the most difficult challenge. The Office 
has suggested a summons to appear could be the first option pursued. Our goal is efficiency. We 
assessed at the time of the application and we still assess that a summons to appear, an approach 
which clearly focuses on the individuals named, would be in the Sudanese context, the most 
efficient way to ensure the appearance of the named individuals. It would be of course the 
responsibility of the territorial State, the Sudan, to serve the summons and to facilitate the process. 
The formal reaction by the GOS will be decisive for the Judge’s decision. The case is in their hands. 
 
Let me also inform you that before and after the filing, we remained in contact with the 
authorities of the Sudan.  They informed after the filing of the creation of the ministerial 
committee in charge of reviewing all aspects of the filing.   They have published on the website of 
the Sudanese what seems to be an official position  although  it  has  not  been  confirmed  
formally  to  the  OTP;  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  the Government of Sudan while putting 
forward its objections to the Security Council referral has apparently decided to engage legally 
with the Court on the issue of admissibility; it is also worthy of interest that Ahmet Harun is 
now announced to be under investigation. 
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In support of the filing and to secure the widest support for our judicial activity, the OTP has 
actively engaged with Arab and African countries. I can only emphasize the support given to the 
OTP before and after our application by the Secretary General of the Arab League as well as the 
MFA of Egypt.  Other Arab countries were also open and helpful while emphasizing that a scenario 
where arrest warrants would be issued could create a confrontational scenario where ability to 
support and cooperate with the Court would be affected. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ghana 
as Presidency of the AU has been key in ensuring AU positive reaction. We visited the AU and gave 
a report on our activities. This constructive cooperation with the Court is also reflected in the way 
this issue was addressed during the Arab Summit in Riyadh. All those personalities were keen to 
promote the continued legal engagement of the Sudan with the Court. UN representatives 
including Mr Jan Eliasson with whom I talked a week ago, also emphasized the difficulties related 
to the peace negotiations, and the deployment of peace keepers. Next week I will brief the 
Secretary General of the UN on our activities. 
 
The judges will review the evidence submitted and decide how to proceed. If the Pre‐Trial 
Chamber is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the named individuals have 
committed crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, the Chamber may issue either a summons 
to appear or a warrant of arrest against Ahmad Harun and Ali Kushayb. 
 
As I noted at the ASP and at the press conference of the February filing, the Office is continuing to 
gather information about current crimes committed by all the parties in Darfur and is monitoring 
the spill‐over of violence into Chad, including in the refugee camps, and into the Central African 
Republic, which are both State Parties. In the meantime, we hope that this case will contribute to 
stopping the violence. 
 
Other potential situations 
 
As you are aware we are also monitoring a number of other situations, some of which are already 
publicly known. In particular, in relation to Côte d’Ivoire, as part of the information gathering 
process the Office has proposed to the authorities of that country that we undertake a mission. A 
new letter was sent in December and we have not received any answer; we are continuing to 
press them.  The UN has been very supportive on this matter. 
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With respect to the fourth situation, we hope to make the announcement before the summer. It is 
clear that this determination could lead us to open an investigation into another African country. 
This might lead to renewed perceptions in the public of an African bias. I hope you can help me to 
dispel this misperception. The Court is an important institution for African countries to put an end 
to impunity.  Today, one third of all States Parties are African countries. The ideas of the Rome 
Statute are reflected in the Constitutive Act of the AU, which provides that the organisation shall 
function consistently with the “condemnation and rejection of impunity.”   We are working for 
African victims who have suffered in the past from the indifference of the international 
community. We cannot repeat the mistake. 
 
The decision to open a new investigation is based on the law, it is not a sanction; it is the result of 
Africa’s own leadership in promoting the fight against impunity. 
 
Thank you. 
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Luis Moreno Ocampo, Prosecutor 
 
Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, 
 
It is now 4 years since I became Prosecutor. Four years ago, the challenge was to transform 
the Rome Statute, a detailed body of law,   into an operational system of international criminal 
justice. How to trigger cases, how to select situations where the worst crimes were committed, 
how to protect witnesses and investigate in situations of ongoing conflict were the issues to be 
addressed. 
 
Over these 4 years, we have opened investigations in 4 situations – the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Northern Uganda, Darfur, Central African Republic – all countries still engulfed at various 
degrees in conflict. Three situations were referred to us by the States themselves ; one situation, 
Darfur, was referred to us by the United Nations Security Council. In all cases, the Office of the 
Prosecutor has the same duty to carry out an independent and impartial investigation. 
 
We also analyzed the situation in Venezuela and the activities of nationals of 25 States parties 
involved in Iraq. We are currently monitoring other situations in three different continents. 
 
The Court is  now operational.   Our new and complex challenge is  the enforcement of  the 
judicial decisions. 
 
I am grateful for this opportunity to present the current activities of my Office. Let me first update 
you on our cases. 
 
The Situation in the Central African Republic (CAR) 
 
On 22 May my Office announced the opening of an investigation in the Central African Republic.  
As a State Party, CAR referred the situation to the OTP on 22 December 2004. We also received 
significant communications by NGOs. 
 
The OTP’s investigation will focus on the most serious crimes, which were mainly committed 
during a peak of violence in 2002‐2003. There are allegations of killings, looting and rapes.  The 
high number of allegations of rapes and other acts of sexual violence,  perpetrated against 
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hundreds of reported victims, is a distinctive feature of the investigation, with aggravating 
aspects of cruelty: multiple perpetrators, public rapes ; the social impact appears devastating. 
 
In parallel, the OTP will continue to monitor closely allegations of crimes committed since the end 
of 2005 in the northern part of the country. 
 
In liaison with the Registry we will conduct extensive outreach activities towards affected 
communities. 
 
The Situation in Darfur, the Sudan 
 
On 27 February 2007, I presented evidence to the ICC Judges.   The Pre‐Trial Chamber   
rendered their decision on 27 April, finding that the evidence presented offered reasonable 
grounds to believe that Ahmad Muhammad Harun, former Minister of State for the Interior, and 
Ali Muhammad Ali Abd‐Al‐Rahman, otherwise known  as  Ali  Kushayb—a Militia/Janjaweed 
leader—joined together to  persecute and  attack civilians in Darfur. 
 
The Prosecution’s case demonstrated how Ahmad Harun organised a system through which he 
recruited, funded and armed Militia/Janjaweed to supplement the Sudanese Armed Forces, and 
incited them to attack and commit massive crimes against the civilian population; the 
Prosecution’s case demonstrated that Ali Kushayb, by personally delivering arms and leading 
attacks against villages, was a key part of that system. Acting together, they committed crimes 
against humanity and war crimes. 
 
Concerning the admissibility of the case, let me recall that the Prosecution application is 
concerned with Ahmad Harun and Ali Kushayb joining together to attack civilian populations in 
Darfur.   There is no investigation in the Sudan into such criminal conduct.   No proceedings 
have taken place in relation to Ahmad  Harun.  And  the  investigation on  Ali  Kushayb does  not  
relate  to  the  same  incidents as  those investigated by the Office; it does not connect Ali 
Kushayb to Ahmad Harun.   The Sudanese investigations do not encompass the same persons and 
the same conduct which are the subject of the case before the Court. 
 
The Pre‐Trial Chamber concluded that the case against Ahmad Harun and Ali Kushayb falls within 
the jurisdiction of the Court and appears to be admissible. 
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The Government of the Sudan or the defendants can challenge this decision, but it has to be in 
front of the Court ,not in the media, not in political fora. Any decision on admissibility belongs to 
the judges. 
 
On 7 June, I briefed the Security Council of the United Nations on the situation in Darfur. I recalled 
that the ongoing situation in Darfur remains alarming. There are 4 million people in need of 
humanitarian assistance in the region, constituting two thirds of the population of Darfur.  There 
are 2 million internally displaced people, immensely vulnerable.  There are continuing attacks 
against them and against international workers, as well as frequent impediments by the 
authorities to the delivery of assistance.  Presiding over this dire situation is the same individual 
sought by the Court, Ahmad Harun, now Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs. 
 
It is of particular concern to my Office that, Ahmad Harun, who coordinated the crimes against the 
civilian population, crimes which forced their displacement, is still today the Minister of State for 
Humanitarian Affairs with the responsibility to monitor and affect these vulnerable people, and the 
international personnel helping them. I asked the Council to address this unacceptable situation. 
 
Ladies and gentlemen, 
 
The Darfur situation requires a comprehensive solution.  The ICC is doing its part. The Office will 
complete its first investigation and will continue to evaluate information about current crimes. As 
the Rome Statute emphasizes, justice for past and present crimes will enhance security in Darfur. 
The Security Council and regional organizations must take the lead in calling on the Sudan to 
arrest the two individuals and surrender them to the Court. The territorial State, the Sudan, has the 
legal obligation and the ability to do so.  And we count on every state to execute an arrest 
should either of these individuals enter their territory. 
 
 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) 
 
The situation in the DRC was referred to us by the Congolese authorities. As you know, the 
situation in the DRC, in terms of gravity of crimes committed since the entry into force of the 
Statute, is the worst within our treaty jurisdiction. 
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In very difficult logistic and security circumstances, we have completed the investigation of the 
first case involving the prosecution of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, leader of the most dangerous militia 
in Ituri; our evidence shows that he is individually responsible for the crimes of enlisting, 
conscripting and using children under the age of 15 years to participate actively in hostilities. 
 
On 29 January, the Pre‐Trial Chamber confirmed the charges against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo. As 
the President said we are preparing to go to trial. 
 
The OTP has also conducted a second investigation in the DRC related to crimes allegedly 
committed by another armed group in the region of Ituri. We expect to present the case before the 
judges in a near future. 
 
Finally, we are selecting a third case to investigate in the DRC.  We will do it before the end of 
2007. This is an important process, taking into consideration the views and interests of victims. 
 
In the DRC, the worst problem we are confronted with at the moment is the security of our 
witnesses. As you know the Registry is responsible for witness protection and the Registrar will 
further elaborate on this issue in his presentation, but I want to emphasize how grateful we 
are for his efforts. The problem is affecting all of us and must be solved in the framework of the 
“One Court principle”. I call upon you to support the Registry efforts. 
 
Northern Uganda 
 
On 6 May 2005 the Office requested warrants of arrest for Joseph Kony and four senior leaders of 
the LRA. 
 
On 8 July 2005 the Pre‐Trial Chamber issued the warrants of arrest for crimes against humanity, 
including enslavement, sexual slavery, rape and murder, and war crimes. 
 
The OTP, in liaison with other Organs of the Court, is committed to galvanizing international 
efforts to execute the warrants. 
 
Other national mechanisms can be useful for the other combatants, those who want to give up 
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arms and rejoin their families, those who did not bear the greatest responsibility. 
 
Enforcing the decision of the Court on their arrest is important; it is important for the victims in 
Uganda and Southern Sudan, it is important for the credibility of the Court and its deterrent impact 
and it is important for the establishment of a legal framework worldwide. The victims in Uganda are 
entitled to peace, security and justice. 
 
Other potential situations 
 
We are also monitoring a number of other situations, some of which are already publicly known.   
In particular, in relation to Côte d’Ivoire, as part of the information gathering process the Office has 
proposed to the authorities of that country that we undertake a mission. A new letter was sent in 
December and we have not received any answer; we are continuing to press them. 
 
Cooperation 
 
The  President has  underlined the  importance of  State  cooperation to  implement our  
mandate. Let  me emphasize this point. The investigative activities I just described would not have 
been possible without the cooperation of States. Visas for our witnesses, use of facilities for our 
interviews, exchange of information, evacuation  of  threatened  staff  in  deteriorating  security  
situations  :  the  daily  support  of  States  and international organizations to our investigation is key.  
As reflected in the structure of my Office, the needs and functioning of investigation, prosecution 
and cooperation are absolutely intertwined in our work. 
 
In order to facilitate the participation of States Parties in implementing the principles embodied in 
the Statute, we are developing a more proactive approach to cooperation.  Our goal is to provide 
States with a clearer sense of the types of cooperation required by the OTP. Our objective is to give 
States the information they need to prepare a framework for cooperation with the Office and the 
Court as a whole; thus when we are faced with emergency situations, we can act together swiftly 
and efficiently.  This process is working well. 
 
The challenge I see at the moment is more related to the enforcement of the law. How to ensure 
the enforcement of the Court’s decisions? How to ensure, in particular, the arrest and surrender of 
individuals sought by the Court?  How to ensure the enforcement of the Court’s decisions in 
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situations  where  the  international  community  is  trying  to  achieve  in  parallel  many  
objectives;  re establishing security, providing humanitarian assistance, promoting political dialogue 
between the parties to the conflict, and preparing for reconstruction and development. 
 
As the Prosecutor of the ICC, I was given a clear judicial mandate. My duty is to apply the law 
without political considerations. I will present evidence to the Judges and they will decide on the 
merits of such evidence. 
 
And yet, for each situation in which the ICC is exercising jurisdiction, we can hear voices challenging 
judicial decisions, their timing, their timeliness, asking the Prosecution to use its discretionary 
powers to adjust to the situations on the ground, to indict or withdraw indictments according to 
short term political goals. We also hear  officials  of  States  parties  calling  for  amnesties,  
granting  of  immunities and  other  ways  to  avoid prosecutions, supposedly in the name of 
peace; we can hear voices portraying the ICC as an impediment to progressing further with Peace 
processes. 
 
These proposals are not consistent with the Rome Statute. They undermine the law States parties 
committed to. It is essential to ensure that any conflict resolution initiative be compatible with the 
Rome Statute, so that peace and justice work effectively together.  Arrest warrants are decisions 
taken by the judges in accordance with  the  law,  they  must  be  implemented.      States  parties  
and  other  stakeholders must  remain  in  all circumstances aware of the mandate given to the 
Court; there can be no political compromise on legality. 
 
The beneficial impact of the ICC, the value of the law to prevent recurring violence are clear. Arrest 
warrants have brought parties to the negotiating table; have contributed to focus national 
debates on accountability and to reducing crimes ;  exposing the criminals and their horrendous 
crimes has contributed to weaken the support they were enjoying, to de‐legitimization them  and 
their practices such as conscription of children ; on the longer term, the Court will contribute to 
harmony or at least peaceful co‐existence between former enemies as a sense of justice and 
reparation is achieved. 
 
The tension I see in Uganda is not between Peace and Justice. It is not the decisions of the 
International Criminal Court which undermine peace processes and conflict resolution initiatives. 
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It is the lack of enforcement of the Court’s decisions which is the real threat to enduring Peace.  
Allowed to remain at large, the criminals exposed are continuing to threaten the victims, those 
who took tremendous risks to tell their stories; allowed to remain at large, the criminals ask 
immunity under one form or another as a condition to stopping the violence. They threaten to 
attack more victims.  We cannot yield. 
 
The challenges are immense for political actors. The Rome treaty is a new system, global standards 
have been established without a global police or enforcement apparatus; enforcement of Court’s 
decisions is the responsibility of national states. 
 
Dealing with the new legal reality is not easy. It needs political commitment; it needs hard and 
costly operational decisions:    arresting  criminals  in  the  context  of  ongoing  conflicts  is  a  
difficult  endeavour. Individuals sought by the Court are often enjoying the protection of armies or 
militias, some of them are members of Governments eager to shield them from justice. 
 
Those  difficulties  are  real.  They  can  however  not  lead  us  to  change  the  content  of  the  law  
and  our commitment to implement it.  In all situations, more State cooperation in terms of 
securing arrests is needed. For the ultimate efficiency and credibility of the Court you created, 
arrests are required. The Court can contribute to galvanize international efforts, and support 
coalitions of the willing to proceed with such arrest. But ultimately, the decision to uphold the law 
will be the decision of States parties. 
 
Thank you.  
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Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor/Le Procureur 
 
Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, 
 
The President has described the challenges that we, together with States parties, are confronted 
with. 
 
The concept of the Rome treaty has become a reality. The Court has made this body of law 
operational, has transformed ideas and concepts into a working system. States parties which 
committed to the new law are now facing a more difficult challenge: enforcing the law, enforcing 
the Court’s decisions. 
 
Ensuring the enforcement of the Court’s decisions, ensuring, in particular, the arrest and 
surrender of individuals sought by the Court, in all situations before the Court, requires your 
support. 
 
Such support can take a variety of forms: 
1.   Political support. In any bilateral meeting, in any multilateral activity, in any development 
program, the States Parties should automatically mention the need to respect and 
implement the ICC judges’ decisions. 
2.   Marginalization of the individuals sought by the Court to facilitate their arrest. No 
support, no supplies, no financial aid should reach indicted individuals. They have to be 
isolated within their own communities. 
3.   Tracing of whereabouts of the individuals sought by the court. 
4.   Planning and execution of arrest operations. 
 
Let me describe how this can apply to each situation. 
 
The Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) 
 
In the case against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, we are preparing to go to trial. 
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The OTP is also completing its second investigation in the DRC related to crimes allegedly 
committed by another armed group in the district of Ituri. Any arrest warrants issued would have 
to be enforced. We hope to be able to make the results of this second investigation known before 
the end of the year. 
 
 
Finally, we are in the process of selecting a third case to investigate. We are monitoring to 
this end the overall situation and collected information on alleged crimes committed by 
individuals and armed groups in different provinces and at different periods under our temporal 
jurisdiction. Among others, there are allegations of massive sexual violence, forced displacements 
of persons, killings or pillaging in most of the Eastern parts of the DRC, including the Kivus. 
 
DRC is a situation where your political support is concretely needed. There are a lot of issues on 
the agenda of the international community in the DRC: demobilization and reintegration of militia 
into the national forces; security. Justice could easily be pushed off the agenda. Consistent 
support to international justice is being tested. 
 
I have raised the subject of keeping cooperation with the Court on the DRC agenda with the 
Secretary General of the UN on the 28th of August, with Legal Advisor Nicholas Michel, Under 
Secretary General Jean- Marie Guehenno and with SRSG Swing in Kinshasa. The UN Secretary 
General and his team have accepted to raise it at the highest level with the DRC authorities. I have 
also raised this matter with the EU Special Representative for the Great Lakes; he and several 
States committed to  provide their support for my demarches; I am grateful to them. 
 
Following such efforts, the reaction from the DRC authorities has been positive. We are very 
hopeful that this will lead to concrete steps being undertaken in the near future. 
 
 
Given  the  importance  of  maintaining  such  diplomatic  activities,  we  urge  you  to  request  
from  your authorities that any bilateral meeting with the DRC authorities, President Kabila 
in  particular, be  the occasion to explicitly mention cooperation with the ICC. As States parties, as 
members States of the UN which are actively supporting the demobilization process, it is 
important that you should also express your full support to the Court. In the same way, any 
multilateral meeting on the DRC in the UN context should be used to mention the ICC. Silence is 
undermining us ; but any expression of support is helping us. 
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The Situation in Northern Uganda 
 
Warrants of arrest for Joseph Kony and senior leaders of the LRA for crimes against humanity and 
war crimes were issued on 8 July 2005. They are still outstanding. 
 
 
As I have stated in the ASP last year, those warrants must be executed. There is no excuse. 
There is no tension between Peace and Justice in Uganda: arrest the sought criminals today, 
and you will have Peace and Justice tomorrow. Victims deserve both. 
 
The 4 criminals have threatened to resume violence if the arrest warrants are not withdrawn; they 
are setting conditions; it is blackmail; the international community has to ensure protection for 
those exposed to those threats. 
 
My Office has again devoted efforts to galvanize national and international efforts to arrest. A 
lot can be done by all of you to support these efforts. 
 
 
•   Joseph Kony and the three other indicted commanders have re-gained credibility in the past 
months. 
We ask all States Parties to contribute to their re-marginalization and to use all public 
occasions to recall  that  those  4  individuals  are  responsible  for  massive  crimes;  
abduction  of  children; transforming them in killers or sexual slaves. The LRA is continuing to 
commit crimes as no children have been released, as no sexual slaves have been freed; UNICEF 
and the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General on children in armed conflicts 
stated that the LRA should release the abductees immediately; 
•   Joseph Kony and the three other indicted commanders have regained strength and 
financials means. We ask States Parties to monitor with utmost vigilance supply networks, 
possible diversion of aid and funds to the benefit of the sought individuals. We thank States 
parties which have renewed efforts to monitor assistance from Diaspora communities to the 
LRA ; it must be recalled that any assistance that can help the sought individuals abscond from 
the Court would be illegal ; 
• Joseph Kony and the three other indicted commanders have become a regional power, 
threatening stability in the sub region. We ask all States parties to support collaborative efforts 
between the DRC and Uganda to address the issue of arrests; we hope that the support of 
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MONUC will remain forthcoming. 
 
As you can see, at a national level, or in multilateral fora, each of you can do a lot to contribute 
to arrests. The speech of the Belgian Prime Minister during the 25th  of September UNSC summit is 
a good example. I would be extremely grateful if you could keep the Office updated of any step 
taken in furtherance of such requests for support. 
 
The Situation in the Central African Republic (CAR) 
 
On 22 May we announced the opening of an investigation in the Central African 
Republic. 
 
The OTP’s investigation will focus on the most serious crimes, which were mainly committed during 
a peak of violence in 2002-2003 and with a particularly high number of allegations of rapes and 
other acts of sexual violence, perpetrated against hundreds of reported victims. 
 
 
As the CAR has not yet any implementing legislation, we have prepared a draft cooperation 
agreement specifying in particular channels of communications between the Office and CAR for 
the processing of our requests for judicial assistance1. The text will be signed shortly. However, we 
have already started our investigative activities on an ad hoc basis. 
 
Cooperation wise, we would again request all States parties to mention the need for 
cooperation with the ICC in all bilateral or multilateral meetings with the CAR. 6 States 
parties have an Embassy locally in Bangui. A good opportunity to address the issue is offered by 
the Donor Roundtable that will take place in Brussels on 26 October that a number of States 
parties will attend (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Peru, Slovakia, South Africa, The 
Netherlands, UK) alongside Organizations such as the World Bank, the IMF, the African Union. 
 
Finally, we hope to benefit from the full cooperation of the EU Force to be deployed in 
CAR. We are thankful for the support already given by the EU Delegation in Bangui. 
 
 
The Situation in Darfur, the Sudan 
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On 7 June, I briefed the Security Council of the United Nations on the situation in Darfur. I 
emphasized that the territorial State, the Sudan, has the legal obligation and the ability to 
arrest Ahmad Harun, former Minister of State for the Interior and Ali Kushayb, a 
Militia/Janjaweed leader and surrender them to the Court. 
 
I described how Ahmad Harun, responsible for the forced displacement of millions of people into 
camps, is now controlling his victims, in his new position as Minister for Humanitarian affairs. I 
urged key partners— the African Union, the League of Arab States, the United Nations and the 
European Union—to call on the Sudan to arrest and surrender the sought individuals to the ICC. 
 
However, the issue of enforcement of the arrest warrants has been put off the agenda of relevant 
international meetings. 
 
Justice was not formally on the agenda of the UNSC trip to Khartoum following my report. Justice 
was not mentioned in the UNSG subsequent reports on Darfur where the UN secretariat 
developed a three prong approach with a humanitarian, political and security components only. 
Not justice. 
 
I have engaged in efforts to raise awareness of the need for execution of the arrest warrants. 
Efforts have included high-level meetings with senior UN officials, including the Secretary 
General Mr Ban Ki Moon prior to his visit to Khartoum and with the Arab League Secretary-
General Amr Musa. I also addressed the issue in New York in September on the eve of the UNSC 
Summit on Africa, and of the 2nd meeting of the extended contact group on Darfur. I explained to 
my interlocutors that the Court needed first and foremost words expressing their political support. 
Their silence could be interpreted as a weakening resolve of the international community on the 
enforcement of the arrest warrants. Their silence could encourage the provocative gesture of 
promoting Harun instead of removing him from Office. 
 
I am grateful for the efforts of Ambassadors and advisors who managed to secure references to 
the arrest warrants in high level speeches of Ministers and Heads of Government, among them the 
UK, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal on behalf of the EU, Denmark, Australia, Trinidad and 
Tobago, New Zealand and Lichtenstein. 
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The issue will not go away. On 5th  December 2007 I will inform officially the UN Security Council, 
that the Sudan is not cooperating with the Court. The Sudan is not complying with Security Council 
Resolution 1593. 
 
Finally, let me mention also that we are continuing our investigative activities in neighbouring 
Chad and have requested the assistance of the future EU mission in Chad on issues of security. 
 
Conclusion 
 
As a Prosecutor, I have been approached by States and other stakeholders suggesting that the 
responsibility to secure arrests lies in large part with the Prosecution. They suggested more 
requests for arrest warrants targeting lower level perpetrators, easier to arrest than Ministers or 
powerful militia leaders. I wish to take the occasion of this briefing to state clearly that the 
Prosecutorial policy, in accordance with the Statute, will seek to investigate and prosecute those 
most responsible for the most serious crimes of concern to the international community, based 
on the criminal evidence we collect and subject only to the judicial review of the Chambers. 
 
The Rome Treaty consolidates the “duty of  every state to  exercise its criminal jurisdiction 
over those responsible  for  international  crimes”  but  also  to  support  a  permanent  
International  Criminal  Court whenever and wherever the Court decides to intervene. They have 
to “guarantee lasting respect for and the enforcement of international justice”. They have to 
seriously address the issue of arrest.  
 
Thank you. 
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Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor/Le Procureur 
 
Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, 
 
Since our last meeting in October 2007, our interaction has been sustained at all levels: in the 
field, here in The Hague, and also in New York. I would like to highlight the support you generated 
for the work of the Court on Darfur by attending the Security Council meeting of 5 December in 
New York, as it coincided with the meeting of the Assembly of States Parties (ASP). 
 
It has been a key moment. It demonstrated how strong we are when we work together while 
respecting our different identities. It was only a moment in time; it is clear that more efforts will 
be needed by all of us to transform such a moment into concrete and continued support to the 
Court. But we had a glimpse of the potential strength of international justice. It was a message 
that the ASP, the NGOs and the Court gave to the Security Council. It was also a strong message 
to perpetrators and potential perpetrators of crimes, showing that the Court enjoys wide support. 
It was a strong message of commitment to the victims. 
 
Since October 2007, I visited Colombia to meet with victims, judges, prosecutors and national 
authorities. We announced the beginning of the second and third investigations in Darfur during 
our meeting at the Security Council. We secured the arrest of Mathieu Ngudjolo in the DRC. I 
travelled to the Central African Republic to meet with victims. We are preparing the beginning of 
the Lubanga trial and the confirmation hearing of our second DRC case. 
 
Today, I will present an update of our cases and analysis activities. I will also, in response to 
requests by States to be very specific on the types of cooperation we look for, describe in each 
case the support we need and  how the  support you  give  is  making a  difference. A  recurring 
concern in  most situations under investigation or analysis is the need for States Parties to 
consistently maintain the commitment taken in Rome to end impunity. I feel that such 
commitment needs to be particularly borne in mind in the context of any conflict management 
initiative. 
 
1. - Let me update you on the cases. 
 
The Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) 
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For the last four years we have been conducting investigations in the DRC as a conflict was 
ongoing.  With the support of VWU we managed to minimize the risk for our witnesses. To-date 
no OTP witnesses have been wounded or killed. The Court fulfilled its duty of protection established 
in art 68 (1) of the Statute. 
 
No we are facing a new challenge. We are conducting trials and confirmation hearings. Although 
conflict is still ongoing and protection needed, confidentiality is no more an option. We have the 
duty to disclose the identity of each witness to the accused. The defence has to check and 
challenge the credibility of our witnesses. 
 
All the witnesses living in the Ituri region are at risk. Members of the armed groups such as UPC 
and FNI are still active and influential in this region and pose both a general and very tangible threat 
to our witnesses and their families and dependants as soon as their identities or their testimonies 
are disclosed. 
 
Each one of them has to be protected. The Prosecution foresaw this problem early on. Our policy of 
focussed investigations was established to reduce the number of witnesses to a minimum. We 
have 34 witnesses for the entire Lubanga case. The standards of protection were approved in the 
Strategic Plan of the Court. All foreseeable risks should be eliminated. This is my duty pursuant to 
the Statute. 
 
But the Statute developed a system of protection which relies for the implementation of protective 
measures on an independent unit within the Registry. How to harmonize positions when there is 
a different appreciation between the OTP and the Registry? In such case who is responsible for 
the implementation of measures required to protect witnesses? Those are essential issues. 
 
If the Prosecution’s witnesses are not protected, the Prosecution can not fulfil its role. My 
position is clear: the OTP will help to establish provisional measures of protection, but can not 
replace or duplicate VWU. This is why the discussions in both Chambers on how the protection 
system of the Court works are so important. 
 
•        In the Thomas Lubanga Dyilo case, the Prosecution is confident that we have all the 
evidence required. Proving the case is of course my responsibility. But maximizing the impact of 
the case can be a common task of the Court and States Parties. Any ruling in the case will be 
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important for the prevention of child  recruitment  in  the  DRC,  Colombia  and  other  countries.    
Any  ruling  will  be  a  message  that transforming children in soldiers is a crime, a crime that will 
be prosecuted. The Amicus curiae by Radika Coomaraswamy, Special representative of the 
Secretary General on children in armed conflicts, that was just submitted is already an important 
document in this regard. 
 
This first trial is also an opportunity to demonstrate to all perpetrators and potential perpetrators 
of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that the ICC is operational, not a vague threat any 
longer, but a very direct one. Your suggestions on how to maximize the impact of the first trial of 
the ICC would be very helpful. 
 
•        With the arrest and transfer of Mathieu Ngudjolo, my Office has completed a first phase 
of its DRC investigation, focusing in two cases on crimes committed by leaders of armed groups in 
Ituri since July 2002. We are now moving on to another investigation, with other applications for 
arrest warrants to follow in the coming months and years. 
 
Different options are being analyzed about our third and possibly fourth case. Among others, 
there are reports of sexual violence of shocking brutality, of forced displacements, of killings in the 
Kivus, committed by the regular soldiers of the DRC, by the FDLR and by Laurent Nkunda’s forces. 
We held a meeting at the seat  of  the  Court  on  the  13th   of  March  with  international and  
local  NGOs  to  consider  the  available information; I also met with the High Commissioner for 
Human rights Louise Arbour last week. The extent of the violence but also its dispersion, which 
makes it difficult to define the most responsible, was commented upon by all. Other options for 
investigation include the case of high officials in the region who have financed and organized 
militias. 
 
Cooperation needed 
 
• First, political support: I wish to emphasize as the President did the particular 
significance of the arrest of Mathieu Ngudjolo. While Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and Germain 
Katanga were already in detention in the DRC before their surrender to the Court, 
Mathieu Ngudjolo was a free man; a man who was part of the demobilization process and 
a man who had benefited from an amnesty in the past. He was a Colonel in the 
Congolese army. This was basically the first real arrest for the Court, and it was 
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performed with the cooperation of the DRC authorities, the UN and Belgium. 
• I was disturbed however to receive information that some members of the diplomatic 
community in Kinshasa , including State Parties and the UN, were expressing the view that 
this arrest would break down the DDR process or rekindle conflict in Ituri. This, coming 
from States Parties, is a confusing message sent to the territorial State; there might be 
requests for cooperation in the future which may be even more complex. There must be a 
more consistent approach by diplomatic representations that requests for assistance and 
decisions of the Court have to be executed. 
 
• It is also important that we fight this perception that ICC intervention is doomed to 
prolong conflict and create more violence. It is not true in the DRC, it is not true in 
Uganda, and it is not true in Darfur. 
 
• Finally, I draw your attention to the fact that, given the developments in Uganda and the 
sense that the international community seems willing to negotiate away international 
justice, Nkunda and others are now questioning the Goma agreement which excludes any 
amnesty for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. We ask that your authorities take 
any occasion to reaffirm in relation to the DRC situation that the commitment to end 
impunity is not negotiable. It is the law. Please inform my Office of any such statement. 
 
 
The Situation in Northern Uganda 
 
The Court has issued its first arrest warrants against Joseph Kony and other LRA commanders 
in 2005. Those arrest warrants remain in effect and have to be executed. Joseph Kony and his 
fellow commanders committed unspeakable crimes. Evidence shows their criminal responsibility 
for thousands of killings and abductions since July 2002. Joseph Kony transformed children into 
killers and sex slaves. Joseph Kony forced them to kill their parents and brothers. Joseph Kony 
attacked boarding schools, abducting not one or ten but all the schoolgirls to offer them as 
rewards to LRA officers. Joseph Kony slaughtered and terrorized the population of Northern 
Uganda forcing 1.6 millions into camps for displaced persons. 
 
In  the  course of  our  investigation, we  also  collected information on  its  strategy to  use  
crimes to  get international attention: he attacked camps and killed what he considered a 
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sufficient number of people to get attention. Incredibly he succeeded. Joseph Kony, the first 
indictee of the ICC, has managed to be portrayed as a man looking for peace. Joseph Kony has 
received money and food, resources that he has used to enlarge and strengthen his group. In 
exchange for his crimes and his refusal to surrender and free the abductees, Joseph Kony receives 
an offer to sign an agreement that does not mention the arrest warrants and contains a promise of 
a deferral of investigations under article 16. 
 
Joseph Kony is  covering up his crimes.   And he is  winning. My Office has been approached 
by top international negotiators in  Juba to  actually discuss how to  withdraw the arrest 
warrant with a  LRA delegation. I  confirm that I  will only meet Joseph Kony’s lawyers in  
Court. I  have a  strong case, an admissible case. 
 
In accordance with the Statute I have to investigate and prosecute crimes in order to 
contribute to the prevention of future crimes. I am concerned at deliberate efforts to deny the 
reality of past, present and future crimes committed by Joseph Kony. The LRA is continuing to 
commit crimes: no children have been released; no sexual slaves have been freed as noted by 
UNICEF and the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General on children in armed conflicts. 
 
Denial of past and present crimes is a major concern. My Office has been told informally by 
international authorities that now was not the moment to probe further into allegations of crimes 
committed by the LRA in DRC, Southern Sudan and CAR, that ‘at this sensitive juncture of the Juba 
talks it was better not to publicize such information”.  I cannot be part of this. The international 
community has to conduct conflict management initiatives, but none of us should deny reality. We 
have to respect the facts and the law. 
 
In terms of investigations, we are in the process of confirming judicially, through interviews with 
defectors, that Joseph Kony killed Vincent Otti ; that money and goods delivered for humanitarian 
purposes reached him and allowed him to plan further crimes ;  that the LRA is moving to Central 
Africa Republic. 
 
There is a lot to do to end violence in Northern Uganda. Offering Joseph Kony an exit strategy, or 
immunity under one form or another is not the way. 
 
Cooperation needed: 
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•          Joseph Kony and the other indicted commanders have re-gained credibility in the past 
weeks. We ask all States Parties to contribute to their re-marginalization and to use all public 
occasions to recall that those individuals are responsible for horrific crimes. 
•          Joseph Kony and the three other indicted commanders still have access to financials means 
from the diasporas or from diversion of assistance. We ask States Parties to monitor with 
utmost vigilance supply networks, possible diversion of aid and funds to the benefit of the 
sought individuals. It must be recalled that any assistance that can help the sought individuals 
abscond from the Court would be illegal. 
•          We ask all States Parties to support collaborative efforts between the DRC, Uganda and 
others to address the issue of arrests; we hope that the support of MONUC will remain forthcoming. 
 
The Situation in the Central African Republic (CAR) 
 
My Office’s investigation is continuing to focus on the most serious crimes, which were mainly 
committed during a peak of violence in 2002-2003. As the President indicated, I travelled to Bangui 
on 7 February 2008. During my visit, I was able to speak with victims, representatives of civil 
society and local population to answer questions. 
 
We hope to submit an application to the Judges during the current year. However our 
investigation is delayed at the moment by the absence of answers to requests for cooperation made 
in June of 2007. 
 
In terms of present crimes, it seems that no proceedings have been initiated; I insisted with 
President Bozizé during my recent visit that such proceedings had to be initiated. Philip Alston, the 
UN special rapporteur on summary executions who travelled to Bangui at the same time as 
myself, did the same. It is important that all States Parties with an Embassy in CAR (Chad, Congo, 
the DRC, France, Japan, and Nigeria) seize the opportunity of any meeting with President Bozizé or 
his Ministers of Justice and Defence to stress this imperative. 
 
The Situation in Darfur, the Sudan 
 
As I informed the UN Security Council and the ASP in December, the Sudan is not cooperating 
with the Court. We also announced two new investigations. The first investigation looks into 
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who is bearing the greatest responsibility for ongoing attacks against civilians; who is 
maintaining Harun in a position to commit crimes; and who is instructing him. The second 
investigation concerns allegations of rebel attacks against peacekeepers. We will issue our first 
application to the Judges this year. 
 
We will report again to the UNSC in the first week of June. I understand there might be another 
coincidence of dates with the resumed ASP and hope to see again a number of delegations in the 
room. 
 
We are conducting a number of activities in Chad and other countries of the region. In the case of 
Chad, the main challenges faced by our operations are related to security both for our witnesses 
and our staff.  The Court has engaged with the EU and the UN to request assistance from the UN 
Mission MINURCAT and the European Union Operation EUFOR. 
 
In order to explain our activities, prepare for the presentation of the next report to the UNSC 
and foster support  for the arrest of A. Harun, I have travelled to a number of the Sudan’ 
neighboring countries or partners : Qatar, Egypt including a meeting with the Arab League, Jordan. 
I will be visiting Indonesia, a member of the UNSC and Saudi Arabia shortly. It is part of my 
mandate to improve efficiency and show our impartiality. I emphasize the efforts by all the 
countries concerned to follow up on the visits, to inform me of conversations with envoys sent by 
Khartum on this issue, or other high level conversations. Though Harun is still in the Sudan, the 
attitude of those States, mostly non States Parties, is a mark of respect for the Court as  an  
institution. We  have  also  ensured  that  no  negative  message  on  the  ICC  would  be  adopted 
in forthcoming regional meetings. 
 
Cooperation needed: 
 
• Our principal objective is to make sure that the issue of enforcement of the arrest warrants 
is not put off the agenda of relevant international meetings. In particular, I will travel to 
NY this week and insist that the arrest warrants should be on the agenda of the UNSC trip 
to Khartoum in May or June. Those of you members of the UNSC can help in this regard. 
 
• We also still need more States to raise the issue of the arrest warrants with Khartum. Only 
one State Party has informed us of such bilateral exchange since December. I am grateful 
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for the effort but others must join as the Sudanese authorities must get a sense of a 
strong and consistent message from  the  international community. We  are  also  looking 
forward to  close  cooperation with  the Slovenian presidency of the EU. 
 
• Finally, RFAs on the tracing of Harun and on his activities within the Sudan have been and 
will be sent. I urge States Parties to give them their utmost attention and to contact my 
Office should they have questions. 
 
2. – Let me now turn to our analysis activities. 
 
Based on Article 15, my Office proactively collects information about alleged crimes falling under 
the Court jurisdiction. Currently we are analysing situations on three continents. Let me mention 
those that were or that we have decided to make public. 
 
Regarding Cote D’Ivoire, the authorities have not taken appropriate steps to facilitate an OTP 
mission despite repeated requests. We urge all States Parties to put this issue on the agenda of any 
bilateral meeting with CDI. No State party has ever informed us that it had done so. 
In Colombia, the purpose of the October mission was to receive information to assist the 
evaluation of ongoing national proceedings against those most responsible for crimes – whether 
members of the FARC, the paramilitary or others - that fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC. The 
Office but also a number of non governmental actors and UNICRI are following up on our visit. 
 
Regarding Kenya, following allegations of killings and displacements,I have sought further 
information under article 15 (2) from a range of institutions in the country. I have also met with 
former Secretary General Kofi Annan 
 
Finally, the Office has decided to make public its analysis activities in Afghanistan. Letters under 
article 15 (2) will be sent to the Government and other actors. 
 
All these steps are taken in the course of our examination of situations under Article 15. We are 
trying to be as informative as possible. But no decision to open an investigation has been taken 
and there should be no presumption that such an investigation will be opened. 
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Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, let me join the President in recognizing the work of the Registrar Bruno Cathala. After 
5 years Bruno is going back to France to be the President of the Evry tribunal. He will be a 
judge again. We are losing a man with a passion for this Court, with a vision for this Court.  
What will remain however is  a strong legacy. 
 
His legacy include the system of legal aid, the structure for victims participation, an electronic 
court, the project for permanent premises and a building that will be a symbol of justice for 
different communities. Without Bruno Cathala, we would not have a detention centre that is 
quoted as a model. He contributed to building the identity of the Court as an independent, 
impartial and participatory ICC. I will miss him. But his departure will also show the strength of his 
legacy; it will show that the institution he built is bigger than its members, even its founding 
members. Bruno’s efforts will endure. 
 
I want to thank him on behalf of the OTP and its staff. Thank you. 
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Mrs. Fatou Bensouda, Deputy Prosecutor/Procureur Adjoint 
 
Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, 
 
Thank you for being here. Since our last meeting in March 2008, the interaction between the 
Office of the Prosecutor and you has been sustained at all levels. 
 
On 5th June 2008, as the Prosecutor presented his Report to the UN Security Council on Darfur, 
States parties to  the Rome Statute, participating to  the ASP, attended and it  is  symbolic that 
the move to  secure a Presidential statement of support to the Court’s work on Darfur was led to 
fruition by the President of the ASP, a member of the UNSC, Costa Rica. 
 
The adoption by the UNSC of a unanimous presidential statement on 16 June calling on Sudan to 
comply with its obligation to cooperate with the Court under 1593 was a strong message of 
commitment to the Court, to the work of the Office, and to the victims. It was also a strong 
message to perpetrators and potential perpetrators of crimes, showing the strength of 
international consensus on Justice beyond any regional boundaries. 
 
In recent weeks, we have also received the marked support of the European Union through its 
Presidency, Slovenia, its Parliament and through the adoption of the General Affairs and External 
Relations Council Conclusions on Darfur on 16 June, following the Prosecutor’s briefing to that 
Council. 
 
The Prosecutor travelled to Indonesia and Saudi Arabia. He is going shortly to Libya. I personally had 
an occasion to brief here in Brussels the countries of the ACP and it was a fruitful exchange. I will be 
travelling next week to Sharm El Sheikh to attend the African Union Summit. 
 
Each of such contacts is the occasion to secure both concrete judicial cooperation and political 
support for our justice efforts.  It is this kind of constant building up of a network of cooperation 
which allowed the Office and the Court to secure the assistance of Belgium, Portugal and others 
for the arrest of Jean-Pierre Bemba on 24 May here in Brussels in a short timeframe and in 
smooth conditions of confidentiality and efficiency. We  hope  to  maintain this  level  of  support  
and  cooperation throughout our  situations and activities. 
As the President said, key and innovative provisions of the Rome Statute, regarding victims’ 
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participation and witness protection, the rights of the accused are being clarified by the judges of 
the Court. In the weeks to come, there will be defining moments for this Court: as Prosecutors, we 
trust that a new date will be set for the Lubanga trial; the Confirmation of charges hearing in the 
case against Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui on 27 June; the start of the Lubanga 
trial; and the Office will present a new application to the judges under article 58, in our second case 
in Darfur, in July. 
 
I will focus my brief on the Office’s investigative activities, which are expanding, with the prospect 
of our third case and possibly fourth cases in the DRC, as well as work on our second and third 
cases in the Darfur situation. I will also brief you on our investigative activities in the case of 
Northern Uganda. 
 
1. - Let me update you on the cases. 
The Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) 
 
Concerning the case against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, let me just repeat the words of the Prosecutor. 
This is a permanent Court. We are building an institution for the world and for the coming years. 
The Court is defining its legal standards for the next years and for all its upcoming cases. This 
Court must insist on the highest legal standards, and fair trial is the most important of all. 
 
The Prosecution has of course appealed the Decision to stay the proceedings in the strongest 
terms. But if the Court decides that it is not the moment to start a trial because there are issues 
that need to be considered, it is the law. And it is full respect for the law that will ensure the 
enduring authority and legitimacy of this Court. I am confident that the legal problems will be 
solved and a new beginning of the trial will be scheduled very soon, but it will be the decision of 
the judges. 
 
We need to understand the logic behind this decision. As a legal institution the Court must continue 
to insist on defining and clarifying the legal standards as the basis of the Court’s activities. Fair 
trials are fundamentally important. 
 
The Court has also pursued its efforts to promote enforcement of the arrest warrant against Mr. 
Bosco Ntaganda, a former subordinate of Mr. Lubanga, who is also charged with the war crimes of 
enlisting, conscripting and using children under 15 to participate actively in hostilities. The arrest 
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warrant, initially issued under seal in 2006, was unsealed in April 2008 upon request of the 
Prosecution. Mr Ntaganda is allegedly the current Chief of Staff of the Congrès national pour la 
défense du peuple (CNDP) an armed group, active in North Kivu in the DRC. 
 
The Confirmation of Charges hearing in the case of Mr Katanga and Mr Ngudjolo will begin in a 
few days, on 27 June. With this case, the OTP completed a first phase of the DRC investigation, 
focusing on the horrific crimes committed by leaders of armed groups active in Ituri since July 2002. 
 
The Office is now moving on to a third case in the DRC. In the selection process, the OTP 
is paying particular attention to the numerous reports of crimes committed by a multiplicity 
of perpetrators and groups in the North and South Kivu provinces, including numerous reports on 
horrific sexual crimes. The OTP received the views and concerns of victims and associations in this 
regard at the seat of the Court on 13 March 2008. 
 
Given the particular characteristics of those attacks, the Office will also consider ways to facilitate 
investigations by the DRC judiciary and contributions to “dossiers d’instruction” against 
perpetrators. This will require enhanced protection for witnesses and the judiciary. 
 
The OTP is also monitoring the situation of those individuals who may have played a role in 
supporting and backing armed groups which committed crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court. 
 
DRC is a situation where the political support of states is concretely needed. 
 
The Situation in Northern Uganda 
 
The arrest warrants against Joseph Kony and other LRA commanders, the first issued by the 
Court, have been outstanding since 2005. They have committed unspeakable atrocities and we 
believe that they are criminally responsible for thousands of killings and abductions since July 
2002. They are charged with crimes against humanity and war crimes, including rape, murder, 
sexual enslavement, enlisting of children, attacking civilian populations, and pillaging. Those arrest 
warrants remain in effect and have to be executed. 
Joseph Kony, the first indictee of the ICC, has received money and food, resources that he 
has used to enlarge and strengthen his group. He has committed new crimes in DRC, Southern 
Sudan and CAR. 
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Joseph Kony and two remaining commanders of the Lord Resistance’s Army are fugitives from 
the ICC. They continue to plan and commit crimes. They abduct civilians, including children, for the 
purposes of forced recruitment and sexual enslavement. My Office has confirmed that 200 to 300 
civilians have recently been abducted by the LRA in these three countries. These are the same 
crimes which the LRA leaders are charged with in Northern Uganda. They are now inflicting the 
same violence on a new generation of victims. 
 
Let me be transparent. As the Deputy Prosecutor of a Court which has issued arrest warrants 
against the LRA leaders 3 years ago, I regret the halting of any effort to promote arrests of those 
indicted criminals during the Juba process, the absence of any EU statement calling for the arrest 
of those criminals, and the absence of clear efforts to avoid the diversion of international aid in 
favour of the LRA. This has allowed Joseph Kony to divert money from the Juba talks, in order to 
re-arm, and commit new crimes. We are aware of the difficulties of an arrest operation. This is 
why the Office has consistently requested that such an operation be prepared by cutting off the 
supply networks of Joseph Kony, encouraging defections and stepping up planning of the arrest. 
The choice was never between an arrest operation or nothing. 
 
The international community has to conduct conflict management initiatives. We have to respect 
the facts and the law. 
 
Joseph Kony might be proved innocent in a Court of law.  But it is not the role of a peace mediator, 
or of the Security Council, to decide whether Mr Kony will end up in a jail in Scheveningen, in jail 
in Kampala, or in golden exile. It is not for politicians to decide who is a criminal deserving arrest 
and who does not. It is not for politicians to decide when a State is conducting genuine 
proceedings or not. It is the Court’s responsibility. 
 
The Situation in the Central African Republic (CAR) 
 
On 22 May 2007 we announced the opening of an investigation in the Central African 
Republic. 
 
The OTP’s investigation is focusing on the most serious crimes, which were mainly committed 
during a peak of violence in 2002-2003 and with a particularly high number of allegations of rapes 
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and other acts of sexual violence, perpetrated against hundreds of reported victims. 
 
On 24 May 2008, Mr. Jean-Pierre Bemba, Chairman of the Mouvement de Libération du Congo 
(MLC), an armed group which intervened in the 2002-2003 armed conflict in Central African 
Republic (CAR), was arrested in the suburbs of Brussels. We expect him to be transferred to The 
Hague shortly. 
 
Mr. Bemba was charged by the ICC for crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in 
Central African Republic. The MLC pursued a plan of terrorizing and brutalizing innocent civilians, 
in particular during a campaign of massive rapes and looting. Mr Bemba had already used the same 
tactics in the past, in CAR and in the DRC, always leaving a trail of death and destruction behind 
him. 
 
In CAR, our investigation into the 2002-03 crimes continues. We are also monitoring recent 
crimes. The Prosecutor has written to CAR authorities inquiring about national proceedings 
against the main perpetrators of crimes committed since 2005. 
 
We  welcome  the  efficient  approach  taken  in  the  context  of  the  national  dialogue  in  CAR,  
where transparency has been given to all participants that no immunity can be granted for crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court. This is helping the Court, and the CAR. 
 
The Situation in Darfur, the Sudan 
 
On 27 April 2007, more than one year ago, the ICC Judges issued arrest warrants for Ahmad Harun 
former Minister of State for the Interior and current State Minister of Humanitarian Affairs, and 
Ali Kushayb, a Militia/Janjaweed leader, for war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
 
Just three weeks ago, on 5 June, the Prosecutor informed the Security Council that the Government 
of Sudan continues not to cooperate with the Court. The Government of Sudan is not 
complying with Security Council Resolution 1593, referring the Darfur situation to the ICC. The 
territorial State, Sudan, has the legal obligation and the ability to arrest Mr. Harun and Mr. 
Kushyab and surrender them to the Court.   The Sudanese authorities can – and they must – 
surrender the two indicted criminals to the Court, and break the system of violence and impunity in 
Darfur. 
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The  Prosecutor also  reported on  the  Office’s  ongoing second  and  third  investigations in  
Darfur.  The mobilization of the state apparatus to plan, commit and cover up crimes against 
civilians, in particular the Fur, Massalit and Zaghawa, in such a systematic way, over such a region, 
over such a period of time, is the focus of the Office’s second investigation. 
 
Furthermore, the investigation into allegations of rebel crimes, focusing amongst others on the 
Haskanita attack against peacekeepers, continues. 
 
2. – Let me now turn to our analysis activities. 
 
Based on Article 15, the Office proactively collects information about alleged crimes falling under 
the Court’s jurisdiction. The Office continues its analysis of various situations in the preliminary 
examination phase. As part of its ongoing analysis of the situation in Colombia, the Office has 
written to the Government of Colombia seeking further information. We also had fruitful 
exchanges in Washington with the Secretary General of the OAS on  how our justice efforts and 
other initiatives are reinforcing not undermining each other. 
 
The Office has also written to various parties in Kenya seeking further information in relation to 
alleged crimes committed on that territory, including to the two parties which now constitute the 
Government. The Office has received a reply from the Kenyan National Commission on Human 
Rights but still awaits a reply from either of the two political parties concerned. 
 
The Office has also recently written to the Government of Afghanistan seeking further 
information in relation to alleged crimes committed on that territory. 
 
In relation to Côte d’Ivoire, the Prosecutor met with the Ambassador after the last diplomatic 
briefing and the Office’s outstanding request to carry out a mission to that territory was 
discussed. We regret that no progress has been made in this regard. We call upon the 
government of Côte d’Ivoire to facilitate this mission as a matter of urgency. 
 
Conclusion 
 
As a Prosecutor, I am confident that the judicial activities of the Court will proceed efficiently ; as 
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demonstrated  recently,   the   defendants   will   be   treated   fairly,   the   Prosecutor’s   action   
scrutinized energetically, the victims will have their own, dignified, autonomous voice. 
 
The most difficult challenge might well be outside the courtroom. The arrests of Ngudjolo and 
even more Bemba have demonstrated the potentiality of the system. The UNSC PRST was also an 
important moment. 
 
By virtue of the Rome Statute, each State Party must support the Court wherever and whenever it 
decides to intervene or not to intervene, to support the Court whether it decides to indict, convict 
or acquit. 
 
It is time for States to transform their expression of support to the idea of international justice 
into concrete cooperation. Impunity is not an abstract notion. Impunity fuels violence. 
Continuation of violence and crimes is what happens in situation, like that of Joseph Kony and 
other LRA leaders, where States Parties of the ICC are not facing their responsibilities, and still 
continue to refuse to call publicly for arrests. 
 
It is not enough to call generally and theoretically for compliance with the Rome Statute. Efforts 
to arrest must be ongoing and unrelenting. In Uganda, in the DRC, in CAR. It is not true only for the 
territorial states. The whole international community should mobilize themselves to support the 
effort of territorial states. 
 
Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, 
You cannot remain silent on Kony and hope that what you say on Harun can carry weight.  I ask 
you for consistency.  
 
Thank you. 
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Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor/Le Procureur 
 
Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, 
 
Let  me  report  on  the  last  developments of  the  Office  of  the  Prosecutor’s (“OTP”) 
activities. 
 
a.   Uganda 
 
The  Office  confirmed  that  Vincent  Otti  was  killed  by  the  Lord’s  Resistance Army (“LRA”), 
following orders by Joseph Kony. The Prosecution provided the information to the Pre-Trial 
Chamber. Joseph Kony and the other two LRA commanders charged with crimes against 
humanity and war crimes committed in Northern Uganda remain at large. They continue to 
commit crimes and to threaten the entire region. Arrest is long overdue. 
 
It is confirmed that Kony used the Juba peace talks to gain time and support, to rearm and attack 
again. We have collected information indicating that at the end of 2007, Joseph Kony issued 
orders to abduct 1,000 persons to expand the ranks of the LRA. The price paid today by civilians is 
high. The LRA is attacking civilians in Southern Sudan and in the Central African Republic (“CAR”), 
and is now also committing atrocities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DRC”). 
 
Reports indicate that just a few days ago, on 17 September 2008, the LRA attacked Congolese 
villages in the Haut Uelé District of the DRC (Dungu Territory). These attacks all follow a similar 
method, with markets surrounded and looted, students abducted from school, properties burned 
and dozens of civilians killed, including several local chiefs. Tens of thousands have now been 
displaced. 
 
We appreciated the efforts of States to monitor assistance and resources provided to the LRA in 
the context of the Juba talks. We are also working well with national authorities to control the 
LRA supply network in Europe and elsewhere. The Prosecution urges all actors, including regional 
and international organizations, to support and work together with the DRC, CAR, Southern Sudan, 
Uganda and the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (“MONUC”) in 
the planning and execution of the arrests. 
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b.    Central African Republic 
 
The Prosecution presented the document containing the charges in the case of Mr. Jean- Pierre 
Bemba on 1st  of October. The same day, the Prosecution disclosed incriminatory and exculpatory 
evidence to the defence. In the CAR collection, there is just one document  containing  
information with  some  exculpatory  value  received  under  the confidential regime established 
by Article 54(3)(e). The Office is working to disclose the information to  the  defence.  The  Office,  
in  close  consultation with  the  Victims  and Witnesses  Unit  (“VWU”)  and  the  Pre-Trial  
Chamber  III,  is  working  on  witness protection issues. The Prosecution is ready for the start of 
the Confirmation of Charges Hearing on 4 November. 
 
c.   The Democratic Republic of the Congo -  1 
 
As you know, on 13 June 2008, the Trial Chamber imposed a stay of the proceedings in the case of 
the Prosecutor against Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo.  The Chamber took that step because the 
Prosecution was not able to put all relevant material received under conditions of confidentiality 
but with eventual exculpatory value before the Trial Chamber, in order for it to assess the impact 
of any non-disclosure on the fairness of the proceedings. 
 
The Office appealed this decision based on a different interpretation of the law, but at the same 
time the Office is dedicating its utmost efforts to reach an agreement with the information 
providers in order to comply with the Judges’ request. 
 
The OTP has addressed the concerns that led to the original stay. The Prosecution has provided to 
the Trial Chamber all undisclosed evidence from Non Governmental Organizations (“NGOs”) in an 
unredacted form, and has informed the Chamber that it was in a position to immediately provide 
all the United Nations (“UN”) documents that form part of the undisclosed evidence to the Trial 
Chamber, thanks to a new agreement it has reached with the UN. Accordingly, the Prosecution 
asked the Chamber to lift the stay and review the documents. 
 
On 3 September 2008, the Trial Chamber refused to review the documents and lift the stay of the 
proceedings. It accepted that the Prosecution is now in compliance with the original requirement, 
but added new conditions. 
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The Office also appealed this new decision. The Appeals Chamber has to rule on these legal 
aspects. 
 
In the meantime, the Prosecution went back to the UN, and we reached last week a new 
agreement with  the  Office  of  Legal  Adviser  of  the  UN  in  order  to  meet  the  new 
requirements  established  by  the  Trial  Chamber.  The  UN  has  been  consistently supporting the 
Court and we found a solution that preserves its legitimate concerns for the security of its 
personnel and still meets the requirements of the Trial Chamber. 
 
The Prosecution is focusing on starting the Lubanga trial. We are litigating the issues, but we 
are also finding operational solutions that will be presented to the Judges in a few days. 
 
Let me also highlight that the arrest warrant against Mr. Bosco Ntaganda is still outstanding. We 
are seeking the support of all actors in the Kivus, the DRC and the region to secure his arrest. 
 
d.   The Democratic Republic of the Congo -  2 
 
As  the  President said, the  Pre-Trial Chamber I  confirmed the  charges, and  we  are preparing 
for trial. The work of the Office is of course affected by the security situation on the ground.   
Today, the Forces de Résistance Patriotique d’Ituri (“FRPI”) forces are attacking Bogoro again. and 
MONUC is trying to stop them. All actors involved must find ways to support MONUC in this 
regard. 
 
e.   The Democratic Republic of the Congo - 3 
 
The Office is now moving on to a third case in the DRC, in the North and South Kivu provinces, 
where we have received numerous reports of crimes committed by a multiplicity of perpetrators 
and groups, including numerous reports on sexual crimes. We are currently engaging all actors to 
secure their support. 
 
Given the particular characteristics of those attacks, the Office will also consider ways to facilitate 
investigations by the DRC judiciary and contributions to “dossiers d’instruction” against 
perpetrators. This will require enhanced protection for witnesses and the judiciary. 
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f.   Darfur, the Sudan 
 
The two individuals sought by the Court, Mr. Ahmed Harun and Mr. Ali Kushayb, remain at large. 
The Government of the Sudan continues to refuse to cooperate with the Court  and  to  comply  
with  UN  Security Council  (“UNSC”) Resolution 1593  (2005). Following my presentation of the 5 
June report to the Council, on 16 June, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Presidential 
Statement 21, which states that the Security Council takes note of the OTP’s efforts to bring to 
justice the perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur, in particular the 
arrest warrants for Ahmad Harun and Ali Kushayb and urges the Government of the Sudan and all 
other parties  to  the  conflict  in  Darfur  to  cooperate fully  with  the  Court,  consistent with 
Resolution 1593 (2005), in order to put an end to impunity for the crimes committed in Darfur. 
 
On 14 July, The Prosecution requested to the Pre Trial Chamber I an arrest warrant against  Mr.  Al  
Bashir  for  genocide, crimes  against  humanity and  war  crimes.  The evidence shows that Al 
Bashir’s forces attacked the civilian population in Darfur since March 2003. First they were 
attacked in their villages, and now they are attacked in the camps for displaced persons. 
 
Additionally,  my   Office   requested   information   from   the   Sudanese   government regarding 
the Kalma Camp attack committed on 25 August, where Sudanese forces allegedly killed at least 31 
civilians. We are assessing if this was an isolated act or a new strategy: open attacks against 
civilians in camps for displaced persons in Darfur. 
 
Finally,  we  have  proceeded with  the  investigation into  allegations of  rebel  crimes, focusing  
on  the  Haskanita  attack  against  AU  peacekeepers. We  are  now  ready  to proceed to the 
Judges with an application in the third investigation before the end of 
2008. 
 
Instead of addressing this issue judicially, Mr. Al Bashir is using the Sudanese state apparatus to 
challenge the case through political, diplomatic, and communication channels. They  have  
organized  a  campaign with  four  main  points:  i.  the  Court  is attacking Africa; ii. the Court is 
affecting the peace process; iii. the Court  is affecting the security of victims and of the 
international personnel, because if indicted, Mr. Al Bashir would retaliate against them; iv. there is 
no evidence, and the case is a personal issue of the Prosecutor against Mr. Al Bashir. 
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On the first point, we cannot accept this attempt to divert our attention from the crimes. As UN 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon said: this is  not about Africa, this is  about Darfur. The victims 
of the crimes committed in Darfur are almost 3 millions of African citizens. The evidence shows 
that Mr. Al Bashir used some tribes, that he  labelled “Arabs”, to attack other tribes, that he 
called “Zurgas” or “Africans”. During the attacks, Al Bashir’s forces consistently claimed that they 
were going to kill the “Africans”. Who is attacking Africans in Darfur is very clear. The public 
campaign that has been launched is part of an attempt to cover-up those crimes and to divert our 
attention. All of us have a responsibility to set the record straight, and I count on your support. 
 
On  the  second  point,  the  idea  that  justice  will  promote peace  in  Darfur  is  both  a 
cornerstone of the Rome Statute and a decision taken by the Security Council in March 
2005. The support of all the members of the UNSC to this approach has been confirmed 
by the Presidential Statement of the Council in June 2008. The situation has not changed, and again 
all of us have a responsibility to clarify this. The Court has been given a judicial mandate, and 
must implement it. 
 
On the third point, the mere fact that Mr. Al Bashir is threatening the victims, African Union 
(“AU”) and UN personnel, should be seen for what it is: the confirmation of his criminal intent. 
The Court and the States Parties cannot be blackmailed. Again, I need your very strong voices to 
make clear that such threats will not be rewarded with promises of impunity. 
 
On the fourth point, I will deal with this in Court. I will present my evidence and the judges will 
assess. As you know, the judges held a first hearing on 1st of October. 
Ladies and Gentlemen, 
 
We have a judicial mandate. We are doing our part, but we also need your voices to confirm the 
legitimacy of the Court you have created in the state of political attacks that this Court, alone, 
cannot confront. 
 
Let me now turn to our analysis activities. 
 
On 18  June 2008 my Office wrote to  the Government of  Colombia seeking further 
information on the decision to extradite senior former paramilitary leaders to the United States of  
America.   We also sent a  number of  requests to  neighbouring states and European states to 
115 
 
gather more information on possible support to the commission of crimes by the FARC; we want 
to identify the existence of national proceedings in this regard in different countries. 
 
As  part  of  our  ongoing  analysis  of  the  situation  in  Colombia,  I  led  a  mission  to Colombia, 
from 25 to 27 August 2008. The Prosecution delegation met with victims, participated in a Seminar 
supported by the Netherlands for Judges and Prosecutors that are applying the “Law on Peace and 
Justice”. We had a meeting with a plenary of the Supreme Court of Justice. We met with the 
“Procurador General”, who provided with useful information on the ongoing investigations. We 
visited a mass grave exhumation that is part of the national investigations against the paramilitary 
activities. We received explanations from all the levels of the Government. We met with the 
President, the Vice President and different ministers. We also met with representatives of civil 
society. 
 
The Office awaits a reply to a request sent to the Government of Afghanistan seeking further 
information in relation to alleged crimes committed on that territory. 
 
As I confirmed on 20 August 2008, my Office is analysing the situation in Georgia. The Office is 
currently analysing open sources documents as well as reports from Georgia and over 3,000 
documents received from the Russian Government. We received the visit of officials of the 
Georgian government. My Office is continuing to gather more information in order to determine 
whether there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation. 
 
As the President said we are celebrating ten years of the Rome Treaty. The law is now operational. 
It is time to confirm in reality our commitment to put an end to impunity for the most serious 
crimes of concern to the international community. 
 
Thank you. 
 
Following a question on the AU statement on support of a delay in the investigation in 
Darfur, the Prosecutor answered: 
The Prosecution cannot speculate on  current or  forthcoming peace efforts, as  these efforts,  
pursued  in  parallel  by  other  members  of  the  international community, are outside the 
judicial remit of the Office of the Prosecutor. The interests of peace are the responsibility of other 
organs, inter alia the UNSC or regional organizations. The Council recognized through the adoption 
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of 1593 that justice is an essential component to the solution for Darfur, and that lack of justice for 
Rome Statute crimes in Darfur poses a threat to international peace and security. The UN Security 
Council had full knowledge of the OTP’s plans, and following on their referral of the situation in 
2005 and the presentation of seven reports to the Council on the progress of the Prosecution’s 
work, unanimously expressed their support for the OTP’s work in June 2008. 
 
My Office continues to update the Arab League, the African Union and institutions and leaders 
seeking for comprehensive solutions in Darfur on the Court’s judicial developments. In New York, 
two weeks ago, I met with Sheikh Al Thani, Qatar’s Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Mr. Jean Ping, Chairperson of the African Union Commission and Mr. Bernard Bembe, 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Tanzania. I was also invited to attend the first consultations of the 
Arab Ministerial Committee set- up by the Arab League to arrange peace talks between the 
Government of the Sudan and the armed movements in Darfur, chaired by Qatar’s Prime Minister 
and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sheikh Al Thani, and co-chaired by the Secretary General of the 
Arab League, Mr. Amr Mussa and Mr. Jean Ping. The Committee meeting was also attended by 
the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Libya, Algeria and Morocco, as well as 
by the Tanzanian, Senegalese and Burkinabe Foreign ministers. The Prosecution respects the 
complementary role they are seeking to play in bringing a comprehensive solution to Darfur. 
 
On 11 July, Deputy Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda briefed the AU Peace and Security 
Council in Addis Ababa, and met with the AU Commission Chairperson, Mr. Jean Ping. 
 
On 9-10 August 2008, Deputy Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda met in Botswana with President  Festus  
Mogae  and  Attorney  General  Athalia  Molokomme as  well  as  the Ministers responsible for 
Justice, Defence and Security. Deputy Prosecutor Bensouda also spoke with President Sirleaf 
Johnson of Liberia. 
 
On 10-11 August 2008, I conducted an official visit to Dakar, where I met with President Wade and 
discussed in particular the case of Darfur. The support of President Wade and His Minister for 
Foreign Affairs Mr. Cheikh Gadjo has been valuable. 
 
While in New York, I also met with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Sierra Leone, the Ministers of 
Justice of Rwanda and Kenya, and the outgoing and incoming Presidents of the Assembly of States 
Parties (“ASP”). 
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Fatou Bensouda, Deputy Prosecutor  
 
Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, Thank you for being here. 
 
Today, 7 April, is the day of Remembrance of the Rwanda Genocide. It has been 15 years 
since the killings started and the unthinkable happened, again. It is a solemn reminder of the 
responsibility of States Parties to the Rome Statute. It is a call for action   to   arrest   Bosco   
Ntaganda,   Joseph   Kony,   Ahmed   Harun   and   Omar Al‐Bashir, as well as to stop the massive 
crimes that they are still committing. 
 
Let me update you on the Office activities since our last meeting. 
 
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) 
 
It has been 5 years since President Kabila referred the situation of the DRC to the International 
Criminal Court, and international justice has become an integral part of the efforts for peace and 
reconciliation in the Great Lakes region. 
 
In DRC 1, Prosecutor versus Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, the Trial Chamber has examined 16 
Prosecution witnesses. This includes former child soldiers, political, military and other insiders, as 
well as experts. We have presented documentary evidence, including videos, and documents from 
the UPC. In the next weeks, we will hear around 20 prosecution witnesses. We expect the 
Prosecution case to be completed by June    2009.    The    Defence    has    announced   that    they    
will    call    witnesses; in principle, they will appear in September. 
 
These 11 weeks of trial have confirmed the existence of two main challenges for the whole Court: 
the need to ensure the protection and the proper conditions for vulnerable witnesses coming 
from situation countries, where tensions still remain. We still have concerns in this regard and 
we will address it with the Registry and Chambers. 
 
In the DRC 2 case, we are ready to go to trial. The beginning of the trial is scheduled for 24 
September. 
 
We are trying to present each prosecution case in less than six months. We will present about 25 
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witnesses in the Katanga/Ngudjolo case. 
 
As you know, we still have one suspect at large in DRC, Bosco Ntaganda. He has been active in 
the Kivus as Chief of staff of the CNDP. Bosco seems to have taken over the leadership of the 
group when Nkunda was arrested by Rwanda. The DRC Government is conscious of its obligations 
under the Rome Statute and we are in discussion with them and all partners in the region in order 
to ensure that Bosco is surrendered soon. 
 
Our third investigation in the DRC continues, with a focus on the Kivu provinces. We are 
working on all the groups active in the region, but for operational reasons cannot disclose much 
information at this stage. In this DRC 3 case, we are aiming at a  coordinated approach  whereby  
national  judicial  authorities in  the  region  and beyond as appropriate will take over cases in 
order to ensure that all perpetrators are prosecuted. The possibility for us to transfer information 
collected in the course of our  investigations  will  depend  on  the  development  locally  of  
protection  for witnesses and judges. 
 
Let me turn to Northern Uganda 
 
President Museveni referred the case to us 5 years ago. The Court has done its job, issuing arrest 
warrants as early as 2005. But arrests have not been prioritized by the international  community.  
Negotiations  have  allowed  the  LRA  to  re‐build  and re‐arm. 
 
LRA crimes against civilians have resumed with the same cruelty and  across a growing area 
in Northern DRC, Southern Sudan and close to CAR. 
 
The joint operation by regional states that we witnessed is recognition of the need for action. The 
fact that the Governments of the region acted together, with the objective of executing a warrant, 
is an encouraging signal. 
 
The  capture  of  high  level  commanders,  and  information  gathered  on  supply networks should 
help continue the work against the LRA. Our understanding is that the Ugandans will continue to 
assist DRC counterparts. 
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Outstanding arrest warrants have to be executed. 
 
As President Song mentioned, on 10 March, PTC II ruled that the Uganda case is admissible. It is 
important that the three indictees, as soon as they are arrested, are transferred to  The Hague. I  
insist once more that work in  Uganda to  build up accountability mechanisms must focus on 
the other LRA combatants, who are not sought  by  the  Court.  I  strongly  discourage  States  
Parties  to  encourage  Court shopping for the three indicted LRA leaders. 
 
Let me now turn to the Central African Republic, a situation referred to us in 2004 by President 
Bozize. 
 
As the President mentioned, Jean‐Pierre Bemba’s confirmation hearing took place on 
12‐15 January 2009. 
 
On  3rd    March,  the  PTC  requested  the  Prosecution  to  consider  submitting  an Amended 
Document Containing the Charges, addressing Article 28 of the Statute on command/superior 
responsibility. We did so on 30 March 2009. The initial mode of liability under Article 25(3)(a) for 
individual criminal responsibility has not been dropped.  Both  modes  of  liability  are  submitted  
as  alternatives.  The  evidence supports both forms of liability. 
 
In the meantime, the investigation goes on: We have performed forensic activities in Bangui 
(exhumation and autopsy) and are grateful for the cooperation extended by the Central African 
authorities and a number of partners. During our last diplomatic briefing, the CAR Minister of 
Justice was with us and committed to such cooperation; it has been forthcoming. 
 
Let me turn to the situation in Darfur, the Sudan 
 
The OTP presented a third case in November 2008, regarding the alleged responsibility of 3 rebel 
commanders for crimes committed against AU peacekeepers in Haskanita on 29 September 2007. 
We hope to have a decision from the Judges this month. Different rebels  groups publicly 
committed to  ensure the  appearance of potential suspects in Court. Should the Judges rule in 
favour of our request, judicial proceedings could start soon. 
 
A month ago, the ICC decided that Omar Al‐Bashir shall be arrested to stand trial for crimes of 
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rapes, extermination and killings committed against millions of civilians in Darfur. 
 
The Sudan is obliged under international law to execute the warrant on its territory. If  it  does  
not  enforce  the  warrant,  the  United  Nations  Security  Council,  which referred the case to the 
ICC, will need to ensure compliance. 
 
In  order to  prevent future crimes in  Darfur, to  avoid thousands of  deaths next month, we 
must act now. After the Court’s decision, Omar Al‐Bashir expelled humanitarian organisations. 
This is  not just an  aggravation of  the humanitarian crisis. The expulsion of aid workers is 
another step in the commission of the crime of extermination. 
 
In accordance with the Rome Statute, States Parties have to guarantee lasting respect for and 
enforcement of international justice. States should implement a consistent diplomatic campaign 
to support the Court’s decision and to deny Omar Al‐Bashir any form of support. The Office 
of the Prosecutor wishes to consult with States Parties on possible initiatives in this regard and 
possibly request your assistance: 
 
Non‐essential contacts with Omar Al‐Bashir should be severed. When contacts are necessary, 
attempts should be made first to interact with non‐indicted individuals; there are at this time only 
three persons sought by the Court: Ali Kushayb, Ahmed Harun and Omar Al‐Bashir. 
 
In bilateral and multilateral meetings, States Parties should proactively express their support to 
the enforcement of the Court’s decision, request cooperation with the Court in accordance with 
Security Council resolution 1593, and demand that attacks against the    displaced,    including    
through    expelling    humanitarians,    cease immediately. The Office is grateful for initiatives 
already taken by some States in this regard. 
 
There  can  be  no  “business  as  usual”  attitude  regarding  the  warrant.  Strong leadership is 
required. The kind of leadership we have found in the Great Lakes Region. There, African heads 
of States have chosen the path of justice and called upon the ICC to help them. National 
leaders as well as regional and international organisations are working together, integrating the 
tracks of justice, humanitarian assistance, peace and security. There is still a long way to go. But 
they have said no to massive crimes. This is the way forward. And this is not happening for Darfur. 
Why? 
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As a Deputy Prosecutor, and as an African woman, I am dismayed by suggestions that this Court is 
targeting Africans. This Court has indicted the President of the Sudan because he pursues the 
extermination of 2.5 million Africans. 
 
This Court, in liaison with the African Union and the Arab League, two organisations publicly 
committed to fighting impunity, has examined for years whether the Sudanese   authorities   have   
investigated   and   prosecuted   the   massive   crimes committed in Darfur. They have done 
nothing. Worse, they have condoned the rape of  women and  girls  for  five  years, African 
women, African girls. This  Court is defending African victims and will continue to do so. 
 
Former President Mbeki of South Africa, as the leader of the AU panel, is in contact with 
Prosecutor Moreno‐Ocampo. We explained to him that the ICC has conducted investigations 
against six individuals, including the three rebel commanders. There are no sealed arrest warrants 
and the Court is not conducting new investigations. President Mbeki has the huge task of moving 
the process of accountability ahead for all the other individuals involved in the commission of 
crimes. We are committed to working with him. 
 
Let me now turn to other situations 
 
Situations in five countries on four continents are under analysis: Colombia, Georgia, Kenya, Côte 
d’Ivoire, and Afghanistan. 
 
On  30‐31  March,  upon  the  invitation  of  former  Secretary  General  Kofi  Annan, the Office 
participated in the Geneva Conference on Kenya with government representatives, as well as 
members of the civil society. The leadership of Kofi Annan is   essential.   We   fully   support   his   
efforts   to   encourage   local   accountability mechanisms. We stand ready to assist Kenya. 
 
On  22  January  2009,  the  Palestinian  National  Authority  lodged  a  declaration accepting 
jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with Article 12(3). The OTP has also received 326 
communications related to the situation of Israel and the Palestinian Territory. The Office will 
examine all issues related to its jurisdiction, including whether the declaration by the Palestinian 
Authority accepting the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC meets statutory requirements, whether 
crimes within ICC jurisdiction have been committed and whether there are national proceedings in 
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relation to alleged crimes. 
 
Before I conclude, let me appraise you of developments in the area of positive 
complementarity 
 
Next to its existing cooperation networks, the Office has developed a network with law 
enforcement agencies. After three meetings to exchange experience with war crime units from 
around the world, the Office has started a project with interested countries and INTERPOL to 
increase our mutual cooperation. From mid February to March 2009, investigators and 
prosecutors from 8 different countries including, among others, the  Premier Substitut du  
Procureur de  la  République Centrafricaine à Bangui stayed in the Office, exchanging experiences 
and practices. 
 
The Rome Statute created more than a Court in far away Den Haag. It established an innovative 
model of international cooperation. We, together with national police institutions, and together 
with national judiciary, will do the investigative and prosecutorial work. We need you, the 
diplomatic community, to ensure that justice is respected and arrest warrants are implement 
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Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,  
 
Thank you for being here. 
 
As the Vice‐President mentioned, just a week ago, on 18 May, the ICC held its first initial 
appearance hearing for a suspect in the Darfur situation. 
 
Mr. Abu Garda’s appearance in Court would not have been possible without the assistance of a 
number of African and European States, who worked together with the Office of the Prosecutor 
over the last 8 months, including The Netherlands, the Host State of the ICC, Chad, Senegal, 
Nigeria, Mali and the Gambia. I wish to thank them again. 
 
Ladies and Gentlemen, Let me update you on the other Office activities since our last meeting. 
 
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) 
 
In DRC 1, Prosecutor versus Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, the Trial Chamber has examined 
22 Prosecution witnesses. This includes former child soldiers, political, military and other insiders, 
as well as experts. We have presented documentary evidence, including videos, and documents 
from the UPC. We expect the Prosecution case to be completed by June 2009. 
 
In the DRC 2 case, we are ready to go to trial. The beginning of the trial is scheduled for 24 
September. We are trying to present each prosecution case in less than six months. We will 
present about 25 witnesses in the Katanga/Ngudjolo case. 
 
As you know, we still have one suspect at large in DRC, Bosco Ntaganda. He has been active in 
the Kivus as Chief of staff of the CNDP. Bosco seems to have taken over the leadership of the 
group when Nkunda was arrested by Rwanda. The DRC Government is conscious of its obligations 
under the Rome Statute and we are in discussion with them and all partners in the region in order 
to ensure that Bosco is surrendered soon. 
 
Our third investigation in the DRC continues, with a focus on the Kivu provinces. We are 
working on all the groups active in the region, but for operational reasons cannot disclose much 
information at this stage. In this DRC 3 case, we are aiming at a  coordinated approach whereby 
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national judicial authorities in  the  region  and beyond as appropriate will take over cases in 
order to ensure that all perpetrators are prosecuted. The possibility for us to transfer information 
collected in the course of our  investigations  will  depend  on  the  development  locally  of  
protection  for witnesses and judges. 
 
Let me turn to Northern Uganda 
 
LRA crimes against civilians have resumed with the same cruelty and across a growing area in 
Northern DRC and Southern Sudan. 
 
It is almost 4 years since the ICC warrants were issued. LRA killings and abductions continue under 
Kony’s leadership, with more than 100,000 now displaced by LRA activity in DRC, and over 50,000 
in Southern Sudan, including over 18,000 displaced across the border from DRC, according to UN 
OCHA estimates. 
 
The joint operation by regional states that we witnessed is recognition of the need for action. The 
fact that the Governments of the region acted together, with the objective of executing a warrant, 
is an encouraging signal. 
 
The  capture  of  high  level  commanders,  and  information  gathered  on  supply networks should 
help continue the work against the LRA. Our understanding is that the Ugandans will continue to 
assist DRC counterparts. 
 
Outstanding arrest warrants have to be executed. 
 
Let me now turn to the Central African Republic, a situation referred to us in 2004 by President 
Bozize. 
 
On  3rd    March,  the  PTC  requested  the  Prosecution  to  consider  submitting  an Amended 
Document Containing the Charges, addressing Article 28 of the Statute on command/superior  
responsibility.  We  submitted  the  amended  document  on  30 March 2009,  with  both modes 
of  liability (command/superior responsibility and individual  criminal  responsibility  under  
Article  25(3)(a))  as  alternatives.  The evidence  supports  both  forms  of  liability.  We  expect  
the  Chamber  to  issue  its decision by the end of June. 
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In the meantime, the investigation goes on: We have performed forensic activities in Bangui 
(exhumation and autopsy) and are grateful for the cooperation extended by the Central African 
authorities and a number of partners. 
 
Let me turn to the situation in Darfur, the Sudan 
 
As I mentioned earlier, Bahar Idriss Abu Garda voluntarily appeared in Court on 18 May in 
response to a summons. 
 
The rebel commander is the first person to appear before the Court voluntarily in response to a 
summons and the first person to appear in relation to the Darfur investigation opened in June 
2005. 
 
As the Prosecutor stated, “voluntary appearance is always an option under the Statute, including 
for President Al Bashir should he elect to cooperate.” 
 
The initial appearance of Mr. Abu Garda was also an occasion to pay tribute to the peacekeepers 
targeted in Haskanita: “By killing peacekeepers, the perpetrators attacked the millions of civilians 
who those soldiers came to protect. They came from Senegal, from Mali, from Nigeria, from 
Botswana, to serve and protect. They were murdered. Attacking peacekeepers is a serious crime 
under the Statute and shall be prosecuted.” 
 
Regarding our case against President Omar Al Bashir, the Sudan is obliged under international law 
to execute the warrant on its territory. If it does not enforce the warrant, the United Nations 
Security Council, which referred the case to the ICC, will need to ensure compliance. The 
Prosecutor will report on the non‐cooperation of the Sudan to the UNSC on 5 June. 
 
The Prosecutor is also in regular contact with President Mbeki, as the leader of the AU high‐level 
panel. President Mbeki has written to offer dialogue and cooperation. The Office recognizes the 
importance of a comprehensive solution for Darfur, including reconciliation and compensation, as 
well as moving ahead the process of accountability for other individuals involved in  the 
commission of  crimes.   The Office of the Prosecutor is committed to working with President 
Mbeki and the AU panel toward these goals. 
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Non‐essential contacts with Omar Al‐Bashir should be severed. When contacts are necessary, 
attempts should be made first to interact with non‐indicted individuals; there are at this time only 
three persons sought by the Court: Ali Kushayb, Ahmed Harun and Omar Al‐Bashir. 
 
In bilateral and multilateral meetings, States Parties should proactively express their support to 
the enforcement of the Court’s decision, request cooperation with the Court in accordance with 
Security Council resolution 1593, and demand that attacks against  the  displaced,  including  
through  expelling  humanitarians,  cease immediately. The Office is grateful for initiatives already 
taken by some States in this regard. 
 
Let me now turn to other situations 
 
Situations in five countries on four continents are under analysis: Colombia, Georgia, Kenya, Côte 
d’Ivoire, and Afghanistan. 
 
On  30‐31  March,  upon  the  invitation  of  former  Secretary  General  Kofi  Annan, the Office 
participated in the Geneva Conference on Kenya with government representatives, as  well as  
members of  the  civil  society. The  leadership of  Kofi Annan is essential. We fully support his 
efforts to encourage local accountability mechanisms. We stand ready to assist Kenya. 
 
On 22 January 2009, the Palestinian National Authority lodged a declaration accepting jurisdiction 
of the Court in accordance with Article 12(3). The OTP has also received 326 communications 
related to the situation of Israel and the Palestinian Territory.  The  Office  continues  to  examine  
all  issues  related  to  its  jurisdiction, including  whether  the  declaration  by  the  Palestinian  
Authority  accepting  the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC meets statutory requirements, 
whether crimes within ICC jurisdiction have been committed and whether there are national 
proceedings in relation to alleged crimes. We have received important contributions to our 
analysis, including a report sent by the Prosecutor by the Secretary‐General of the Arab League, 
Mr. Amr Musa. 
 
Before I conclude, let me say a few words about positive complementarity and its importance in 
terms of enforcing the mandate of the Court and maximizing the impact of our work. 
 
A positive understanding of complementarity means firstly making sure that the Court  is  taken  
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seriously  as  an  enforcer  of  the  Statute.  After  six  years,  the international community 
recognizes the existence of a new global legal framework, and realizes that it has to act. This 
means for instance implementing the provisions of the Rome Statute into national legislations. 
 
Secondly, the Office has developed the practice of being as transparent as possible so the  
international  community  and  our  partners  will  know  whether  there  are situations which may 
require investigations to be carried out. 
 
A third manner in which the Office can act is to use its access and expertise to help broker certain 
forms of assistance to national prosecutions and judicial authorities. 
 
The  fourth  way  that  the  Office  can  act  is  to  provide  information  to  national authorities 
that have been obtained in the course of its investigations. The Office is willing to do so, with the 
important caveat that any such information will only ever be transmitted if the Office is satisfied 
that the security of witnesses and the independence of the judiciary can be adequately addressed 
and guaranteed. 
 
Thus we, together with national police institutions, and together with national judiciary, will do 
the investigative and prosecutorial work. We need you, the diplomatic community, to ensure that 
justice is respected and arrest warrants are implemented. 
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Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, 
 
As the President said, States have the opportunity to transform the Kampala Review Conference 
into a major milestone. The next Assembly will be a great moment for you to finalize your plans 
and exercise your collective responsibilities. 
 
How to do it is of course the responsibility of States.  As the President said, it would be improper 
for the Court to take any position on amendments to be decided by States. As the Prosecutor, 
my Office’s contribution is a public Prosecutorial Strategy and a report on the activities of the last 
three years that you will receive before the end of the year, taking in consideration the 
consultation process conducted, including meetings in New York, The Hague and yesterday in 
Geneva. The Prosecution is presenting its own plans in order to increase predictability and 
to help stakeholders to produce their own plans.  Our  Prosecutorial  Strategy  is  our  
independent  contribution  to  the Court Strategic plan. It focuses on our activities but also 
present areas where we can work together. 
 
Let me now quickly update you on the Prosecution activities: 
 
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) 
 
In  DRC  1,  Prosecutor  versus  Thomas  Lubanga  Dyilo,  we  concluded  the 
presentation  of  our  evidence  and  we  are  now  waiting  for  the  Appeal Chamber to make a 
decision. The issue is if Judges can include new facts at this stage of the proceedings based on 
Regulation 55(2). 
 
In the DRC 2 case, we are ready to go to trial. A few days ago, Mathieu Ngudjolo’s Defence 
requested a postponement of three months to the beginning of the trial. This is under the 
consideration of the Judges. 
 
Central African Republic 
 
As you know, we appealed the decision ordering interim release of Jean‐Pierre Bemba. We 
understand the concerns or the States. The Prosecution’s position is based on the facts: there 
has been no change of factual  circumstances in  the  case.  Most  of  the  circumstances  cited  
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by  the decision are pre‐existing and have been cited previously by the same judge as either 
grounds for continued detention or irrelevant to an application for release. 
 
On 3   September, the   Appeals   Chamber   decided   to   grant   suspensive effect to  the  
Prosecutor’s  Appeal. 
 
On 4  September,  Pre‐Trial Chamber  II  decided to postpone  the  hearings with   States   on   
Mr.   Bembaʹs   conditional   release until   the   Appeals Chamber has  ruled  on  the  appeal. 
 
In the meantime, preparations for trial continue. Today, we are presenting our amended 
document containing the charges, a trial brief and all our incriminating evidence. 
 
Darfur, the Sudan 
 
During the Abu Garda confirmation hearing, we presented two witnesses who were victims 
of the attack. For the OTP, attacks against peacekeepers are very serious crimes, with a huge 
impact. My Office will ensure investigations of crimes against peacekeepers. Somalia is the 
example of the consequences of the withdrawal of peacekeepers. 
 
Let me turn to our  preliminary examination activities, a key aspect of the complementarity 
regime. 
 
Our experience shows that making transparent preliminary examination activities will increase 
the predictability of the Court, the cooperation of the different stakeholders and the 
preventative impact of the Rome Statute in general. 
 
We have examples of the importance of such a transparent approach in our current preliminary 
examinations in Colombia, Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire, Afghanistan, Georgia, Palestine and just recently 
Guinea. Let me give a few examples. 
 
Regarding Kenya, I met on 3 July with a Government delegation from Kenya, led by Justice 
Minister Kilonzo. They informed me that, in order to prevent a recurrence of violence during the 
next election cycle, those most responsible for the previous post‐election violence must be held 
accountable. They are committed to ending impunity, and committed themselves to refer the 
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situation to the Court if efforts to conduct national proceedings fail. 
 
The African Union Panel of Eminent African Personalities, chaired by Kofi Annan, submitted to 
the OTP a sealed envelope containing a list of persons allegedly implicated and supporting 
materials collected by the Waki Commission. The leadership of Kofi Annan is essential for 
my Office. He explained how for instance in Kenya there is no opposition between a truth 
commission and justice. He presented a three‐pronged approach: ICC prosecuting those most 
responsible; national accountability proceedings for other perpetrators; and reforms and 
mechanisms such as the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation commission. 
 
With the leadership of the Kenyan authorities, these three tacks should complement each other. 
I will meet with President Kibaki and Prime Minister Odinga tomorrow to discuss the upcoming 
steps in investigating and prosecuting those most responsible. I will explain to them what my 
duties are. 
 
A second aspect that I want to highlight, and which is also included in our Prosecutorial Strategy, 
is our policy to increase reactivity to upsurges of violence potentially falling within the 
jurisdiction of the Court in order to promote timely accountability efforts at the national level 
and to maximize the preventative impact of our work. 
 
What happened in Guinea, a State Party to the Rome Statute since 14 July 2003, is a good 
example. The Office has taken note of serious allegations surrounding the events of 28 
September 2009 in Conakry in accordance with my duties under Article 15. We publicly informed 
on 14 October that we were monitoring those allegations and just six days later, Foreign Affairs 
Minister Alexandre Cécé Loua travelled to the Court and met with Deputy Prosecutor Fatou 
Bensouda. We have requested written information from the Guinean Government on the crimes 
and on modalities put in place for conducting national investigations and prosecutions of those 
responsible. 
 
Finally, it is critically important, if we want to further reinforce the preventative impact of the 
Court activities, to implement the pending arrest warrants. 
 
After 5 years, it is time to do a serious effort to arrest Joseph Kony and the other LRA 
commanders sought by the Court. They are continuing to commit crimes. First in Uganda, then in 
DRC, and now in the Sudan. 
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The only way to stop Joseph Kony is by arresting him and surrendering him to the ICC. 
Outstanding arrest warrants have to be executed. 
 
We still have one suspect at large in the DRC, Bosco Ntaganda. The worst allegations of gender 
crimes during the last years were about crimes allegedly committed by troops under Bosco 
Ntaganda’s command. Bosco Ntaganda should  be  arrested,  there  is  no  excuse.  All  States,  
including  the  DRC’s neighbours, should facilitate his arrest. I am going to the area next week, in 
particular to Kigali, to see what can be done. 
 
The Judges’ decisions are closing doors; as the doors are closed, no windows can be opened. 
This is what we need to discuss. How States will make operational their commitment to enforce 
the Court’s decisions. 
 
Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, 
 
Let me focus briefly on my  managerial role. From the perspective of the OTP, the CBF 
recommendations raise no concerns. Our focus should remain on cost efficiency, how to do 
more with the same resources. The OTP has requested no new posts, although our activities 
greatly increase. In fact, we reduced our requests: the 2009 budget has assessed that the 
vacancy rate would be 10 %; our vacancy rate is actually much lower: it is below 4%. However 
we requested a small adjustment. We estimated a vacancy rate of 
8%, meaning that we are absorbing a 4%. 
 
There   are   two   key   aspects   of   our   cost   efficiency:   flexibility   and standardization. Our 
teams and our field office will continue to be organized in a flexible manner; the OTP will rotate 
personnel in accordance with the needs; we must not rigidify our structures. 
 
We will also ensure that our staff increases its efficiency following common standards. We issued 
the Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, we finishing detailed documents on our main 
policies and we are completing a detailed operational manual. To ensure efficiency, our staff 
will be trained and  evaluated  based  upon  the  Office’s  standards.  Our  new  senior  legal 
advisor is in charge of this process. She has more than 20 years of experience as prosecutor in 
Durban, South Africa. She was managing an office with more than 700 persons. She will be very 
good to ensure this standardisation of the Office. 
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Cost effectiveness depends on the services to be provided by the Registry and in  the  
cooperation  that  we  receive  from  States.  We  are  grateful  for  the security, the 
transportation and the support provided by the field offices staff. We depend on them to 
conduct our investigations on the field. We are in the process of finding a common 
understanding on the services to be provided by the Registry to the OTP. We are also working 
with the Presidency to harmonize better the work of the Court and to produce a clear report on 
governance. We are committed to the “One Court” principle. We are mindful of our 
responsibility to build an institution. 
 
Let me conclude. In a few years the Rome Statute Court has become a reality. The Court is doing 
its judicial work and other stakeholders are ensuring that the Rome Statute is respected. The 
President of the Court is making efforts the ensure harmony between the Court and the UN. 
Let me quote the UN Secretary‐General  in  his  recent  report  on  enhancing  mediation  and  its 
support efforts of 8 April 2009: “Ignoring the administration of justice […] leads to a culture of 
impunity that will undermine sustainable peace. Now that the International Criminal Court has 
been established, mediators should make the international legal position clear to the parties. 
They should understand that, if the jurisdiction  of  the  International  Criminal  Court  is  
established  in  a  particular situation, then, as an independent judicial body, the Court will 
proceed to deal with it in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Rome Statute and the 
process of justice will take its course”. 
 
This is also confirmed by the recently released report of the AU High Level Panel on Darfur, 
under the chairmanship of former President Thabo Mbeki. President Mbeki requested more 
accountability in Darfur. The report encourages more activities to ensure that there is no 
impunity for crimes committed in Darfur.  It fully respects the role of the ICC as an independent, 
judicial institution. The report neither challenges the evidence collected, nor does  it  question  
the  arrest  warrants  issued  against  Ahmad  Harun,  Ali Kushayb and President Al Bashir. The 
report does not challenge the ultimate role of the ICC Judges in deciding on those cases. 
 
The  report  proposes  an  additional  solution  to  fight  against  impunity  in Darfur, the creation 
of a hybrid court to complement the action of the ICC. It is not an alternative to the ICC. It is 
meant to address those cases that the ICC will not deal with. Of course, these hybrid courts, if 
established, would face the huge challenge of actually prosecuting members of the army and 
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police inside the Sudan, who benefit from de jure and de fact immunity, and with the huge 
challenge of protecting witnesses. 
 
The leaderships of Secretary‐General Ban Ki‐Moon, President Thabo Mbeki and former 
Secretary‐General Kofi Annan are remarkable demonstrations of progress of the Rome Statute 
system. It is a good moment for the Kampala review conference. 
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Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, 
 
I am pleased that we can meet in advance of the Kampala Conference, which, as the President 
said, is a seminal event in the further reinforcement of the international justice system. 
 
There are many reasons for celebration. We will arrive in Kampala with 111 States Parties, 
regular interaction with the UN Security Council, as well with strong relations with non‐States 
Parties, governmental and non‐governmental organizations, and with the common understanding 
that the ICC is a fully operational Court. 
 
In a few years, the Court has become a part of the international landscape. 
 
The delegates of 1998 put a new design on paper, an innovative design to manage violence in the 
world. 2010 is different. You can take stock of the successful implementation of the Rome system, 
and decide how to strengthen the system. 
 
As the President said, the Court will not be involved in any way in definition of, or amendments to 
the law. Legislative powers belong to States. But we can contribute to the stock‐taking exercise. 
The facilitators did a tremendous work preparing the ground for our meeting in Kampala. I would 
like to thank them and present some comments on the four issues to be discussed there, starting 
with the role of victims. 
 
The Rome Statute establishes victims as actors in the system, not just passive recipients of justice. 
Victims are critically important during the preliminary examination phase, helping my Office to 
select situations to investigate. We have received thousands of communications in accordance 
with Article 15 of the Statute. Gravity of crimes against victims is the single most important 
criterion in the selection process of situations and cases. My Office will continue to fully respect 
their rights to participate in the Court’s proceedings. We recently published our policy paper on 
victims’ participation, designed to ensure a consistent and clear approach of the Office. 
 
If I had one wish to add to the list of expected achievements in Kampala, it would be to ensure 
that victims are given in peace processes the same role that they have in proceedings in the 
Court. They should be listened to. In Rome, States were mindful that “during the 20th   century 
millions of children, women and men have been victims of unimaginable atrocities” and they 
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“recognized that such grave crimes threaten the peace, security and well‐being of the world”. The 
UN  Security  Council  has  also  recognized  the  importance  of  victims,  in particular women, in 
conflict resolution and peace processes, first in Resolution 1325 (2000) and in subsequent 
resolutions. But the practice is different. Victims of sexual and gender violence and child soldiers 
are now listened to in the courtrooms. But we don’t see them yet at the negotiating table. Their 
rights are ignored. Could I ask the delegations in Kampala to ensure that the principles established 
in the Preamble of the Rome Statute and in the UN resolutions are implemented? 
 
Let me now turn to cooperation and complementarity. The Rome Statute is an agreement 
between States, based on these two principles: complementarity and cooperation. 
 
As the President said, cooperation is forthcoming. 85 per cent of my Office’s requests for 
cooperation to States Parties and non‐States Parties receive positive answers. This is a highly 
satisfactory rate. States are fulfilling their legal duties, and including cooperation to punish and 
prevent massive crimes in their policies. 
 
But, as stressed by the facilitators and emphasized by the President of the Court, one remaining 
challenge is to arrest individuals when they are protected by active militias or when they use the 
state apparatus to commit massive crimes. Kampala is an opportunity to refine our strategy to face 
this challenge. I would encourage you to add the following key points to your pledges in Kampala: 
a. Public  and  diplomatic  support  to  execute  arrest  warrants issued by the 
Court; 
b. Severance of non‐essential contacts with persons who are the object of an 
ICC arrest warrant; 
c. Cutting off all supply networks to such persons; and  
d. Providing concrete support for arrest operations. 
 
Regarding positive complementarity, the Office of the Prosecutor has adopted a proactive policy. 
Our cooperation with Germany regarding the recent case against an FDLR leader in the DRC 
situation is one example of this approach. We are ready to discuss in Kampala how to further 
develop various forms of judicial interaction with States Parties and non‐States Parties. As the 
President said, in the DRC, there are judges and prosecutors willing to investigate and prosecute  
cases,  but  they  need  protection,  for  themselves  and  for  the witnesses. 
 
With regard to peace and justice, the stock‐taking exercise in Kampala will provide an occasion to 
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confirm the States’ commitment to end impunity for the  perpetrators  of  the  most  serious  
crimes,  thus  contributing  to  the prevention of such crimes. The failure to act during the 
Rwandan genocide provided the impetus in Rome to transform the pledge of “never again” from 
a moral promise to a legal standard. 
 
This is a new reality, and we have to adjust to it. In fact, we are. This principle has been put into 
practice, among others, by two high level representatives of the African Union, former South 
African President Thabo Mbeki and former UN Secretary‐General Kofi Annan; both have stressed 
the need to ensure justice in their work in Darfur and Kenya to end recurring violence. Both need 
the full support of the 111 States Parties. If we are committed, certainty of investigations and 
prosecutions for the most serious crimes will deter future crimes. 
 
The best example is Kenya. Justice for the post‐electoral violence in Kenya will ensure a 
peaceful election in 2012. Additionally, it will send a clear message for the 15 elections to come in 
the region: violence during electoral times cannot be a tool to retain or to gain power; but it is a 
sure avenue towards a one‐way ticket for prison in The Hague. That is the message we need to 
send it Kampala. 
 
Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, Let me conclude. 
Since 1998, the Rome Statute was adopted, the Security Council referred a situation to the Court, 
and the Court issued its decisions on individual cases. The situation is clear. Kampala is an 
opportunity for States to demonstrate their consistent support for the new legal framework 
established in Rome, for a renewed commitment to protect the rights of the victims of the most 
serious crimes. 
 
Let  me  conclude  by  thanking  the  Government  of  Uganda  in  providing  a venue for the Review 
Conference in Africa, a leading continent in the fight against impunity. As an example, I met last 
week with the President of Tanzania Jakaya Kikwete and I was struck by the forward‐looking ideas 
he plans  to  put  forward  in  Kampala,  including  on  the  future  of the  Arusha facilities to assist 
in the work of the Court in Africa. 
 
Thank you. I look forward to seeing you in Kampala in a month. 
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Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, 
 
As the President said, it has been a truly eventful half year since we last met. I will take 
advantage of his detailed report on our judicial activities to focus on a specific issue: the 
evaluation of the efficiency, effectiveness and the economy of the Office of the Prosecutor. 
 
The Assembly of States Parties (ASP) is analyzing the possible overlapping of its subsidiary  
bodies  in  fulfilling  its  management  oversight  role,  and  the  Hague Working Group is active 
on this matter. Last September, it held a special meeting where the President of the Court 
explained the final Court’s decision on internal governance,  as  well  as  the  preparation  of  a  
new  report  on  Court‐ASP  relations, hoping that this report would serve as a good starting 
point for discussions. The President also expressed his personal commitment to lead this 
process and to make it a success.  The Office welcomes this important discussion; it is a 
critical part of the development of this innovative institution. Personally, this is one of the 
priorities for my last 19 months as the Prosecutor.  I commit to providing the relevant 
information allowing States Parties to make their decisions. To paraphrase the President, 
States may not agree with all points of our approach, but clarity on the Office of the 
Prosecutor’s views can help move the discussion forward. 
 
Since September 2003, the public policy of the Office of the Prosecutor is to ensure cost 
efficiency. Each year, the Office presents a budget with the activities that it will perform. After 
the ASP approves the budget, the performance of the activities programmed should be the 
primary indicator of the efficiency, effectiveness and economy of the Office. 
 
I prepared a chart to show you the different assumptions during the last four years. 
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The  only  unfulfilled  assumption  is  the  2008  trial  and  is  connected  with  the  first 
decision to stay the proceedings in the Lubanga case. This was an important long 
term investment that built the legitimacy of the Court. This is a Court of justice, 
where the law and the rights of the parties are taken seriously. That is why non‐ 
States Parties   such   as   Russia,   Rwanda,   China   and   the   USA,   and   regional 
organizations such as the Arab League work closely with us. That is why leaders involved 
in atrocities are fiercely attacking us. 
 
Since  then,  you  will  note  that  the  Office’s  activities  have  constantly  been  in 
accordance with, or even exceeded, the activities budgeted for. 
 
During  2010,  we  started  two  unforeseen  investigations  in  Kenya  and  we  are  not using 
the contingency fund. 
 
We are increasing efficiency, doing more with the same amount of money. You can also 
see that for 2011, the OTP has requested a reduction of 0.2%. States will define our 
budget, and we will independently implement it in the best possible way, with the 
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necessary oversight. Let me present a different dimension of the efficiency, effectiveness 
and economy. 
 
President Song has explained in the past that the Court itself is just one part of the justice 
system. The other parts, such as States, international organizations and civil society are 
needed to make the system effective. 
 
As in any court, the Judges make the final decisions on the criminal responsibility of the 
accused. But as in no other Court, the Judges decisions will have an impact on the 
citizens and the institutions of 114 States and beyond. We need to include these two 
dimensions in our conversations about effectiveness and efficiency. 
 
A good example is the investigations into the FDLR (Forces démocratiques de libération du 
Rwanda). 
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They  were  carried  out  in  cooperation  with  different  States  Parties,  such  as  the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and France, as well as non‐States Parties, such as 
Rwanda, and proactive activities of Germany, which is conducting national proceedings 
against the President and Vice‐President of the FDLR. This is the first case in which the 
Office provided information to national authorities to carry out proceedings, thus 
implementing our policy of positive complementarity. 
 
 
 
 
 
The  results  of  our  investigations  in  the  Kenya  situation  will  be  presented  to  the Judges 
in December. We are preparing two cases against six individuals. These cases could have a 
critical role to play in preventing violence in the next election in Kenya and in another fifteen 
countries of the region. Just last Friday, in anticipation of the presidential   elections   on   7   
November,   Guinean   Minister   of   Justice   Col.   Siba Loholamou stated that any violence 
will be punished, including in accordance with the Rome Statute. 
 
These few examples illustrate that the Rome Statute established a complex system of justice,  
where  different  organs,  States  and  institutions  have  a  singular  role  to perform in 
coordination with each other. 
 
 
Respecting the mandate and independence of the Office of the Prosecutor is the best way to 
ensure the efficiency, effectiveness and the economy of the innovative system of justice 
created in Rome and celebrated in Kampala. 
 
I will now pass the floor to Mme Registrar. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
147 
 
Appendix R: 20th diplomatic briefing 
 
 
 
 
 
Luis Moreno‐Ocampo 
Prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Court 
 
Remarks to the 20th 
Diplomatic Briefing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Hague 8 April 2011 
Check against Delivery 
 
148 
 
Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, 
 
As the President stressed, the second UN Security Council referral demonstrates a growing trust 
on the role of the Court. There was no discussion or hesitation. The matter was referred as 
a normal activity. It was not just for the Libya situation: the UN Security Council Resolution 1975 
(2011) of 30 March on Côte d’Ivoire also took note of the Court’s activities. 
 
I would like to brief you on activities of the Office in these two situations. 
 
As the Prosecutor, my first responsibility was to conduct a preliminary examination regarding the 
situation in  Libya. It is important to note that in accordance with Article 53 of the Rome Statute, 
when the Office receives a referral it shall initiate an investigation, unless there is no reasonable 
basis to do so. As opposed to the Sudan situation, there was no indication of national 
proceedings. We moved fast, and the Office opened the investigation on 3 March. 
 
We immediately created a team of about ten investigators, most of them fluent in Arabic, 
reallocating resources from different investigative teams on a provisional basis. The Office is 
applying for the Contingency Fund for the Libya situation. We showed the Court was ready to 
immediately start a new investigation. 
 
We are focusing the first investigation on a few specific incidents that occurred in the first ten days 
of the conflict. We have been able to collect strong evidence on two different aspects: 
1.   A  specific Libyan  regime  policy  to  attack  civilians;  after  the  Tunisia  and  Egypt situations, 
they were planning how to control demonstrations in Libya; 
2.   Incidents where unarmed civilians were attacked by security forces. 
 
The Office is now focusing on identifying those who bear the greatest criminal responsibility for 
the crimes committed. We are very advanced. 
 
We are paying particular attention to the security conditions. The Office is avoiding contacting any 
person that could be attacked by Libya’s security forces. We rely on evidence provided by persons 
that are not subject to any foreseeable risk for them or their family, in Tripoli or in other places. 
We are very selective of the persons we approach. We do not want to place persons under the 
Court’s protection system. It is a matter of efficiency, and it is a matter of respect for the lives of 
the witnesses. This is my duty. 
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The Office of the Prosecutor is deeply concerned about the situation of civilians in Tripoli in 
particular, and other cities under the control of the regime. Internal Security Forces carried out a 
policy of arrests and forcible disappearances against those who they consider as not loyal, 
because they participated in the demonstrations, as well as regime critics and individuals who had 
communicated with foreign journalists and human rights organizations. This is also why we are 
avoiding contact with them. 
 
The Office of the Prosecutor is progressing fast because it is receiving cooperation from many 
sources, including Interpol and many States Parties. We are also in contact with the  Commission  
of  Inquiry  created  by  the  UN  Human  Rights  Council,  which  is planning operations. 
 
I will brief the UN Security Council on Libya on 4 May; to increase predictability and respect its 
prerogatives, I will inform the Council of my next steps, including the time that  my  Office  will  
present  the  evidence  before  the  Judges  and  request  an  arrest warrant. 
 
It is important that States start discussing how to implement an arrest warrant in the Libya context 
if the Judges issue such a warrant. States can decide whether implementing an arrest operation is 
a matter for the Libyans, or if the international community can help. I don’t see a reason to wait to 
have an arrest warrant in order to start the discussions and plan. 
 
Let me emphasize: I am confident that we will present a first request for an arrest warrant in a few 
weeks. The Judges will decide. If they agree, States should have a plan. 
 
In subsequent investigations, we will look at other alleged crimes, including rapes, abductions, 
forced disappearances, forced displacement and torture. 
 
Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, 
 
Let me focus now on Côte d’Ivoire. 
 
On 1st   October 2003, the then Government of Côte d’Ivoire submitted a declaration under 
Article 12(3) of the Statute, accepting the jurisdiction of the Court for crimes committed on its 
territory as of 19 September 2002. Since then, my Office has been conducting a preliminary 
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examination, monitoring the crimes in this situation. 
 
Since December 2010, there have been consistent allegations of new crimes under the jurisdiction 
of the Court committed in the aftermath of the presidential runoff. 
 
Recently, on 18 December 2010, we received a new Article 12(3) declaration, this time signed by 
President Ouattara, committing himself to cooperate with the Court. 
 
In the meantime, the Office has reminded all parties to the conflict that any attack against 
civilians should be investigated and prosecuted. The Office is working in close collaboration with 
the UN, ECOWAS and different States concerned with the situation. 
 
We have received information from Mr. Ouattara and Mr. Gbagbo, as well as from other 
sources. We will also liaise with the UN Commission of Inquiry to ensure effective coordination. 
 
We are progressing in our preliminary examination activities, but let me clear: a declaration under 
Article 12(3) is not a referral. To start an investigation, I should request authorization from 
the Pre‐Trial Chamber in accordance with Article 15. Therefore, a referral would expedite our 
activities. Some States Parties are analyzing whether to refer the situation to the Prosecutor. 
 
Côte d’Ivoire could be an opportunity to assist national authorities to develop a comprehensive 
program of justice, reconciliation and development. Again, States’ plans will be required; the Office 
will contribute to the prevention of future crimes by performing its judicial activities. 
 
Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, 
 
Let me conclude by asking your assistance to explain the  preventative dimension of the Court. The 
Rome Statute is adding a crucial tool to the diplomatic arsenal. The work of the Court and States’ 
efforts in the situations in Libya and Côte d’Ivoire could be useful to draw a permanent line: 
leaders cannot commit atrocities to gain or retain power. There will be no impunity for such 
behavior. 
 
This line will help the understanding that this new tool could potentially save hundreds of thousands 
of lives and billions in money, avoiding new conflicts, and this should be factored in. 
151 
 
 
What is happening in  Guinea is a clear example of this. 
 
We are working with the national authorities and some States concerned to ensure justice  for  the  
crimes  committed  during  the  28  September  2009  events.  As  a consequence, there were 
concerted efforts promoting national investigations, and there was a peaceful election. 
 
Last week, the Office led its fourth mission to Guinea to follow‐up on the on‐going national 
investigations and link up with the newly established authorities. The delegation of the Office met 
with the President of Guinea, Mr. Alpha Condé, the Prime Minister, Mr. Mohamed Saïd Fofana, and 
the Minister of Justice, Mr. Christian Sow. All the top authorities of Guinea confirmed their 
commitment to justice and accountability, including in particular for the crimes committed on 28 
September 2009. 
 
I would appreciate if you could assist us explaining this new idea in your diplomatic activities. Even 
though it is in the Rome Statute, it is not yet fully perceived and understood.  This  is  what  the  UN  
Secretary‐General  is  calling  the  “shadow”  of  the Court, and its value should be better 
evaluated. This is the most efficient way the Court’s efforts can help stop new violence. 
 
Let me finish. 
 
To ensure this preventative impact, to guarantee the legitimacy of the Court in the years and 
decades to come, a clear  external governance system is needed. The President expressed the 
importance of the work on external governance for the Court. The President has the full support of 
the Office of the Prosecutor: when he speaks, the Court speaks. 
 
I will now pass the floor to Mme Registrar. 
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Excellencies, 
 
Ladies and Gentlemen, 
 
As indicated by the President, the activities in the Courtroom are progressing. The Lubanga 
decision is coming, and today, the last testimony in the Katanga/Ngudjolo trial is starting. The 
progress in the latter trial shows that the Court is increasing its efficiency with each case. 
 
At this meeting, however, I would like to highlight some other Court decisions, which go beyond 
the responsibility of individuals; decisions that affect the management of conflicts. States can learn 
how Court decisions offer possibilities. 
 
The Chamber’s decision for the confirmation of charges against Callixte Mbarushimana could have 
an enormous influence on the demobilization of the FDLR. 
 
The  confirmation  of  charges  hearing  in  the  Kenya  cases  was  followed  by  all  the Kenyans. 
They see that very senior public figures have to provide explanations to the judges. The ICC judges 
become public figures in Kenya and the judicial process is perceived as fair and is seen as crucial for 
preventing future violence in this country. 
 
Let  me  focus  on  the  incumbent  Prosecutor’s  decisions  on  Darfur,  Libya  and  Côte d’Ivoire 
that could have impact on the ground, on the way that States involved manage conflicts and on 
the budget. 
 
In Darfur, the Court issued arrest warrants against Ahmad Harun and Ali Kushayb for the crimes 
committed against 4 million civilians during 2003/4. After, the Court includes such attacks in the 
arrest warrants against President Al Bashir. The Office completed the collection of evidence that 
exposes the responsibility of one individual who is in the chain of command between President 
Al Bashir and Ahmad Harun. The Office will present a new case before the end of the month. I will 
brief the UN Security Council on 
15 December. 
 
In Côte d’Ivoire, the Court again contributes to stability. Three weeks ago I visited Côte d’Ivoire, 
and I met with the authorities, the opposition parties, the Truth, Dialogue and Reconciliation 
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Commission and civil society. We requested cooperation and we confirmed our duty to 
investigate crimes allegedly committed by all the parties of the conflict. The Prime Minister will be 
present at the coming ASP to show the commitment of the country with such impartial approach. 
This does not mean that the Office will present all cases at the same time; rather, the Office will 
follow a sequential approach. 
 
The Office was closely following the alleged crimes committed since December 2010 during its 
preliminary examination phase, facilitating the planning of a series of short and very targeted 
investigations. 
 
In Libya, the current focus of the Office’s investigations is twofold: firstly, it continues the 
collection of evidence against Saif Al‐Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al‐Senussi in preparation for 
their eventual trial. It is up to the UN Security Council and States to ensure that they face justice 
for the crimes for which they are charged. Secondly, the Office is continuing its investigations into 
gender crimes in Libya. Preliminary evidence collected so far indicate that hundreds of women 
were raped and the involvement of high ranking officials in the commission of gender crimes 
including sexual violence and rapes. 
 
The death of Muammar Gaddafi has not changed the activities of the Office. The Pre‐ Trial 
Chamber considered that “Muammar Gaddafi and Saif Al‐Islam are both mutually responsible as 
principals to the crimes” and most of the witnesses refer to activities that include  both  of  them.  
Even  if  witnesses  can  only  speak  about  the  actual  role  of Muammar Gaddafi,  the  Office  
still  has  to  conduct  the  interviews  in  order  to  find exonerating evidence against the other. 
 
Further investigations could also be necessary for other crimes allegedly committed by the  
different parties in  Libya since 15  February 2011. Here, the Office will  take  in consideration 
that the new Libyan authorities are in the process of preparing a comprehensive strategy to 
address crimes, including the circumstances surrounding the death of Muammar Gaddafi.  In 
accordance with the Rome Statute the Court should not intervene if there are genuine national 
proceedings. The Commission of Inquiry will moreover present a report in March 2011. The Office 
will be prepared to present a comprehensive report on the crimes allegedly committed by the 
different parties in Libya since 15 February 2011 and the existence of genuine national 
proceedings, during its third briefing to the UN Security Council in May 2012. In this sense, around 
€1.2 million required in the current budget for this third investigation could be removed from 
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the normal budget and presented in an annex. 
 
Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, 
 
Let me provide some general references to cost efficiency. Mme Registrar will inform you more 
precise about the budget of the Court. 
 
The public policy of the Office of the Prosecutor, confirmed by its Policy paper of September 
2003, has been to focus its investigations and prosecution on those bearing the greatest 
responsibility for the most serious crimes, based on the evidence collected. 
 
This policy is based on statutory scheme limiting the Court’s jurisdiction to the most 
serious crimes of concern to the international community, ensure a high impact on the prevention 
of future crimes and promote cost efficiency. 
 
The Office can handle concurrently several situations while respecting its limited resources; the 
budget would have to be duplicated or triplicated with an expansive prosecution policy. 
 
The debate about a Court case driven or resource driven was solved by the adoption of the 
contingency fund. That creative solution allows the Office this year to carry out its investigation 
into the unforeseen Libya situation. 
 
The  Office  presented a  budget  proposal amounting to  €31.8  million  for  2012.  This 
comprised €5.36 million for the 2012 case assumptions in the situation of Libya, referred to the 
Court by the UN Security Council earlier this year, and an amount of €26.4 million for the “other 
cases” already before the Office prior to the Libya referral (Uganda, DRC, CAR, Darfur and Kenya). 
Accordingly, the Office was able to present a 0.5% below zero nominal growth budget compared to 
the 2011 budget for the “other cases”. 
 
The Office is faced, for the first time, with the possibility that investigations cannot proceed due 
to resource constraints. The CBF proposal would entail a change to the previously agreed 
structures, and will transform the decision making. Some cases will not be investigated because 
budgetary constraints. Changing the model of the Court from a case driven to a resource driven 
one, is more than a budget issue, it is a legal and strategic question. 
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To conclude, let me take advantage that so many Ambassadors are present here, to respectfully 
present some problems in our debates in The Hague Working Group. 
 
The Working Group is having discussions dealing with governance; these are of crucial importance 
to the Office. 
 
The Office considers that the oversight role of the ASP should be consistent with the Statute in 
accordance with which the Prosecutor is accountable but independent to the ASP; and the staff of 
the OTP is accountable only to the Prosecutor and not to the ASP or its subsidiary bodies. 
 
In the discussions on the Independent Oversight Mechansim, the Office held the view that the 
suggested “three pronged” approach circumvents the ASP resolution and has no legal basis in 
the Statute. 
 
Discussions should be based on legal merits. The Office is prepared to present additional 
information at the appropriate time. 
 
 
Thank you 
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Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, 
 
Thank you for being here today. 
 
This is my first opportunity to brief you as Prosecutor of the International Criminal  Court,  as 
three  months have  passed  since  I  assumed  office.  Before anything, let me join President Song 
in offering my sincere condolences to the families,  friends  and  colleagues  of  the  US  
Ambassador  and  staff  who  so tragically died in Benghazi. Allow me also to thank you once more 
for the privilege, responsibility and vote of confidence bestowed upon me by the Assembly  of  
States  Parties  and  the  wider  international  community,  and  to express my gratitude for the 
honour to continue to serve international justice. 
 
As President Song mentioned in his statement, this Court has witnessed many changes in the 
recent months, which have been an intense period. I personally alia spoke at two gender 
seminars in The Hague, earlier this month; I was invited to travel for official visits to Senegal and 
Nigeria, in July, where I amongst others met with the respective Presidents; and my Office also 
opened a preliminary examination into the situation of Mali, following the visit by a delegation 
from Mali, led by the Minister of Justice, on 18 July, formally requesting an investigation. 
 
These are just a few examples. But I mention them, as they relate to some of the priorities I 
have identified for my tenure as Prosecutor. 
 
I should also add here that last week, I submitted to the Assembly of States Parties the names 
of the three candidates for the position of Deputy Prosecutor. Following an extensive process, the 
following candidates were selected: Ms Raija Toiviainen (Finland); Mr Paul Rutledge (Australia); and 
Mr James Stewart (Canada). These candidates were selected from a pool of 120 applicants. 
This nomination is a culmination of an extensive interview process, which was conducted by myself 
and my Office with outside assistance. The process, which started in May 2012, included an initial 
screening, written test, oral presentations, face-to-face interviews as well as interaction with 
Senior Managers and Trial Lawyers  within  the  Office.  Allow  me  to  stress  here  that  all  
interviewed candidates were of very high quality. I selected the candidates that possess the 
capabilities and qualities of an excellent Deputy Prosecutor, taking into account the requirements 
of article 42 paragraph 3 of the Statute and my vision for the Office. 
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Of course, the list of pressing issues for me as Prosecutor is long, but one important goal I have 
set is to ensure that the Office delivers high quality and efficient  investigations and  prosecutions,  
which  are  at  the  heart  of what  my Office does. Next to focusing on actually doing those 
investigations and prosecutions, I also want to reflect on how we can further improve them. 
We have already defined our basic standards on how we do the investigations with the issuing of 
our operational manual but I now want to further improve those standards aiming at defining 
what could be commonly accepted standards for doing international investigations. For that 
purpose, I am reaching out to the other international tribunals, to international organizations 
like Interpol and to the law enforcement community in general. With the first trials coming to an 
end and the lessons learned exercises that the Court is embarking upon, my plan is to further 
consolidate our prosecutorial standards in the operational manual. 
 
Specifically, regarding our investigations, we have an obligation and a duty to focus our 
attention on sexual and gender violence. As it can be a challenge to gather evidence of these 
crimes in some contexts, we will continue to look for innovative methods for the collection of 
evidence to bring these crimes to Court in a way that will ensure their prosecution and will 
respect and protect the victims. 
 
The Office will continue to pursue the gender crimes and crimes against children defined in the 
Rome Statute and the Office will do so systematically. In so doing, I would like to strengthen the 
cooperation between my Office and civil society.  My  Office  will  continue  to  periodically  and  
consistently  revisit  its policies and practices regarding sexual and gender crimes, to ensure 
effective prosecution of these crimes and always striving to do it even better. I hope to finalize a 
gender policy paper soon. 
 
The appointment of Brigid Inder as the new Special Gender Adviser of the Office will also help 
to get strategic advice on sexual and gender-based violence, together of course with the strong 
team I have within the Office. 
 
During my tenure, I also want to contribute to the Court’s efforts to strengthen the Court’s 
relationship with Africa. Mali is the fourth African State to refer a situation to the Office of the 
Prosecutor. ECOWAS also officially supported the Office’s intervention in Mali. I am proud of this 
support as well as the commitment to this Court expressed by the African continent. I will continue 
to seek the support of all States Parties, including  in Africa. Already plans are underway for 
my visit to Addis Ababa to meet the new Chairperson of the AU. 
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I also want to continue to clarify the process of the Office’s preliminary examinations, and 
ensure transparency in  the decisions. For me, preliminary examinations are key elements of 
OTP activities, as they can provide early opportunity, through contacts with relevant authorities as 
well as public information, to encourage national proceedings and prevent recurrence of violence. 
In the coming months the Office will, similar to last year, publish a report on all its preliminary 
examinations, as well as a comprehensive report on the preliminary examination in Colombia. 
 
Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, 
 
In general, the relationships of the Office, within and outside the Court, are important to me. In 
these relations, the Office’s independence as the cornerstone of the Rome Statute system should 
at all times be respected and protected, in particular by States Parties. The system established by 
the Rome Statute is based on the concept of independent judicial activity. Without its 
independence, the Court risks losing its value. 
 
This however does not mean that the Office  is an  isolated organ. On the contrary. The 
efficiency of the Court and of this Office relies on the cooperation it receives from the  
international  community.  After  ten  years in  operation,  the Court and its States Parties have 
established a system that is operational. Assistance is largely forthcoming. But in order to 
maximise the Court’s role and impact, as well as to improve the Court’s effectiveness, it needs the 
sustained cooperation of all the States Parties to the Statute, in particular when it comes to 
arresting individuals sought by the Court. In this light it is also perhaps worth recalling the 66 
recommendations formulated by the Bureau in 2007. Strategies and efforts to ensure the arrest 
and surrender of those individuals against whom arrest warrants have been issued must remain 
at the top of the political agenda of all States Parties. The cost of impunity is simply too high. 
 
Bosco Ntaganda’s continued presence in the Kivu provinces is a high risk; the international 
community needs to support the efforts of the Government of Uganda to arrest the leaders of the 
Lord’s Resistance Army. The Government of Sudan has consistently failed in its responsibility to 
cooperate with the Court and to arrest and surrender the individuals sought by the Court in 
relation to the situation in Darfur. The collective community of States therefore should now 
consider what measures can be taken to ensure execution of the arrest warrants short of military 
intervention. 
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On a separate note, but similarly related to the support by the Assembly of States Parties, I 
would like to join President Song in mentioning the resources of the  Court.  We  are  all  aware  of  
the  very  difficult  economic  environment, including for the States Parties, and also aware of the 
very difficult budget discussions last year. 
 
Throughout the years, the Court, including the Office of the Prosecutor, has consistently found 
creative ways to ensure and increase efficiency and find savings. For the Office, in addition to the 
operational manual and standardized policies, the rotational model of moving teams across cases 
depending on needs has in particular created cost benefits through efficiency gains. However 
with ever increasing Court activities, we have reached the limits of our absorptive capacity; the 
2013 proposed budget is the minimal and reflects the Court’s efforts to cut down on costs. Any 
additional cuts will have considerable impacts on Office’s capacity to do its work and fulfill its 
mandate given by States. I would therefore encourage positive attitude of delegates in the 
discussions on the budget, knowing that justice is a worthwhile and relatively inexpensive 
investment in the future. 
 
Excellencies,Ladies and Gentlemen, 
 
With the necessary support from the States Parties, in the coming months and years, the Office 
of the Prosecutor will continue to improve the quality of its prosecutions. The decision of Trial 
Chamber I sentencing Thomas Lubanga to 14 years   imprisonment, as well as the decision on the 
reparations principles and proceedings, which the President mentioned earlier, are a great 
incentive to continue our prosecution in our other cases. 
 
In The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, the judgment is expected 
to be delivered hopefully before the end of this year, and in The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo, presentation of evidence by the defence started on 14 August 2012, within a total 
timeframe of up to 8 months set by the Trial Chamber. 
 
As we prepare for trial in April next year for the two Kenya cases, we continue to face huge 
security and witness intimidation issues in Kenya. We can also do with much better cooperation 
from the Government of Kenya. 
 
As the President also mentioned, we are awaiting to hear what will be the new date for the 
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commencement of the confirmation of charges hearing in the case against Laurent Gbagbo, and 
the same goes for the trial date in the case of The Prosecutor  v.  Abdallah  Banda Abakaer  
Nourain  and  Saleh  Mohammed  Jerbo Jamus regarding the attack of the AU peacekeepers in 
Haskanita in Darfur. 
 
All in all, it is safe to say that there will be sufficient work ahead of us. I hope I may count on 
your cooperation and support throughout these activities of the Office and more. 
 
Thank you for your attention. 
 
